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Abstract 
 
Operating Outside of Empire: Trading Citizenship in the Atlantic World, 1783-1815, 
looks at markets and ships as spaces for negotiation between merchants and the state. The 
dissertation follows the experiences of former British colonists in America who won 
independence and then immediately tried to find a way to get back into the British empire. For 
American merchants, such as Nicholas Low, William Constable, and Thomas Handasyd Perkins, 
the inconsistently-governed Caribbean provided an entry point to the greater British Atlantic and 
the markets of the empire. These merchants won access by exploiting the opportunities offered 
by environmental catastrophes, slave rebellions and trade wars.  
The dissertation approaches the trade in identity through five chapters that trace the 
connections formed between transatlantic merchants and their relationship to an increasingly 
intrusive and powerful state apparatus. By taking citizenship and belonging in a new direction, 
the dissertation looks at the ways in which commerce reshaped nationality and challenged what it 
meant to be a citizen in the Atlantic World. Before the idea of the nation was fully formed, 
merchants, statesmen, and philosophers offered an alternative conception of belonging and 
nationality that was much more fluid and malleable. By focusing on information as a valuable 
commodity, the dissertation shows how letters filled with rumors and gossip sustained an 
economy without the official support of a government monopoly and even in opposition to the 
Royal Navy. It was through their discussions of demand and opportunity that merchants 
participated in debates about the nature of commerce, the loyalty of the citizen, and the role of 
the state in regulating national identity and international trade.  
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Introduction 
On November 1, 1797, an American vessel known as The Indian Chief arrived in the port 
of Cowes. Mr. Hewlet, The Indian Chief’s supercargo, had stopped in Cowes for the latest 
commercial news when his ship was promptly seized by British authorities under suspicion of 
having violated the law by trading with His Majesty’s enemies. The ship had just completed a 
global voyage. Having left London in 1795, Hewlet directed The Indian Chief to the Portuguese 
island of Madeira, undoubtedly to fill its hold with that island’s namesake wine, before 
continuing on to the English East India Company’s outpost at Madras. From Madras, Hewlet 
stopped in Dutch Batavia and then proceeded to return to England for further instructions on the 
best market to sell his newly obtained wares. By flagrantly sailing across three empires in the 
midst of the bloody French Revolutionary Wars, this one vessel seemed to challenge not only 
Britain’s exclusive hold on India, but the entire mercantilist system which underpinned all 
European overseas empires. However, when The Indian Chief found itself before the British 
High Court of Admiralty on February 27, 1801, the captors defended their prize not by 
emphasizing The Indian Chief’s proclivity for smashing through imperial markets, but instead by 
harping on the alleged British identity of the ship and its owner. At first, this appeared to be a 
peculiar tactic as The Indian Chief’s owner, Joshua Johnson, was the former American consul to 
London. Johnson, who was born in America, had resided in London as a merchant since 1771. 
Johnson had only left England in 1797 (two years after The Indian Chief left port) and the 
captors believed that his twenty-six year residence in the country made Johnson a British 
merchant, despite his official status as an American agent.  
According to the captors, Johnson was a British subject whose business with The Indian 
Chief violated his obligations as a subject of the crown. The court eventually sided with Johnson, 
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whose representatives in court argued that Johnson was in the process of moving permanently 
from England during The Indian Chief’s voyage. Judge Sir William Scott agreed, arguing in his 
ruling for the restitution of the vessel that Johnson was to be “considered as an American,” from 
the very moment when he “set foot on board the vessel to return to America.”1 According to the 
court, Johnson was in fact a British merchant by residence, but the act of leaving the country had 
transformed his identity.     
Cases like that of The Indian Chief reveal the multiplicity of interpretations of nationality 
and belonging that were still possible at the end of the eighteenth century. Despite the 
nationalizing impulses of the Age of Revolution, trade was an activity through which merchants 
and states constantly reshaped the definition of national identity.2 Merchants used the 
marketplace to trade in identity and select the most appropriate nationality to safeguard their 
profits. Those self-fashioned voyages often came into contact with the state when merchant 
vessels were caught by privateers and hauled before the admiralty courts. In the courtroom, 
merchant transnationality came into conflict with privateers and the state, each of which had a 
unique and evolving understanding of national identity. 
Operating Outside of Empire: Trading Citizenship in the Atlantic World, 1783-1815, 
examines markets and ships as spaces for negotiation between merchants and the state. This 
study follows the experiences of former British colonists in America who had just won 
independence and then immediately tried to find a way to get back into the British empire. For 
American merchants, the inconsistently-governed Caribbean provided an entry point to the 
                                                 
1 The Indian Chief, 27 Feb. 1801, see, Christopher Robinson, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the High 
Court of Admiralty, 1798-[1808], vol. 3 (London: A. Strahan, 1802), 12–21. 
2 My approach to the Age of Revolution embraces the broad chronological and geographical framework adopted by 
Subrahmanyam and Armitage, see, Sanjay Subrahmanyam and David Armitage, eds., The Age of Revolutions in 
Global Context, c. 1760-1840 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
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greater British Atlantic and the markets of the empire. They won access by exploiting the 
opportunities offered by environmental catastrophes, slave rebellions and trade wars. For the first 
ten years of independence, Americans maneuvered around restrictive trade regulations through 
subterfuge, intermediary ports, and outright smuggling.  
The period bracketed between the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars brought 
new challenges and opportunities for American merchants, who faced increasing scrutiny as 
neutral carriers in hostile waters. American nationality, while undefined, became a liability as 
British and French authorities suspected the American flag of covering enemy property. When 
American sea captains left home waters they were forced to negotiate with foreign merchants, 
naval officers, and admiralty court judges to justify their national identity and the legitimacy of 
their neutral commerce. By the turn of the century, state reforms had closed regulatory loopholes 
and rationalized the administration of the empire, effectively constricting foreign contact with 
the British colonies. Armed with these weapons of economic warfare, British privateers seized 
vessels based on the mere suspicion that American ships intended to venture towards blockaded 
enemy ports. Ultimately, the Royal Navy’s supremacy in the Atlantic provided the British a 
chance to increase drastically the scale of Britain’s economic dominance through the licensing of 
all commercial activity. In other words, precisely at the moment that historians traditionally 
claim that “economic liberalism” gained traction over mercantilist systems, the British 
introduced a new system wherein the state could control free enterprise by forcing Atlantic 
merchants to pay to play. After twenty-five years of independence, American commerce once 
again operated under the umbrella of the British Empire. Peace may have brought America’s 
political separation from Europe, but economic interdependence persisted well into the middle of 
the nineteenth century.  
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This study brings into focus the Caribbean as the center of European negotiations over 
trade, citizenship, and empire. While focusing on the Atlantic as a field of inquiry, it views the 
ocean as a conduit, which allowed merchant practices to flow into a wider world that 
increasingly experienced the effects of consumer globalization since the sixteenth century. My 
research traces the connections formed between transatlantic merchants and their relationship to 
an intrusive and powerful state apparatus. Information was a valuable commodity, and the letters 
filled with rumor and gossip sustained an economy without the official support of a government 
monopoly. It was through their discussions of demand and opportunity that merchants 
participated in debates about the nature of legitimate commerce, the loyalty of the citizen, and 
the role of the state in regulating national identity and international trade.  
 The story of Americans operating outside of empire engages with a wide range of 
historical scholarship on identity, globalization, and the Atlantic World. As a distinct field, the 
Atlantic offers an important window into understanding the connections between individuals 
belonging to different empires, operating on the frontier, or even in imperial metropoles. The 
Atlantic World was a sphere of interaction, at the intersection of four continents, where 
commodities, people, and ideas flowed across borders despite closed imperial controls.3 Instead 
of a stateless utopia, the Atlantic World subsumed overlapping systems of governance and 
market control. Atlantic studies, then, reveal the experiences of individuals living in an early 
modern world of cross-border circulation and immense state growth.  
Work in Atlantic history has focused on the transatlantic exchange of goods, people and 
ideas. In taking this approach, scholars of the Atlantic World were inspired by Fernand Braudel’s 
groundbreaking studies on global trade and the regional unity of the Mediterranean. Braudel’s 
                                                 
3 On the Atlantic as a “sphere of interaction”, see, Nathaniel Millett, “Borderlands in the Atlantic World,” Atlantic 
Studies 10, no. 2 (2013): 268–95. 
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focus on a ‘shared sea’ and the circulation of goods and money uncovered hidden connections 
which united disparate peoples together under a common culture. Braudel’s work on climate and 
circulation has inspired scholars to consider whether the Atlantic was another shared sea.4 In 
pursuing this idea, Atlantic historians have adopted Braudel’s view of a ‘complex of seas’ in 
order to accommodate the geographic and cultural diversity of the communities which made up 
the Atlantic World.5 The ‘complex of seas’ approach has encouraged the study of several 
nationalized Atlantics (British, French, Spanish, and Dutch) which overlapped and interacted 
with one another. By looking at Atlantic worlds, the story of empire is no longer limited by 
imperial borders or even simple models of center and periphery.6  
According to Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic history is more than a composite of national 
histories, historians should instead focus on the ‘informal actuality’ that lies beneath the 
mercantilist policies of governments.7 Since David Armitage championed a methodology known 
as ‘Cis-Atlantic History’, scholars have opened our eyes to the importance of particular spaces 
and their relationship to the wider Atlantic World in order to overcome the obscuring effect of 
artificial national barriers erected by nationalist historians of the nineteenth century.8 Histories of 
                                                 
4 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 2 vols. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995); Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, 3 vols. (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1982); For a discussion of Braudel’s impact on Atlantic history, see, Alison 
Games, “Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities,” The American Historical Review 111, no. 3 
(June 2006): 741–57. 
5 On the “complex of seas” approach and its impact on the Atlantic World, see, Philip Morgan and Jack Greene, 
“Introduction: The Present State of Atlantic History,” in Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal, ed. Philip Morgan 
and Jack Greene (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 337–56. 
6 Ian Kenneth Steele, The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Kenneth J. Banks, Chasing Empire across the Sea: Communications and the 
State in the French Atlantic, 1713-1763 (Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002); Wim Klooster, Illicit 
Riches: Dutch Trade in the Caribbean, 1648-1795 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998). 
7 Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History: Concept and Contours (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 51–60. 
8 David Armitage, “Three Concepts of Atlantic History,” in The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800, ed. M.J. 
Braddick and David Armitage (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 23; For a criticism of the Atlantic history 
approach as too limited in scope and artificial in approach, see, Peter A. Coclanis, “Atlantic World or 
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port cities in particular have offered an important avenue for studying cross-border interactions 
and circuits of exchange. By focusing on an individual city’s orientation toward the sea, this 
scholarship has revealed important connections prevalent in early modern commerce despite the 
strict mercantilist barriers setup by competing European empires.9 Several chapters below 
contribute to this interest in specific ports as a meeting place for illicit exchanges by examining 
both the peripheries of empires through the neutral islands of St. Eustatius and St. 
Bartholomew’s as well as more central hubs such as Jamaica and London.  
As the most dynamic and cosmopolitan space for transnational cooperation, historians 
have identified the Greater Caribbean as a key geographical framework for understanding how 
empire worked on the ground. Works by Ernesto Bassi, John McNeill and Matthew Mulcahy 
have emphasized the fluidity of space and the unique connections which overrode traditional 
national barriers. According to Bassi, mobile subjects, such as sailors and explorers, “did not live 
lives bounded by the political geographies of the time nor were their lived experiences 
circumscribed by geographical frameworks defined after their own time.”10 Studies of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Atlantic/World?,” The William and Mary Quarterly 63, no. 4 (2006): 725–42; Peter A. Coclanis, “Beyond Atlantic 
History,” in Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal, ed. Philip Morgan and Jack Greene (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 337–56; Peter A. Coclanis, “Introduction,” in The Atlantic Economy during the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries: Organization, Operation, Practice, and Personnel, ed. Peter A. Coclanis (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2005); Also see the global approach to empire taken by Games, Games, 
“Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities.” 
9 Linda Marguerite Rupert, Creolization and Contraband: Curaçao in the Early Modern Atlantic World (Athens: 
The University of Georgia Press, 2012); Kit Candlin, The Last Caribbean Frontier, 1795-1815 (New York: 
Palgrave, 2012); Fabrício Prado, Edge of Empire: Atlantic Networks and Revolution in Bourbon Río de La Plata 
(Oakland: University of California Press, 2015); There is also increased interest in comparative studies of empires, 
see, J. H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006). 
10 Ernesto Bassi, An Aqueous Territory: Sailor Geographies and New Granada’s Transimperial Greater Caribbean 
World (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 9; Matthew Mulcahy, Hurricanes and Society in the British Greater 
Caribbean, 1624–1783 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); Matthew Mulcahy, Hubs of Empire: The 
Southeastern Lowcountry and British Caribbean (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); John Robert 
McNeill, Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620-1914 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010); Schwartz describes this approach as applying Braudel to the “circum-Caribbean region”, 
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Greater Caribbean move from the national to the transimperial, and emphasize the often 
forgotten links connecting disparate islands to the rest of the Atlantic World. The ecological 
focus of the scholarship on the Greater Caribbean is particularly relevant here as it applies 
directly to the opportunities created for extraimperial trades in the years after the American War 
of Independence.  
The call to move beyond national barriers, due to the rapid increase in international trade 
and communication, has led historians to extend the history of globalization back into the early 
modern period.11 Immanuel Wallerstein has argued for a world-system model to understand the 
transition to capitalism and the rise of the European world-economy in the modern world. The 
birth of Wallerstein’s capitalist world-system was dependent on the collapse of empires and the 
end of the early modern era. Wallerstein focused on the dynamic exchange between center and 
periphery, which has been particularly appealing for historians of the Atlantic World interested 
in the direction of trade as well as political power within imperial structures. The strict 
Wallersteinian reliance on nation-states for the formation of a global economy, however, limits 
the scope and effectiveness of the model as it relates to transnational exchange and intercultural 
experience in the Atlantic World. Further, world-system theory needs to accommodate the 
important commercial role of individual ports, over entire nations, in contributing to the process 
of globalization. In the words of Mark Peterson, in discussing the port of Boston, “individual 
British North American cities often had more features in common with their competitors and 
                                                                                                                                                             
see, Stuart B. Schwartz, Sea of Storms: A History of Hurricanes in the Greater Caribbean from Columbus to 
Katrina (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015). 
11 Emma Rothschild, “Globalization and the Return of History,” Foreign Policy, no. 115 (Summer 1999): 107. 
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counterparts in the greater Atlantic world than they shared with their fellow cities in the ‘thirteen 
colonies’.”12 
Studies of consumption have focused on the similarities between early modern 
economies and have shown how commodities connected individuals throughout the world, 
effectively transforming their daily lives.13 Emma Rothschild and Paul Cheney have separately 
emphasized the advantages of intellectual history to illustrate not only the prosopographical 
dimension to globalization but also the increased interest in the real effects of globalization on 
European states in the eighteenth century. According to Cheney, French writers throughout the 
eighteenth century grappled with the effects of international credit on morality, and worried over 
the increasing influence and wealth of the French colonies, which obscured the distinction 
between center and periphery.14  
As a bridge between histories of continents and a global history, historians of the ocean 
have viewed the sea as a space of social life and exchange rather than a dead space between 
                                                 
12 Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, vol. 1–3 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2011); Mark Peterson, “The War in the Cities,” in The Oxford Handbook of the American Revolution, ed. Edward G. 
Gray and Jane Kamensky (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Manuel Covo, “Baltimore and the French 
Atlantic: Empires, Commerce, and Identity in a Revolutionary Age, 1783–1798,” in The Caribbean and the Atlantic 
World Economy: Circuits of Trade, Money and Knowledge, 1650-1914, ed. Adrian Leonard and David Pretel (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Still others challenge the class-consciousness, homogeneity, and modernity of the 
modern world system, see, Joop De Jong, “The Dutch Golden Age and Globalization: History and Heritage, 
Legacies and Contestations,” Macalester International 27, no. 1 (2011): 46–67; Kenneth R. Hall, ed., Secondary 
Cities and Urban Networking in the Indian Ocean Realm, c. 1400-1800 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008). 
13 See John Brewer and Roy Porter’s monumental collection of essays on consumption, John Brewer and Roy 
Porter, eds., Consumption and the World of Goods (New York: Routledge, 1993). In particular, see the essays by 
Amanda Vickery, Peter Burke, and John Wills though all of the essays emphasize the ‘world of goods’ that 
consumers participated in. For the similarities and eventual ‘divergence’ in economies between East and West see, 
Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. Also see Maxine Berg on 
foreign commodities as a spur and inspiration for Western industrialization.  
14 For Rothschild on intellectual history, see, Rothschild, “Globalization and the Return of History”; also see Emma 
Rothschild, The Inner Life of Empires: An Eighteenth-Century History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2011), 201 for a discussion of the impact of commodities on the daily life of merchants and their families. For 
Cheney, see, Paul Burton Cheney, Revolutionary Commerce: Globalization and the French Monarchy (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2010), 17 According to Cheney, some French writers worried that the commercial links 
between France and her colonies would make Europeans into savages, while the Physiocrats suggested that the 
distinction between France and her colonies should be broken down in the name of modernizing French trade, see, 
160 and 164. 
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different metropoles and peripheries. Scholars have suggested that oceans were spaces beyond 
the limits of any individual empire; politically neutral, the ocean had a social life of its own 
which was unrestrained by mercantilist trade barriers. The ocean, then, could be a web of 
reciprocal influence rather than the traditional hub and spoke model of empire common to 
historical narratives.15 By using Atlantic history as a history of the Atlantic Ocean these scholars 
have challenged traditional geographic assumptions, questioning continental and national biases 
and producing a polycentric Atlantic World founded on principles of mutual dependence and 
exchange located in hundreds of overlapping networks that crisscrossed empires.16 Further, as is 
emphasized below, oceans were spaces where identities were shaped by both personal agency 
and external forces. A merchant might safeguard his cargo under a neutral flag, but the vessel 
could still be seized by vigilant privateers attacking ships under suspicion of possessing an alter 
ego, or by a naval squadron that believed the neutral ship intended to wander into hostile waters.  
While the focus of this dissertation lies primarily in the waters of the Atlantic and 
Caribbean, merchants who disregarded national and imperial borders were not limited by a single 
ocean. Many of the merchants under examination here had business interests in the 
Mediterranean, Indian and Pacific Oceans. In this regard, this work situates itself into a broader 
scholarship on world history which has developed in recent years. Outside of the Atlantic World, 
the Indian Ocean has proven to be one of the most vibrant spaces for the study of border-crossers 
                                                 
15 In an attempt to understand trade outside of strict imperial controls, Alison Games has looked at English overseas 
trade before the British Empire, when the English relied on negotiation and adaptability in order to prosper, see, 
Alison Games, The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560-1660 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). 
16 Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, “The Mediterranean and the New Thalassology,” The American 
Historical Review 111, no. 3 (June 2006): 722–40; Paul D’Arcy, The People of the Sea: Environment, Identity and 
History in Oceania (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006); A. Polónia, A. S. Ribeiro, and D. Lange, 
“Connected Oceans: New Pathways in Maritime History,” The International Journal of Maritime History 29, no. 1 
(2017): 90–95; M. N. Pearson, ed., Trade, Circulation, and Flow in the Indian Ocean World (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015); David Abulafia, The Great Sea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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and transnational exchange.17 Sebouh Aslanian’s study of Armenian trade networks from the 
Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean and beyond has shown how global merchant communities 
mobilized imperial structures for their own commercial ends. Aslanian’s Julfans served as 
important ‘go-betweens’ or cross-cultural brokers whose network depended on the successful 
circulation of personnel, information and credit.18 
From the Seven Years’ War to the nineteenth century, the governments of Great Britain, 
France, and later the United States made increasing demands on its citizens. The service of a 
citizen in a war, their loyalty to a cause, or their abhorrence of another became the markers of 
modern citizenship. Many historians have noted the transformation of citizenship in this period 
as states began to shape citizens around certain ideals, and to demand more from their citizens 
than passive obedience. This was seen most forcefully in the mobilization of armies and 
volunteer movements in the Revolutionary Wars. Histories of national identity and citizenship at 
the close of the early modern period tend to either focus on themes of consensus or exclusion. 
 Linda Colley’s Britons discusses the active participation of Britons in the formation of a 
British identity; a relatively inclusive process for Colley leading her to compare Britishness to an 
umbrella or “a shelter under which various groupings and identities could plausibly and even 
advantageously congregate.”19 David Bell has similarly underlined the successful and 
widespread acceptance of the nation as the sole source of legitimate authority in France by the 
                                                 
17 M. N. Pearson, The Indian Ocean (New York: Routledge, 2003); Pearson, Trade, Circulation, and Flow in the 
Indian Ocean World; Subrahmanyam has discussed at length the dilemmas faced by border-crossers in a world of 
unstable identities, see, Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Three Ways to Be Alien: Travails and Encounters in the Early 
Modern World (Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis University Press, 2011). 
18 Sebouh Aslanian, “‘The Salt in a Merchant’s Letter’: The Culture of Julfan Correspondence in the Indian Ocean 
and the Mediterranean,” Journal of World History 19, no. 2 (June 2008): 127–88; Sebouh Aslanian, From the Indian 
Ocean to the Mediterranean: The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa (New York: 
University of California Press, 2014). 
19 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (London: Pimlico, 2003), xi. 
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1780s. Though Bell identifies consensus in the popularity of the nation as an ideal, his work also 
focuses on how the concept of the nation was ‘destabilized’ through debate during the French 
Revolution.20 Discord rather than consensus has proven far more popular in historical 
scholarship as historians have identified this Age of Revolution as a formative period not only 
for French identity but for the wider Atlantic World as well.21 Scholars have notably recognized 
the state’s reaction to growing British radicalism as important in the ideological formation of 
Britishness; backed by loyalist mobs, reformists of every stripe were accosted in the name of 
loyalty to the state. Lisa Steffen argues that the definition of treason in Britain was redefined and 
the concept of allegiance was narrowed during the French Revolution in order to exclude 
reformist movements who wished to alter the legislature. Treason in earlier periods had been 
defined by disloyalty to the monarch, but in the Age of Revolution the king was made into a 
symbol of the state — one to which all loyal Britons now owed their allegiance.22 The passive 
subject of the early modern period gave way then to the conscripted citizen actively participating 
in the nation state. As Kenneth Johnston notes in his study of the persecution of radical British 
authors, “neutrality was not possible.”23 Rather than seeing Britishness as axiomatic of state 
expansion, Kathleen Wilson argues that national identities were “understood, performed and 
consumed in a variety of ways by different groups,” all making claims on the resources of the 
                                                 
20 David Bell, The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2001), 12, 14. 
21 Dror Wahrman has shown how the American Revolution acted to not only reshape the British Empire but it tested 
the limits and concept of Britishness itself, see, Dror Wahrman, “The English Problem of Identity in the American 
Revolution,” The American Historical Review 106, no. 4 (October 2001): 1236–62.   
22 Lisa Steffen. Defining a British State : Treason and National Identity, 1608-1820. New York: Palgrave, 2001,  7, 
138. G.A. Kelly has similarly shown the gradual shift in French thinking over the eighteenth century from treason 
defined as an attack on the king (lèse-majesté) to treason as an attack on the nation itself (lèse-nation) brought upon 
by Enlightenment discourses and the desacralization of the monarchy, see, G. A. Kelly, “From Lese-Majeste to 
Lese-Nation: Treason in Eighteenth-Century France,” Journal of the History of Ideas 42, no. 2 (April 1981): 269–
86.  
23 Kenneth R. Johnston, Unusual Suspects: Pitt’s Reign of Alarm and the Lost Generation of the 1790s (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 294. 
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nation-state.24 According to Douglas Bradburn this was also an important period for the creation 
of the modern citizen in America as proponents of expatriation claimed that free men had the 
right to leave an oppressive regime if necessary. Bradburn argues that the debate over the right to 
expatriation led to America’s first naturalization laws. Similarly, Nathan Perl-Rosenthal has 
shown how sailors and the American federal government worked together to create a system for 
documenting and defending American citizenship claims. Similarly, Peter Sahlins has uncovered 
how citizenship in early modern France evolved gradually from a legal distinction of taxation to 
a political category based on exclusive rights.25 In short, citizenship was a tool for governments 
and individuals to use to their advantage.  
This narrative of modern citizenship has revealed the nuances of legal discrimination and 
the development of natural right ideologies, but it appears wholly incompatible with how states 
managed merchants and commercial nationality at the end of the eighteenth century. At one 
level, scholars following the mercantilist schema of early modern states are right to focus on 
exclusion. After all, long before the British Parliament issued sweeping alien acts, or the French 
Republic broke down the distinction between foreigners and enemies, the governments of these 
countries had established strict definitions of nationality in the construction of their respective 
                                                 
24 Kathleen Wilson, The Island Race: Englishness, Empire and Gender in the Eighteenth Century (London: 
Routledge, 2014), 4. 
25 Douglas Bradburn, The Citizenship Revolution: Politics and the Creation of the American Union, 1774-1804 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009); Nathan Perl-Rosenthal, Citizen Sailors: Becoming American in 
the Age of Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015); For a later discussion of sailors and the 
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Law, Honor, and Citizenship in Maritime America (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013); While 
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British Naval Impressment in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 
2013), 247; Peter Sahlins, Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After (Ithaca: Cornell 
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empires.26 Great Britain’s navigation system restricted trade with the empire to British ships 
owned by British subjects and manned by a British crew. This policy was first enshrined into law 
by the Navigation Act of 1651, and reaffirmed and modified by later governments to act as the 
bulwark of the empire. While the prevalence of smuggling and cosmopolitan commerce in North 
America always undermined this policy on the periphery, historians’ interpretation of 
mercantilism has often reified the main premise of the system: the British empire was solely for 
the British.27  
The last ten years has seen a rich scholarship develop over the ability of border-crossers, 
tricksters, transnational subjects and go-betweens to negotiate past religious, political, and 
commercial restrictions. Primarily, scholars have focused on the Mediterranean in the early 
modern period as a shared world, particularly suited for cross-cultural cooperation. Following 
this trend, studies of the Atlantic world have used ‘entangled history’ as a framework for 
challenging the study of empire as a closed geographic unit.28 Recent works on migrations into 
                                                 
26 Henning Hillmann and Christina Gathmann, “Overseas Trade and the Decline of Privateering,” The Journal of 
Economic History 71, no. 03 (2011): 730–61; Thomas M. Truxes, “Dutch-Irish Cooperation in the Mid-Eighteenth-
Century Wartime Atlantic,” Early American Studies Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 10, no. 2 
(2012): 302–34; Sheryllynne Haggerty, Merely for Money? Business Culture in the British Atlantic, 1750-1815. 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2012), 17, 220. 
27 The most detailed discussion of the role of smuggling in affecting the navigation system comes from Richard 
Pares, see, Richard Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936); Truxes’s 
in-depth examination of smuggling during the Seven Years’ War shows the importance of illicit trade, but his 
interpretation rests on a traditional “mercantilist frame of reference”. Truxes also sees the dynamic illicit practices of 
eighteenth-century merchants in the British empire ending with the Seven Years’ War, see, Thomas M. Truxes, 
Defying Empire: Trading with the Enemy in Colonial New York (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 39, 200; 
For a new interpretation of merchant cosmopolitanism, see, Margaret C. Jacob, Strangers Nowhere in the World: 
The Rise of Cosmopolitanism in Early Modern Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). 
28 Natalie Zemon Davis, Trickster Travels: A Sixteenth-Century Muslim Between Worlds (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 2007); Eric Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern 
Mediterranean (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); E. Natalie Rothman, Brokering Empire: Trans-
Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); Molly Greene, Catholic 
Pirates and Greek Merchants: A Maritime History of the Early Modern Mediterranean (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2010); For the possibilities of the “entangled” approach to the Atlantic World, see, Jorge 
Cañizares-Esguerra, “Entangled Histories: Borderland Historiographies in New Clothes?,” The American Historical 
Review 112, no. 3 (June 2007): 787–99; Eliga H. Gould, “Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-
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the British Empire have challenged a narrow interpretation of the Navigation Acts and Britain's 
closed commercial system. By integrating foreign merchants into the empire, works by Margrit 
Beerbühl and Mark Häberlein have questioned who qualified as British and who participated in 
the project of empire.29 If Britishness was not limited to native Britons, and could be exploited 
by foreigners for their own ends, the state was also complicit in reshaping nationality on a whim 
to restrict access to markets, seize a neutral vessel, or impress sailors into service in the Royal 
Navy. Scholars have also ‘re-thought’ and ‘re-imagined’ the mercantilist policies of European 
empires, by looking at deliberative processes over unitary discourses and by emphasizing the 
mutually dependent relationship between merchants and political institutions in the early modern 
period.30   
                                                                                                                                                             
Speaking Atlantic as a Spanish Periphery,” The American Historical Review 112, no. 3 (June 2007): 764–86; 
Renaud Morieux, The Channel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
29 Margrit Schulte Beerbühl, The Forgotten Majority: German Merchants in London, Naturalization, and Global 
Trade, 1660-1815, English-language edition. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015); Mark Häberlein, “Migration and 
Business Ventures: German-Speaking Migrants and Commercial Networks in the Eighteenth-Century British 
Atlantic World,” in Transnational Networks: German Migrants in the British Empire, 1670-1914, ed. John R. 
Davis, Stefan Manz, and Margrit Schulte Beerbühl (Boston: Brill, 2012); Margrit Schulte Beerbühl, John R. Davis, 
and Stefan Manz, “Introduction: Germans in the British Empire,” in Transnational Networks: German Migrants in 
the British Empire, 1670-1914, ed. John R. Davis, Stefan Manz, and Margrit Schulte Beerbühl (Boston: Brill, 2012); 
For an analysis of how the Dutch nationality was opened up to foreigners in the Caribbean, see, Gert Oostindie and 
J.V. Rotman, “Introduction,” in Dutch Atlantic Connections, 1680-1800, ed. Gert Oostindie and J.V. Roitman 
(Boston: Brill, 2016); Gert Oostindie, “Modernity and the Demise of the Dutch Atlantic, 1650-1914,” in The 
Caribbean and the Atlantic World Economy: Circuits of Trade, Money and Knowledge, 1650-1914 (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Claudia Schnurmann, “Atlantic Trade and Regional Identities: The Creation of 
Supranational Atlantic Systems in the 17th Century,” in Atlantic History: History of the Atlantic System (Gottingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002), 179–97; Similar to the Dutch, naturalization in the Swedish West Indies was 
expansive, to include all foreigners for a fee, Victor Wilson, Commerce in Disguise: War and Trade in the 
Caribbean Free Port of Gustavia, 1793-1815 (Åbo, Finland: Åbo Akademi University Press, 2015). 
30 Steve Pincus, “Rethinking Mercantilism: Political Economy, the British Empire, and the Atlantic World in the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” The William and Mary Quarterly 69, no. 1 (January 2012): 3–34; See the 
introductory essay by Stern and Wennerlind and the essays by Regina Grafe, John Shovlin and Victor Enthoven, 
especially: Philip J. Stern and Carl Wennerlind, eds., Mercantilism Reimagined: Political Economy in Early Modern 
Britain and Its Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). These works have not only reminded scholars of 
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economic needs. The following chapters emphasize both of these approaches. 
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This dissertation takes citizenship and belonging in a new direction by looking at the 
ways in which commerce reshaped nationality and challenged what it meant to be a citizen in the 
Atlantic World. Before the idea of the nation was fully formed, merchants, statesmen, and 
philosophers offered an alternative conception of belonging and nationality that was much more 
fluid and malleable. As the following chapters illustrate, the years after political independence 
can be defined by the transactions and schemes of American merchants who contested the 
boundaries of the British empire.   
The 1780s is often defined by historians as one of marked inactivity in the history of 
Anglo-American commerce. The opening chapter instead argues that the 1780s was a period of 
intense public debate and commercial creativity for the British empire. The conduct of British 
subjects who had both won independence and traded with the enemy during the war provoked a 
series of troubling questions about the loyalty of Great Britain’s West Indian colonies and the 
place of Americans within the empire after independence. The chapter shows that American 
merchants continued to rely on the empire for business connections, products, and even 
commercial identity. By focusing on experimentation rather than market mishaps, the chapter 
shows how merchants and state officials attempted to understand the limits of legitimate 
commerce and the role of the Navigation Act in defining commercial identity. The following 
chapter then focuses on the persistence of Anglo-American commerce in the West Indies. 
Despite increasingly stringent Orders in Council, American produce continued to flood into the 
West Indies to meet the extraordinary demand caused by a series of natural and political 
disasters. Even when ‘the American trade’ hit a temporary downturn after 1789, American 
merchants continued to correspond and depend on the British state to create new opportunities 
for trade in the Caribbean. The information exchanged and gathered by merchants and states 
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offers valuable insight into how those who participated in the economy of information 
understood risk, opportunity, and diplomacy, as they attempted to self-fashion their way into the 
next move of the market.  
Chapter 3 moves into the French Revolutionary Wars, which brought new opportunities 
for neutral American trade both within and without the British Empire. In order to enjoy the 
benefits of neutrality, Americans had to first prove their Americanness to foreign states. The 
chapter points to the general disinterest of the commercial classes in the impressment debate, 
which has overshadowed merchant concerns about sailor desertion to the Royal Navy. In short, 
the voyage from port to court required numerous negotiations with foreign merchants, naval 
officers, and admiralty court judges as Americans grappled with the limits of national identity 
and legitimate commerce.  
Chapter 4 charts the turn from concerns over relative Americanness to questions of 
neutrality. The rationalization of British mercantilist policies during the Napoleonic Wars 
effectively narrowed the field of legitimate commerce in wartime. The period from 1798 to 1809 
saw the dynamic evolution of ‘the neutral’ in law and public consciousness from a morally 
ambiguous supplier of consumer goods to a malicious war profiteer whose trade with 
belligerents undermined the war effort. The chapter argues that the debate over concepts of 
neutrality should be situated within the wider discussion of national allegiance and commercial 
identity which had consumed the British Empire since the American Revolution. The 
mercantilist rhetoric that pervaded reforms in colonial governance and admiralty courts 
attempted to force a choice on American merchants: to rejoin the British Empire or stand with 
Napoleon as an enemy. 
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Finally, Chapter 5 examines how the licensing system transformed international 
commerce. For almost a decade Great Britain and its dominions became the entrepôt for the 
world at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. All trade and even correspondence required the 
empire’s approval. The licensing system had the potential to greatly expand the British empire. 
In this sense, licensing was a mercantilist milestone in the final years of the Navigation Act. 
More importantly, the system offered an alternative view of mercantilism. Rather than a 
restrictive system catering to the few who monopolized foreign trade, licensing greatly expanded 
membership in the empire by granting access to any merchant willing to pay a fee.  
 Through these five chapters the dissertation explores the irreconcilable relationship 
between modern citizenship and early modern commercial practices in the Atlantic World. While 
international trade in earlier periods depended on freedom of movement and ineffectual state 
regulation, the French Revolution fostered the growth of state institutions, which increasingly 
restricted access to citizenship. After independence, American merchants accessed European 
empires by constantly reshaping their own identity to meet the needs of the market. British 
merchants in particular, tempted Americans with offers of access to technically forbidden 
markets and the promise of enormous profits by taking advantage of the general uncertainty 
surrounding American commercial identity. While this period is often mistakenly portrayed as 
one of American neutrals operating in a vacuum, the chapters below emphasize American 
dependence on the British Empire to create demand and furnish a steady supply of news, rumor, 
and gossip. Americans relied on the institutions of the empire to reformulate their identity in 
order to re-enter the British Empire. Despite official commercial restrictions, and eventual war in 
1812, these networks of information persisted. By studying the correspondence of merchants and 
state officials, admiralty court rulings, popular pamphlets, parliamentary debates, and the wealth 
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of commercial information found in contemporary newspapers, this dissertation underscores how 
commerce reshaped individuals’ roles as loyal citizens in the Age of Revolution.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
1 
Chapter 1: Placing Americans in the British Empire, 1783-1789 
 
On February 3, 1781, Richard Downing Jennings faced a crisis of identity. This crisis did 
not originate from any internal angst, but was rather imposed on him by external forces, in this 
case, the Royal Navy. Three days before, the first part of the Royal Navy’s Leeward Island 
squadron surrounded the neutral island of St. Eustatius, taking the inhabitants entirely by surprise 
and cutting off any chance of escape. Now, the remainder of the fleet had sailed into the harbor 
and taken the island with scarcely a shot fired. In their conquest of the island, the two British 
commanders, Admiral George Brydges Rodney and General John Vaughan, managed to capture 
over 150 vessels, along with numerous warehouses overflowing with sugar and tobacco, in a 
single day.1 Jennings, a British subject and native of Bermuda, had resided in St. Eustatius for 
fifteen years while seeking his fortune in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War.2 When war 
broke out again in 1775, the neutral inhabitants of St. Eustatius offered their active assistance to 
the nearby British islands. Jennings proudly recalled that the British merchants in particular were 
always willing to aid their fellow countrymen. And Jennings himself had offered to assist in the 
war effort by supplying Admiral Byron in 1779 with military stores.3 Despite all of their efforts 
on behalf of their country and king, Jennings and the other British merchants on the island 
received no special reward or compensation on February 3, 1781. Instead, under the pretext of 
                                                 
1 George Brydges Lord Rodney, The Life and Correspondence of the Late Admiral Lord Rodney. Vol. 2, ed. 
Godfrey Basil Mundy, (London: John Murray, 1830), 9-11. 
2 Richard Downing Jennings, The Case of Richard Downing Jennings, an English Subject Who Resided at Saint 
Eustatius (London: Printed by JW Galabin, 1790), 5.  According to Michael Jarvis, Jennings represented one of 
many Bermudians who spread out into the Greater Caribbean in search of opportunity. Bermuda served as an 
“invisible central hub” for intercolonial trade in the eighteenth-century. From the island, Bermudians spread into 
foreign and imperial ports and ‘often disregarded imperial borders and restrictive trade laws,’ see, Michael J. Jarvis, 
In the Eye of All Trade: Bermuda, Bermudians, and the Maritime Atlantic World, 1680-1783 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2010). 
3 Jennings, The Case of Richard Downing Jennings, an English Subject Who Resided at Saint Eustatius, 1790, 8–10. 
St. Eustatius had a long history of supplying the British military (along with their rivals), see, Cathy Matson, 
Merchants and Empire: Trading in Colonial New York (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 271. 
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their residency on the island, the Royal Navy singlehandedly disregarded their British identity 
and seized their property. 
 Like the Dutch, French, and American merchant communities on St. Eustatius, the British 
merchants received notice that their property and papers would be confiscated in violation of 
their rights as British subjects. Despite their trade being officially sanctioned by multiple Acts of 
Parliament, Admiral Rodney declared that it was his intention to punish the English merchants in 
particular, “who forgetting the Duty they owe their King and Country, were base enough, from 
lucrative motives, to support the enemies of their country, will, for their treason, justly merit 
their own ruin.”4 Though Jennings willingly admitted that he “did not attempt to restrain 
[himself]” from the advantages a neutral port offered, he nevertheless insisted that his business 
remained neutral and actually contributed to the “general wealth and revenue of his mother 
country, while he was enriching himself.”5 Indeed, Jennings’s business proved to be immensely 
profitable and by the start of the war he was one of the leading merchants on St. Eustatius.6 Like 
many on St. Eustatius, Jennings maintained business partnerships with British, French, Dutch, 
and Spanish merchants during the war. For the Royal Navy, the activities of Jennings and the 
other British merchants were viewed as treasonable and tantamount to a renunciation of their 
Britishness. According to Rodney, British neutral traders had become Dutch Burghers and were 
liable to confiscation and Rodney’s own brand of rough justice. Yet the merchants 
conceptualized Rodney’s actions in a wholly new light. Jennings stated that he believed the 
British admiral was “infected with the commercial mania of the place,” and in turn had become a 
                                                 
4 George Brydges Lord Rodney, Letters From Sir George Brydges Now Lord Rodney to His Majesty's Ministers, 
Relative to the Capture of St. Eustatius, and Its Dependencies, (London: Printed by A. Grant, 1789), 17. 
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merchant himself, plundering the property of his countrymen for sale to the highest bidder.7 
Rodney and Jennings’s opposing views on loyalty and appropriate commerce caused a crisis of 
identity for British merchants on St. Eustatius. This crisis would come to define the debates over 
the future of the British Empire in the following decade. 
These competing views of belonging and utility to the state were symbolic of a greater 
discursive division within Great Britain as a whole. In Parliament, calls by the supporters of the 
government to sink St. Eustatius into the ocean were met with warnings about the potential 
dangers of pushing the war too far and creating more enemies for Great Britain at a precarious 
moment. This discussion continued into the decade after the American Revolution, as Britons 
questioned the meaning of loyalty, belonging, and empire.8  
 Despite the commotion at St. Eustatius, the 1780s are often defined by historians as one 
of marked inactivity in the history of Anglo-American commerce. This chapter will instead 
highlight the intense public debate and commercial creativity of the period. By focusing on 
innovation and experimentation rather than market mishaps we can further understand how 
merchants, state officials, and pamphleteers attempted to grapple with the true meaning of the 
Navigation Act and its pivotal place in defining commercial identity in the British Empire. In 
order to examine the nature of mercantile activity in the 1780s and the debates surrounding it, 
this chapter will engage with several pressing historiographical questions. How did the state 
attempt to regulate Anglo-American commerce in the aftermath of the war? What were the 
conceptions and limits of British identity in the initial years after independence? What types of 
                                                 
7 ibid., 14. 
8 In the debate over the war with the Dutch, Edmund Burke warned of committing to  “a scheme of inhuman plunder 
and unjust oppression,” see, William Cobbett, ed., The Parliamentary History of England, from the Earliest Period 
to the Year 1803 (London, 1806), XXI, 1004; XXII, 218. 
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relevant information were commodified in Anglo-American correspondence and how did this 
information shape merchant perceptions of major political events? 
To answer these questions, the chapter approaches the changing shape of Anglo-
American commerce between 1783-1789 through three interrelated perspectives: the internal 
consequences of commercial war against the neutral Dutch; the debate over American trade with 
the British Empire; and the nature of American commerce with the British Isles and Europe in 
the 1780s. The first section examines popular reaction to Rodney's St. Eustatius escapade in 
order to get at a better understanding of the competing discourses mobilized by merchants, 
politicians, and the Royal Navy in the debate over legitimate commerce and loyalty to the state. 
The debates that St. Eustatius provoked were given further impetus in the years after the war as 
Britons questioned the role of Americans in the British Empire. The next section then 
reexamines the debate started by Lord Sheffield's Observations on the Commerce of the 
American States (1783) over the makeup of the British Empire and the reification of old 
mercantilist trade barriers. Continuing the argument from the previous section, emphasis is 
placed on how Sheffield and his supporters sought to further redefine British mercantile identity 
and loyalty around the Navigation Act. Rather than merely retelling Sheffield's work as a 
restatement of zero-sum mercantilist theory, this section focuses on the different interpretations 
of empire and the Navigation Act that came out of the cessation of hostilities in 1783. After 
examining these competing debates, the chapter then addresses the experiences of newly minted 
‘American’ merchants as they were shut out of old colonial markets and forced to rethink their 
commercial strategies. While technically able to trade independently, many American merchants 
were much more interested in commercial dependence on the British Empire. By looking at the 
experiences of those on the periphery, we can further understand the complexities inherent in 
5 
British identity during the breakup of the First British Empire. The third section looks at 
American merchants as a bridge between two communities in the Atlantic world. Rather than 
focusing on the relative success of various mercantile ventures, this section instead emphasizes 
the old and new connections these merchants utilized and the information they traded within a 
seemingly new Atlantic world. By placing an emphasis on commercial information, we can 
acquire a better understanding of how these merchants viewed their own commercial world in 
the aftermath of independence.   
 
St. Eustatius and the limits of British commercial identity  
 
In studying the capture of St. Eustatius, historians have variously focused on the military 
repercussions of the siege and occupation, the greed and rage of Admiral Rodney in his wanton 
seizure of merchant property, and even the war’s effect on the stability of the Dutch Republic.9 
Yet Rodney’s views on the identity of the English merchants at St. Eustatius have garnered 
relatively little attention. Most scholars note that Rodney was particularly harsh towards his 
fellow countrymen, but little reason is given as to why Rodney focused so incessantly on the 
identity of these merchants, who, in his words, were only “calling themselves English 
merchants.”10 This section will examine the myriad of ways in which the press, ministers of 
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state, MPs, military commanders, and merchants conceived of British identity in their 
discussions of Rodney’s actions on St. Eustatius.  
In order to approach the debate over commercial identity in the taking of St. Eustatius it 
is first necessary to examine the British motivations behind the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War. The 
British ministry was especially interested in outlining their reasons for going to war through the 
publication of a manifesto in December 1780. According to the manifesto, Britain’s declaration 
of war was not meant to target the Dutch Republic as a whole but only its commercial element in 
the city of Amsterdam.11 In the subsequent debate over the war in the House of Lords, the 
Secretary of State for the Northern Department, Lord Stormont, referred to the Dutch as “secret 
enemies” who plotted to undermine Great Britain by forming treaties with Britain’s enemies, and 
clandestinely supporting the rebels from St. Eustatius.12 For the ministry, then, this was 
undoubtedly a commercial war carried on from the general belief that without Dutch aid the 
American rebels would have already been defeated.13    
The opposition in both houses challenged the government’s interpretation of recent 
events by pointing to numerous British violations of the treaties with the Dutch and warning of 
reprisals by the League of Armed Neutrality if Britain made war with their former ally.14 The 
Whig leader William Petty, Earl of Shelburne, led the charge in opposition to the ministry, 
arguing that the current government simply did not understand that the Dutch were merchants. In 
                                                 
11 Cobbett, The Parliamentary History of England, XXI, 970. 
12 Cobbett, XXI, 997, 1004. In Stormont’s initial speech after the delivery of the manifesto he focused considerable 
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commercial warfare against England, see, J. C. Riley, “Dutch Investment in France, 1781-1787,” The Journal of 
Economic History 33, no. 04 (December 1973): 733. 
14 Scott, “Sir Joseph Yorke, Dutch Politics and the Origins of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War,” 574; Tuchman, The 
First Salute, 188. 
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Holland, according to Shelburne, acts deemed ‘heinous’ were excused in the name of promoting 
and extending commerce. In this line of reasoning, Shelburne was backed by Lord Camden in 
the House of Commons who declared that the Dutch were “a wise and politic people; commerce, 
and the advantages derivable from it, were the uniform objects of their political pursuits.”15 If the 
Dutch had strayed and supported the French and Americans against the British, it was due to the 
conduct of the ministry in attempting to restrain Dutch commerce. 
The identification of the Dutch as a ‘commercial people’ in order justify their actions or 
condemn them is a startling window into contemporary British conceptions of commerce and 
identity. For the North ministry, the Dutch had violated the laws of nations by greedily supplying 
Britain’s enemies in their pursuit of French gold. The Dutch sale of naval stores to the French led 
MP Anthony Eyre to call for a crippling blow against the Dutch island of St. Eustatius, which he 
referred to as "that abominable nest of pirates.”16 The opposition though warned of the disastrous 
repercussions of a Dutch war. Thomas Townshend claimed that if the British succeeded in 
destroying the Dutch trade they would in turn destroy Britain’s own commercial prosperity. 
Townshend asked the Commons, if the war continued, “what maritime state remained capable of 
carrying our manufactures of various kinds, to all quarters of the globe, as the Dutch had done 
for above a century?”17 Townshend’s claim was borne out as British manufacturers and 
merchants, along with American traders, exploited the Dutch carrying trade in order to continue 
the consumption of British goods during the war.18  
                                                 
15 Cobbett, The Parliamentary History of England, XXI, 1068. 
16 Cobbett, XXI, 1089. 
17 Cobbett, XXI, 1087. 
18 For evidence of the continued consumption of British goods and the use of Dutch bottoms in this trade see, 
Robert Morris to Benjamin Franklin, 11 Nov. 1781, Robert Morris Papers, LC, reel 4; William Cheever, Jr. to John 
Hodshon & Son, 29 Oct. 1782, Caleb Davis Papers, MHS, Box 20; Jonathan Amory to John Amory, 21 June 1782, 
Amory Family Papers, MHS, vol. 140.  
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In their debate over the decision to go to war with the Dutch Republic, MPs revealed that 
the conduct of a commercial war would depend on their interpretation of what it meant to be a 
‘commercial people’. The ambiguity of what it meant to be a ‘commercial people’ in 1780 is 
somewhat surprising given that historians have readily identified the eighteenth century as the 
pivotal moment when the British began to define their own nationality around Britain’s global 
commerce. To use David Armitage’s well-known argument, British national and imperial 
identity was based around the principles of “Protestant, commercial, maritime and free.”19 Yet 
the debate in Parliament also belies a tension between commerce and morality. If the British 
were a commercial people, clearly their morality was distinct from the ‘Gallo-American’ faction 
running the States General. Unlike the Dutch, the British were not motivated solely by “lucre and 
usurious gain.”20 For their moral compass in navigating the rough waters of commercial identity, 
Britons relied on the Navigation Act as their guide. The debate over the meaning of ‘commercial 
people’ would later have a direct bearing on the debates over the inclusion of Americans in the 
British Empire and the sanctity of the Navigation Act.  
 Parliament met on May 14 to again consider the issue of ‘commercial people’ and St. 
Eustatius. Edmund Burke opened the debate over the seizure of private property on the island 
with a warning for Britain if it continued to carry out a “scheme of inhuman plunder.”21 Burke 
recounted in vivid detail the violent seizure of property on the island. Like a plague, Rodney had 
                                                 
19 David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); 
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indiscriminately attacked both countrymen and enemy traders, seizing everything from the 
artisan’s utensils to the wealth of the most opulent merchants. Though Burke spent much of his 
time on the different victims of Rodney’s onslaught, in particular the Jews of St. Eustatius who 
were expelled from the island, the real force of his speech was reserved for Rodney’s treatment 
of the English merchants. Burke recounted how Rodney had brazenly ignored the protests of the 
Saint Kitts Assembly and the several Parliamentary Acts legitimizing and even encouraging 
trade with the island.22 Burke claimed that Rodney had blatantly and disrespectfully ignored 
these Acts of Parliament, telling the petitioners that, “he and the general did not come there to 
hear acts of parliament explained, but to obey his Majesty's orders.”23 The resulting debate in 
Parliament was tempered only by a general confusion over whether the British commanders had 
acted independently or if they had been instructed to ignore Parliament by the ministry. Lord 
George Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, explained that Rodney and Vaughan had 
not been informed of any Acts of Parliament but were merely told to secure all the property on 
St. Eustatius. Germain justified this approach by claiming that St. Eustatius was “perfectly a new 
case,” independent of existing practices of war.24 Germain’s justification of Rodney’s conduct 
then took a unique turn as he explained to the Commons how Burke’s defense of private property 
was ill founded. Though the inhabitants of St. Eustatius were now part of the British Empire, 
                                                 
22 These were the Grenada Act, the Tobacco Act, and the Cotton Act. For the Tobacco Act, see 20 Geo. 3 c. 39, 
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Germain explained that there were actually two types of naturalized subjects: those who took 
oaths of allegiance, and were entitled to all the privileges of a natural born subject, and then there 
were those who joined the empire “at the point of the bayonet.”25 As a conquered people, these 
‘bayonet subjects’ were vulnerable to mistreatment, seizure of property, and expulsion from 
British territory.  
The opposition took to a stringent defense of ‘commercial people’ and challenged the 
categorization of the merchants on St. Eustatius as ‘bayonet subjects’ and ‘merchants who call 
themselves British’. At the end of Burke’s debate, George Byng entered into a harangue against 
the ministry who, he argued, exerted its influence to give “a mortal stab to the trade of the 
commercial world.”26 Byng praised merchants for their completely legal and praise-worthy 
commerce. The capture of St. Eustatius was, for Byng, a severe loss to the city of London.27 The 
Parliamentary debates continued through 1781 and as the war wound down Burke’s investigation 
of Rodney continued but to no avail. Rodney’s momentous victory at the Battle of the Saintes in 
1782 garnered him lasting fame and prevented any further consideration of the St. Eustatius issue 
in Parliament.28 Indeed, when Burke moved on to the impeachment of Warren Hastings in 1787, 
Hastings’s defenders pointed to Burke’s earlier persecution of Rodney as evidence of his 
misguided vendetta.29 
                                                 
25 Cobbett, XXII, 247. 
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Parliament’s unwillingness to act forced the British merchants of St. Eustatius to turn to 
the courts and the general public for redress.30 The first formal complaint came from the West 
India lobby, which published a petition to the king in April 1781 calling for the release of the 
property seized by the British commanders on St. Eustatius. The petition warned of reprisals by 
the French if Rodney’s actions were seen as a precedent, and reminded the king and the public 
that the tobacco trade on the island was in keeping with the tenets of the Navigation Act and 
sanctioned by Parliament. Rather than the harbor of ‘secret enemies’, the petition claimed that 
the island of St. Eustatius had frequently assisted the British Leeward Islands during the war, 
supplying provisions to the islands of Antigua and Saint Kitts in order to prevent a famine. That 
many British subjects had property in the islands was well known but the petition claimed that 
these subjects, whom the petition called ‘most faithful and loyal subjects’, had remained on St. 
Eustatius in order to trade with Great Britain and her colonies.31 The overall effect of this 
petition on Parliament seems to have been minimal.32 Outside of Parliament though the first 
publication in defense of the island’s inhabitants sparked a wider debate over Britain’s conduct 
in the West Indies.33  
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Despite the popularity of their position in some quarters, the merchants’ cause faced 
considerable pushback from those aware of the notorious legacy of Dutch neutral trade in the late 
eighteenth century. In the Seven Years’ War, the Dutch had made a name for themselves 
shuttling North American provisions and lumber to French islands, effectively trading with the 
enemy. St. Eustatius also served as an important hub for news traveling through the Caribbean, 
linking together the European Caribbean empires with the North American colonies in 
wartime.34 Further, the Dutch profited again from this commerce through the insurance trade by 
covering French property at exorbitant prices. In 1757, James Marriott claimed in The Case of 
the Dutch Ships Considered that neutrals gave up their rights when they traded with Britain’s 
enemies. Marriott argued that the Dutch ships operating in the French islands under special 
licenses were “adopted French ships.”35 Marriott’s pamphlet was aimed at revealing Dutch 
violations of neutrality in the Seven Years’ War, but the pamphlet found a second life when the 
Dutch continued their neutral trade during the American Revolution. The Case of the Dutch 
Ships Considered was reprinted in 1778 after France entered the war. The reprint was not only a 
reaction to the widespread illicit trade conducted during the war, but also as a response to 
increasing interest in curtailing the illegal and often violent activities of smugglers in the 
colonies and in the British Isles.36  
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 The conquest of St. Eustatius was greeted by some as the end result of decades of 
treachery on the part of the Dutch.37 In April 1781, the London Courant and Westminster 
Chronicle featured several letters from Admiral Rodney detailing his conquest of the Dutch 
islands. In one letter, Rodney celebrated the conquest of Demerara and Essequibo, two colonies 
that had the potential to “produce more revenue to the crown, than all the British West India 
islands united.”38 The same paper also featured a letter from Rodney regarding the capture of St. 
Eustatius and the complicity of the British merchants in neighboring islands. In this letter, 
Rodney warned that the only threat to his securing the island was the nearby community of 
British merchants who disregarded their duty and traded in provisions and naval stores with the 
enemy.  
As a result of the conquest, the few papers seized on the island were published 
anonymously as Authentic Rebel Papers (1781).39 Authentic Rebel Papers provided documentary 
evidence of the poor state of the American government, rising tension within the Franco-
American alliance, and the treasonable activities of British merchants on St. Eustatius who were 
                                                                                                                                                             
Smuggled Goods (Cork: William Flyn, 1783); Anthony Merry, Methods to Prevent Smuggling in Great Britain 
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in constant contact with the rebels. Authentic Rebel Papers also revealed the extensive trade in 
tobacco between London and America during the war. Notably, the author of the pamphlet 
decided to redact the names of the merchants trading with the enemy, merely threatening to 
reveal the names if anyone challenged the authenticity of the papers. While this may have served 
to protect merchants in the particular, the author clearly viewed the merchants as traitors, “who 
have been seduced by the flattering prospect of immense gain into a criminal and scandalous 
support of the Rebellion.”40 In a letter from ‘CM’ in Virginia to ‘TS’ in December 1780, the 
Americans are shown taking advantage of the British convoy system to transport tobacco to St. 
Eustatius. Though the tobacco trade was technically legal, due to the Tobacco Act of 1780, the 
Act only protected loyal British trade through neutral islands.41 Another letter from Virginia 
detailed the intricate web of secrecy required in such a voyage, not only to subvert the Royal 
Navy but also to best their fellow American merchants by reaching St. Eustatius first. Too many 
participants in the trade would raise the premium on insurance and therefore affect the 
profitability of the voyage, the anonymous author concluded “let this matter be as secret as 
possible, i.e. in America, but public as the 'Statia streets in the West Indies.”42 Authentic Rebel 
Papers called for ‘public vengeance’ against those who acquired their fortune by such means, 
which illustrates the tension between the English merchants who profited from the war and those 
who viewed their ventures as ‘secret treasons’. The perception, for some, that Rodney had saved 
the empire from its most disloyal subjects was assisted by his own victory at the Battle of the 
Saintes, the multiple votes of thanks offered in both Houses as a result of his victories, the toasts 
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offered throughout the empire in his honor, and by Rodney’s own spirited public defense of his 
actions in the West Indies.43 
 In hearing the appeals of the inhabitants of St. Eustatius, the Admiralty Court handled 
sixty-four different claims. Even though Rodney stated that the value of the prizes taken at St. 
Eustatius were “beyond all comprehension,” the merchants’ claims still managed to exceed the 
estimated value of the prizes taken in 1781.44 Due to the loss of almost all of the documentary 
evidence of smuggling and trade with the enemy, the court process was a prolonged ordeal for 
both Rodney and the claimants. By 1786 only 13 claims had been dealt with: nine of which 
resulted in restitution, 25 were still waiting for an appeal, and the remaining 26 had yet to be 
heard. It was in this climate of legal distress and general confusion that the Lords Commissioners 
of Appeals heard case no. 47, the claim of John and Philip Hawkins in 1786. John Hawkins was 
an English merchant in London whose brother Philip resided in St. Eustatius and oversaw the 
firm’s business on the island; though a relatively modest venture their claim amounted to 
£16,559.45 According to John Hawkins’s affidavit, the Hawkins brothers had entered into an 
agreement with the Amsterdam banker Jean de Neufville to trade with the island in British 
manufactures and tobacco. De Neufville was a well-known banker engaged in trading with 
America during the war. De Neufville’s activities on behalf of the American trade, which 
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included the signing of a secret treaty with Henry Laurens, were discussed extensively in 
Parliament in the lead up to the war.46 Between their partnership with the literal symbol of 
British animosity and their trade in tobacco with the neutral Dutch, the Hawkinses represent the 
quintessential ‘secret enemies’ of the British Empire. While their claim was rejected, and the 
result of the appeal is unknown the published appendix to their affidavit is valuable for providing 
the testimony of Admiral Rodney, General Vaughan, and their agents on the island. In Rodney’s 
affidavit of November 8, 1781, the admiral made his clearest statement yet about his views on 
the neutral British merchants of St. Eustatius, condemning those “who had made themselves 
Dutch Burghers, and thereby as this deponent is informed had forfeited their rights as British 
subjects.”47 Rodney recounted to the court his discovery of twenty-five warehouses containing 
the property of “divers persons, calling themselves English merchants.”48 Rodney’s personal 
secretary, Reverend William Pagett, corroborated Rodney’s testimony before the Admiralty 
Court. Though Pagett conveniently claimed that he could not remember any details regarding 
either the merchants’ papers or Rodney’s correspondence, he did tell the court that Dutch 
Burghers, “chiefly Dutch and English subjects,” owned the goods seized on the island.49 Pagett 
believed that if the prizes had been restored to their original owners the goods would have been 
transported to the enemy in the French islands or North America. Rodney and Pagett were 
clearly of the same mind when it came to the British inhabitants, but other depositions show less 
interest in the identity and activities of their fellow countrymen on the island. While General 
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Vaughan’s testimony mentioned the English merchants, his account focused on the confiscated 
property rather than the identity of the claimants, simply describing, “merchandizes, which were 
claimed and asserted by divers English merchants to be their property, were left undisposed of by 
the said agents.”50 Comparing the affidavits of the deponents makes clear that the lawyers were 
working from a script of some thirty-two questions. Among others, each witness was questioned 
about their origin, the events they witnessed during the capture of the island, whether they saw 
anyone destroy any papers related to the island’s trade, and if the witness knew the identity of the 
owners of the stores. While some testimonies claimed that all of the residents had become Dutch 
Burghers in order to legally trade on the island, only Rodney and his secretary transformed this 
legal status into a moral category.51  
Despite Rodney’s victory in the Hawkins decision, in other cases Rodney was far less 
successful. Elias Lindo, a London merchant, twice defended his claim against Rodney, 
successfully proving through his own articles of agreement and bills of lading that the goods on 
St. Eustatius were owned by his firm Noble & Lindo.52 Lindo’s partnership with David Noble of 
Amsterdam served as a pretext for continued appeals by Rodney on the grounds that “the said 
goods are not proved by legal evidence to have been the property of the claimant, and to have 
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been employed in a lawful British trade.”53 The London World reported on June 4, 1788 that the 
Lords of Appeal confirmed their former sentence in favor of Lindo, “with full costs,” and in 
addition accepted the appeal of Joseph Waldo, a Bristol merchant.54 Kenneth Breen argues that 
the Continental merchants tended to prevail in court over the residents of St. Eustatius. The cases 
of Waldo and Lindo allow us to widen Breen’s argument to include merchants trading from 
Great Britain as well. These merchants were also able to overcome the labels of ‘secret enemy’ 
and those who ‘call themselves British merchants’.55 As will be discussed in the next section, 
many in Britain were beginning to consider the colonies as separate from the national body in the 
aftermath of the American Revolution. This new approach to empire appears directly related to 
the concern over space and residency in Admiralty court decisions. 
 The changing ideology about the loyalty of the inhabitants of the West Indies helps to 
explain the treatment of Richard Jennings at the beginning of this chapter. Jennings published his 
short memoir in 1790, and after almost a decade he had found little redress in the Admiralty 
Courts. Impoverished and his reputation ruined, he turned to the public as his final court of 
justice. Jennings argued angrily that his claim had been denied because the Admiralty Courts 
favored local merchants, and thus a line had been drawn and “THAT OF RESIDENCE HAS 
BEEN MADE THE BOUNDARY OF JUSTICE.”56 Jennings stated that he had endangered his 
business to assist in the war effort while English merchants based in London safely profited 
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through their temporary agents in the West Indies. As a British West Indian, Jennings was 
condemned as merely one ‘who calls himself English’. 
 
“The Alien States of America” 
 
With the conclusion of the war in 1783 the question of America’s place in relation to the British 
Empire remained unresolved. John Baker Holroyd, Lord Sheffield’s Observations on the 
Commerce of the American States with Europe and the West Indies led the charge in this debate. 
Sheffield sought to place the American states outside of the British Empire, arguing for the 
exclusion of Americans from British commercial identity. Sheffield’s fierce defense of the 
Navigation Act ostensibly serves as the preeminent definition of British mercantilism and the 
guiding light for the government’s policy towards America.57 Yet the variety of responses to 
Sheffield’s pamphlet from British and American officials, West Indian planters, and merchants, 
reveals that the Navigation Act was always being reinterpreted and Sheffield’s opponents could 
just as easily use it for their own ends. This section examines the complexity of Anglo-American 
relations in the immediate years after the war. By focusing on debate rather than unitary 
discourses of mercantilist rhetoric, this section highlights the limitations of studying commercial 
policy from solely the perspective of statesmen and Orders in Council.  
Historians have traditionally examined Sheffield’s treatise from an economic perspective. 
This is only natural considering the wealth of economic data Sheffield mobilized in order to 
prove his claim that the British Empire needed its maritime nursery more than it needed 
America. The weight of Sheffield’s argument and its consequent success in shaping official 
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policy has led many scholars to shy away from dissent to view this conversation over 
commercial and national identity as one with a preordained and settled victor.58 Sheffield’s 
Observations was written in response to a proposed commercial act by the Shelburne ministry to 
continue the colonial trade with the new United States. Shelburne's ministry, motivated by the 
spirit of reciprocity and the potential of solidifying an Anglo-American alliance, sought to secure 
the American trade with a provisional bill on March 7, 1783. The bill granted Americans access 
to the British West Indies and treatment as British subjects within British ports. The liberal 
treatment of the Americans stemmed from Shelburne’s emphasis on reciprocity and particular 
privileges in order to preserve the British-American Empire.59 Despite its temporary status, the 
bill provoked a firestorm from Sheffield and his supporters, who decried it in the parliamentary 
debate on March 18. Sheffield argued that Shelburne’s proposal would lead to the destruction of 
the carrying trade.60 Though Shelburne’s ministry soon crumbled, the dangerous ideas behind the 
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bill prompted Sheffield to write his spirited defense of the Navigation Act in 1783. The debate 
that Shelburne’s bill provoked came to define the commercial disputes of the next three decades. 
Beyond its wealth of economic data, Sheffield’s Observations was most of all a treatise 
on identity and belonging. The provisional bill, described by its opponents as an ‘experiment’, 
declared that in British ports the ships of the United States would remain American but the cargo 
would be treated as if it were the property of British subjects imported in a British vessel.61 For 
Sheffield, the Americans were first and foremost aliens, and any experimentation with their 
identity would undermine the Navigation Act, which Sheffield called “the guardian of the 
prosperity of Britain.”62 Sheffield pitched commercial competition as an endless battle for 
preeminence; if the Americans were allowed an exception to the Navigation Act they would 
increase their shipbuilding efforts and overtake the British carrying trade.63 Sheffield further 
warned that the American flag would become a universal flag, used by the French and Dutch to 
sneak into the British Empire and then sell British goods at lower rates in Europe.64 Sheffield 
concluded that the Americans had fought for their independence and Parliament must recognize 
their new identity in order to protect the remainder of the British Empire:  “it is absolutely 
necessary to mark the line of distinction between our subjects and these aliens.”65 Sheffield 
viewed these experiments as a dangerous breach of the Navigation Act, crafted out of a desire to 
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protect the American trade with the West Indies. In a third edition to his popular work, writing 
after the failure of the bill, Sheffield noted with relief the calamities Britain had narrowly 
avoided:  
“Had it passed into a law, it would have affected our most essential interests in 
every branch of commerce, and in every part of the world; it would have deprived 
of their efficacy our navigation laws, and undermined the whole naval power of 
Britain; it would have endangered the repose of Ireland, and excited the just 
indignation of Russia and other countries: the West India planters would have 
been the only subjects of Britain who could have derived any benefit, however 
partial and transient, from their open intercourse directly with the American 
states, and indirectly through them with the rest of the world.”66 
 
As is seen here, Sheffield recognized the need to supply the West Indies from some external 
source. But in order to maintain the sanctity of the Navigation Act, it was necessary for these 
supplies to come from within the British Empire. As an alternative to the Americans, Sheffield 
suggested that Canada and Nova Scotia could both supply the West Indies and serve as a 
potential nursery for seamen. Sheffield argued that within five or six years up to 400 vessels 
might be employed in trafficking Canadian goods to the West Indies and Europe.67 British North 
America then would save the empire, protect the Navigation Act, and supply the West Indies 
without recourse to ‘these aliens’ the Americans. 
 If the Americans were to be excluded from the West Indies and treated in Great Britain 
like any other nation, what was their commercial role in Sheffield’s worldview? The former 
colonies were now merely another customer, and Sheffield encouraged his fellow Britons to 
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view ‘the dismemberment of the empire’ for the advantages it offered.68 Rather than losing an 
essential member, Great Britain had gained a valuable new customer, wholly dependent on 
British manufactures. The Americans actively sought a trade with Great Britain, and Sheffield 
noted that they begged for credit in order to feed consumer demand. The real danger was not that 
America may shun British markets if kept out of the West Indies, but rather that British creditors 
and manufactures may overstock and over-lend the impoverished American consumer.69 Further, 
American inexperience in foreign languages and overseas negotiations meant that the British 
would serve as necessary middlemen in any American business transaction with Europe.70 
Partially as a result of Sheffield’s pamphlet, the new Fox-North ministry shifted the regulation of 
trade to the king and council and issued a new Order in Council on July 2, 1783, to regulate the 
commerce with America.71  
The initial Order in Council repealed the prohibitory acts on American trade, permitted 
the Americans to trade with the British West Indies in British bottoms, and allowed the 
exportation of colonial produce from the British colonies to the United States. Notably, these 
goods would be subject to the same duties as “if exported to any British colony or plantation in 
America.”72 Subsequent Orders in Council would continue to modify and restrict American 
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commercial access to the West Indies until 1788 when an Act of Parliament made the previous 
orders permanent. The Act of Parliament and Orders in Council reaffirmed restrictions on 
American trade in the West Indies but also continued to treat American ships and goods to the 
“payment of the same duties as the like sort of goods or merchandize are or may be subject and 
liable to if imported in British-built ships.”73 In the British West Indies, Americans were 
gradually treated as foreigners and aliens but in the British Isles they remained fellow subjects 
entitled to the privileges they had renounced in 1776. The legal fiction of American foreigners, 
created by subsequent ministries, continued rather than ended the debate over America’s true 
place within the British Empire. 
  While Sheffield’s work provoked considerable interest on both sides of the Atlantic, it 
was the prominent Jamaican politician and future historian of the West Indies, Brian Edwards, 
who penned the most important response.74 Edwards’s Thoughts on the late Proceedings of 
Government (1784) argued for a return to the consanguinity of the past, viewing the Americans 
as “our best friends and customers in peace, and in war our firmest allies.”75 By restricting 
American trade to British ships, Edwards believed the Orders in Council would eventually 
destroy the American trade altogether. Edwards also noted that many in the British West Indies 
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had observed the immediate increase in the cost of American supplies after the proclamation was 
published.76 Further, Edwards claimed that these restrictions might provoke the Americans into 
acting from their passions rather than their interest and shunning the British market entirely. 
Contrary to Sheffield, Edwards viewed the American trade as more extensive and more 
important to British commerce than traditionally imagined. Arguing that custom house books 
could not convey the extent of such a trade, which Edwards described as “spreading through a 
variety of distant channels, their profits all returned to, and ultimately concentred [sic] in, Great 
Britain, like rivers to the ocean.”77 Edwards concluded his Thoughts on the Late Proceedings of 
Government by connecting the commercial success of the sugar islands with the national wealth; 
a view that stood in stark contrast to Sheffield’s emphasis on the importance of the Navigation 
Act as the source of all prosperity. 
 Sheffield was not alone in supporting a strict interpretation of the Navigation Act.78 
Denying the ties of consanguinity after the war, John Stevenson challenged Edwards’s claim that 
the colonists would favor passion over self-interest. Stevenson did agree with Edwards over the 
prevalence of smuggling in the islands, claiming that despite the Orders in Council, the 
Americans would obtain sugar ‘clandestinely’. Nevertheless, the existence of smuggling was not 
a sufficient reason to alter the law, or “for our granting the Alien States of America a free trade 
with our sugar islands.”79 Along with Stevenson, the most stalwart defender of Sheffield’s 
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principles at the time was George Chalmers. Chalmers chastised the West Indians for 
complaining that the proclamation of July 2, 1783, did not do enough for their economic welfare: 
“The question however does not turnoff the pivot of supplying the West India Lords with their 
usual luxuries, or the West India slaves with their accustomed needs.”80 It was not enough that 
the West Indians had three different markets vying to supply their every need, Chalmers mocked, 
because “neither the proclamation nor the law commanded traders to supply the West India 
wants.”81 Finally, Chalmers reiterated Sheffield’s argument that Great Britain had successfully 
supplied the West Indies during the war, stating simply that, without American competition, the 
British were able to provision the islands at great profit to the nation.82 Chalmers believed that 
the true solution was for the West Indies to pursue self-sufficiency, stating that Britain was more 
interested in the West Indies cultivating their own food than any colonial produce.83 
 Several other authors rallied to the West Indian cause in response to Sheffield and his 
supporters. These authors undermined Sheffield through a reinterpretation of the purpose of 
Britain’s commerce, the conduct of American merchants, and the true meaning of the Navigation 
Act. Edward Long, a close friend of Edwards, pointed to the irrationality of British policy toward 
the Americans, complaining that Britain was ostensibly seeking to prevent the development of a 
competitive American mercantile marine. Yet, according to Long, British policy seemed to 
encourage the building of large transatlantic brigs to trade with the British Isles over the small 
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coasting vessels used by the Americans in the West Indies. Further, Long pointed to the 
contradictory policy of treating Americans as fellow subjects in Britain while barring them from 
the West Indies as foreigners: “Thus the American, when he goes to Saint Kitts with his cargo of 
lumber, finds himself renounced as an alien; but when he lands with the same cargo at Liverpool, 
he is caressed and welcomed, as a naturalized Briton.”84 Others chose to focus on Sheffield’s 
warnings about American trustworthiness and credit. ‘An American’ claimed that the 
commercial difficulties brought on by the market glut and widespread credit failures of the 1780s 
were not due to American negligence but rather the inhibitions of Europeans trading in America 
and “assuming the mask of calling themselves Americans.”85 As a counter to the cool logic of 
Sheffield’s trade data, some turned to emotional arguments, seeing the prohibition on American 
commerce as revenge for the war.86 Finally, James Allen’s sweeping attack claimed that Canada 
was a frozen wasteland, producing no crops for export. Allen further argued that only the United 
States could supply the necessary provisions for the West Indies and that the sacrifice of 
commerce for the promotion of navigation would destroy the empire. “The carrying trade,” 
Allen asserted, “is of great importance, but it is of greater still to have trade to carry.”87 Allen 
believed that the trade was so necessary for the survival of the West Indies that if prohibited the 
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colonists would simply smuggle American supplies through neighboring islands or take 
advantage of lax customs enforcement.88  
Contemporary newspapers mark the widespread knowledge and engagement with 
Sheffield’s work. Articles provided supposed proof that the new minister, William Pitt, was in 
favor of a free trade between America and the West Indies, and accounts of Canadian scarcity 
mocked Sheffield’s blind faith in Nova Scotia as an alternative source of grain and lumber.89 A 
letter to the London Public Advertiser, signed ‘Albion’, warned of a ‘set of writers’ that 
attempted to exacerbate the loss of America by claiming that Britain had benefited from the 
separation. The article further claimed that any person who dared to complain of these ‘national 
calamities’ was either ridiculed as a fool or charged as an ‘internal enemy of the state’.90 In this 
spirit, Thomas Paine penned a piece under the pseudonym ‘Common Sense’, claiming that the 
British wished to govern American trade since America lacked a system of commerce.91 Paine’s 
conspiracy of clandestine British governance of America fed into rumors that an American had 
assisted Sheffield in his ‘noxious doctrines’. The British, according to Paine, were conniving 
with the Barbary pirates to destroy American commerce in the Mediterranean in order to protect 
“the favorite system of Lord Sheffield.”92  
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Responses to this debate continued to pour through the press at a rapid rate well into the 
following decade. In 1791 Assistant U.S. Treasury Secretary Tench Coxe used custom house 
records to prove that Sheffield’s blind faith in Canada was baseless. Coxe attempted to show 
conclusively that “the British West India islands are proved to have been indebted to the United 
States, in 1790 for more lumber, more grain, and more bread and flour than they imported from 
these states before the revolution.”93 While this was hardly the final word on the place of 
America within the British Empire, the Atlantic World had shifted considerably by 1791 from 
what Sheffield had described in 1783. In the midst of another revolution American merchants 
would regain their position as an essential part of the British Empire. 
The antipathy prevalent in popular literature during the 1780s is undeniable, but as the 
following section shows, this dispute over government policy did not necessarily lend itself to a 
hatred of the British in general. Merchant correspondence reveals a climate of mutual 
cooperation, which ensured the continuation of commercial relationships despite the competing 
claims of government ministers. Whether out of consanguinity or the safety of old commercial 
ties, Sheffield was right to argue that Americans would continue to purchase British commodities 
despite the restrictive Orders in Council.  
 
Americans attempt to reverse the Revolution  
 
Despite ministerial aggression, Anglo-American commerce returned to its pre-war pace after the 
war. The uncertainties created by the debate over British identity and the limits of the empire 
offered opportunities for American merchants seeking to rekindle Anglo-American trade. This 
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section examines the vicissitudes of that relationship by focusing on the economies of 
information maintained by networks of transatlantic merchants.94 Merchants participated in the 
transatlantic exchange of information and ideas by reacting to gossip and seeking new ventures 
based on rumors of market demand found in their professional correspondence and contemporary 
newspapers.95 By viewing the Atlantic as a sea of exchange, rather than a space of competing 
trade barriers, we can gain a fuller understanding of the complexities of commerce and national 
identity at the end of the eighteenth century.96 Three merchant firms are examined in order to 
highlight the characteristics of these economies of information: the New York firm Lynch & 
Stoughton whose correspondence documented America’s dependence on British manufactures; 
New York merchant Nicholas Low’s struggle with British identity as he attempted to assist his 
loyalist family and cover his own property with British Mediterranean Passes; and Boston 
merchant and Revolutionary patriot Caleb Davis’s commercial relationships with British contacts 
despite the war and proceeding market glut. These three case studies serve to not only reiterate 
America’s dependence on British commodities in the 1780s but also the continued importance of 
Britishness in Anglo-American commerce and British contacts for facilitating foreign trade. 
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The merchant firm of Lynch & Stoughton was formed on March 10, 1783, in Bruges 
between Dominick Lynch, originally from Galway, and Don Thomas Stoughton, a merchant 
with connections to Spain and France. That same year, Stoughton relocated to New York to 
establish a trading house and later married Lynch’s sister Catherine. The partnership agreement 
saw Lynch providing the majority of the funds from the fortune he had accumulated in Bruges 
while Stoughton served as acting partner in New York, dealing with the day-to-day business.97 
The firm’s observations on the American market offer considerable detail on the demands for 
British goods, the general uncertainty from the lack of reliable information, and the missed 
opportunities resulting from such widespread confusion. 
On March 3, 1784, Thomas Stoughton wrote to an Irish contact celebrating the demands 
for British goods, which had even exceeded the abundant supply provided by the evacuation of 
the British from New York. Stoughton wrote confidently that he could obtain advantageous sales 
for Irish linens. Stoughton was so optimistic about the market that he advised Dominick Lynch, 
who was still in Europe, of the possibility of engaging a ship from Galway or Sligo to maintain a 
regular trade between Ireland and New York.98 Yet, just over a month later, Stoughton wrote to 
his partner of potential impending losses for importers of goods from Europe. He now predicted 
that the amount imported would take at least two years to sell. By May, Stoughton had revised 
his estimate again after witnessing the arrival of eight more cargoes from London and Liverpool. 
Now Stoughton believed that it would take three years to sell all of the British merchandise. 
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Combined with the market glut, New York’s agriculture had suffered considerably from the war 
and Stoughton claimed that time was needed before the merchants could begin to sell produce in 
order to pay off their growing debt.99 By the end of the year Stoughton wrote to his partner with 
a gloomy view of their commercial activity thus far: 
“Excuses & ambition in trade are ever productive of evil consequences, that of 
America has been over done. GB & Ireland I am fearful will have reason to 
remember the year 1784. We have neither produce or money to discharge our 
debts, happy is the man of honest principles who has nothing to do with dry goods 
or exposes himself or friends to the collection of debts in this country.”100 
 
With the arrival of peace, a flood of British goods saturated the American market. British 
merchants, eager to maintain their commercial ties with the now independent colonies, lent 
liberally to American customers. As a result, several merchant houses in Britain and America 
went bankrupt due to these lending practices.101 The state of the market was so severe that the 
London Chronicle reported the story of an ‘eminent merchant’, who had sent a large shipment of 
goods to America and failing to receive payment, and too proud to accept assistance, “put a 
period to his existence by shooting himself through the head. He has left a disconsolate widow 
and nine children.”102 British newspapers warned young merchants and tradesmen to ignore 
reports of “American wealth, American faith, [and] American prosperity.”103 Rather than a 
merchant’s paradise, the new states had committed a ‘universal violation of commercial 
confidence’ by failing to pay their debts to British creditors. One London newspaper described 
America’s ‘commercial infidelity’ as a final act of vengeance against Great Britain.  
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 The irresponsible demand for British goods was not limited to young adventurers or 
disreputable Americans. Jonathan Amory, of the prominent Boston merchant family, clearly 
participated in these ventures, taking out five advertisements in the Independent Chronicle over 
the course of a month in order to sell “a large assortment of English goods, too many to be 
enumerated.”104 Stoughton noted that it was not only American demand that fueled the 
destructive trade but also Europeans who “have been intoxicated with golden dreams of America 
& rapid prospects of fortunes.”105 James Beekman echoed Stoughton in a letter to a Manchester 
firm; Beekman blamed the British for draining the specie from New York during the war, 
preventing Americans from repaying their debts. The pervasive spread of British commodities 
alarmed Thomas Pleasants Jr. who warned Thomas Jefferson that if something was not done to 
regulate the trade, “there will not be in Virginia a Merchant unconnected with G. Britain.”106 In 
1784, at the height of the glut, British exports to America were valued at £3,679,467. Over the 
course of the following two years, the value of these exports dropped by almost two million 
pounds before recovering in 1787.107 The market bust ruined several firms on both sides of the 
Atlantic. 
For British commerce, despite these losses, the continued dependence of America on 
British commodities was recognized as a victory. The Hereford Journal boasted that all of 
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Europe’s freight to America could not equal Great Britain’s share of the trade.108 Phineas Bond, 
British Consul to America, noted that so long as British creditors used restraint in their liberal 
lending they could insure a monopoly of the American market for British credit and 
manufactures.109 This general preference for British manufactures and credit appeared to closely 
follow Sheffield’s prediction that only the British merchant had the power to supply the “wants 
of America.”110 The market glut of British goods can be explained through the lens of 
consumption studies, which have shown that the demand for new commodities could often 
outstrip available income and even rationality. Further, American merchants had spent the better 
part of the eighteenth century becoming fully immersed in a Georgian culture of gentility based 
around their consumption of imperial commodities.111 Clearly, political independence did not 
necessarily break the strong ties of commercial and cultural dependence on the British Empire. 
In such a climate, how was any merchant expected to carry on transatlantic business? 
Lynch & Stoughton’s strategy for maintaining commercial relationships despite general 
economic stagnation was to provide their correspondents with a steady supply of negative news 
about American markets. Rather than paint an optimistic picture of American prosperity, 
Stoughton followed a strategy of dissuasion and despair in order to maintain the trust of his 
contacts. Stoughton warned of navigation ‘reduced to nothing’, and the ‘impossibility’ of 
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obtaining vessels for shipments. When writing to Strange, Dowell & Co. of Cadiz, Stoughton 
noted the recent scarcity of grain at Lisbon, and went into great detail on the sudden price 
increase for wheat, Indian corn & flour. Rather than encouragement or schemes to race to the 
market in order to meet this sudden demand, Stoughton’s response was concerted 
disenchantment. He explained that the firm had not sent a single shipment to a house in Lisbon 
because they were fearful of the results of such exorbitant prices.112 The following year, 
Stoughton noted confidently to his partner the success of this strategy; the price of grain in 
Lisbon had finally dropped and by avoiding temptation they had survived while eager 
speculators “must burn their fingers.”113 
The successful maintenance of this correspondence without the actual exchange of 
commodities helps to explain the importance of the economy of information in periods of 
economic downturn. Lynch & Stoughton ensured their trustworthiness by warning their 
European customers off. Confessing to his partner, “we really are at a loss how to employ 
ourselves,” Stoughton did nothing in Europe.114 Instead, he focused on building his firm’s 
trustworthiness by avoiding risky ventures. Stoughton provided his contacts with a steady supply 
of information on the state of agriculture in New York, and in turn requested information on 
opportunities in Europe from his friends in London, Galway, and Cadiz. In August 1785, the 
firm finally announced to its European contacts an abundant crop of wheat and solicited their 
business, telling James Sutton & Co. that any opportunities in London would enable American 
merchants to begin to pay off their debts.115 By December, Stoughton complained to Sutton that 
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he had not received any encouragement to ship grain to European markets.116 Still awaiting some 
sign from a business contact in Europe by May 1786, the firm temporarily gave up on the idea of 
shipping grain for a European market.  
The transactions of Lynch & Stoughton from 1783-1787 make for a dull read. The firm 
took few risks, and their one major European scheme was a failure. Yet the value of the firm 
rests in its role as a purveyor of information about the American market. By recognizing and 
alerting their correspondents to potential market dangers their letters offer us insight into how 
merchants attempted to manage risk.117 Some risks though could not be so easily avoided. At the 
end of 1785, Stoughton wrote to Charles O’Brien in London about insuring a ship for a potential 
voyage to Cadiz. Stoughton noted that it would be preferable to use a British vessel in order to 
guard against the ‘exaggerated danger at Lloyds’ of American ships falling victim to Barbary 
pirates. Unfortunately, the same conditions that flooded the American market with British 
manufactures ensured that few British bottoms were available in 1785 and Stoughton was forced 
to use an American vessel burdened by costly insurance premiums and the threat of ‘piratical 
navigators’.118 
The inability of the American government to protect its mercantile marine from Barbary 
pirates was the most troublesome foreign policy test for the new nation. The American 
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commissioners in London appointed Thomas Barclay to negotiate with the Barbary powers in 
1785. Despite successfully concluding a treaty with Morocco in 1787, American ships in the 
Mediterranean still faced considerable difficulties from Algerian pirates. Added to this was the 
widespread belief that the European powers, and particularly the British, were acting in concert 
with the pirates to keep the Americans out of the Mediterranean.119 In July 1785, the New-
Hampshire Gazette reported on the scale of the Barbary fleet, commenting that the Barbary 
pirates typically only used galleys, but now they appeared to be equipped with ‘stout ships’ 
probably provided by the European states.120 Without any naval protection of their own, 
American merchants relied on the distraction caused by European powers waging war with the 
Barbary States. In 1786 the onset of peace between Spain and Algiers alarmed the New York 
Packet, which declared that if a permanent treaty was signed, “we shall be almost their only 
object.”121 It was in this context of international dominoes, and intrinsically linked markets, that 
New York merchant Nicholas Low read the news and eagerly awaited word from his foreign 
contacts about any potential peace between a European state and the Barbary pirates.122  
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In the summer of 1785, Low received a letter from his Lisbon contact, the firm Daniel 
Bowden & Son, announcing the signing of a treaty between the Spanish and the Algerians.123 By 
October, one account claimed that the commerce of the United States in the Mediterranean had 
almost been ‘annihilated’.124 The consequences of the Spanish truce for American commerce 
were clearly drastic, and for Nicholas Low they had severe repercussions for his business in the 
Mediterranean and especially the Madeira trade.125  
Low’s first introduction to the Madeira trade came as a byproduct of his loyalist 
connections. The Madeira firm Mendonsa & Brush solicited Low’s business based on a previous 
correspondence with his older brother, Isaac Low.126 Mendonsa & Brush, and other Madeira 
firms that corresponded with Low, assured him that despite the number of American ships 
already in port, Low could expect regular returns for his business.127 The prominent landowner 
Dona Guiomar also made a connection with Low, forming an initial agreement to ship 20 pipes 
of madeira on consignment with the returns to be invested in wheat, flour, or Indian corn.128 
Low's opportunities were not limited to just the island of Madeira however. In the 
Mediterranean, Low received price lists from Lisbon, Leghorn, Cadiz and Marseilles. All of 
these solicitations were accompanied with tales of great demand for American provisions; some 
failed to acknowledge the Barbary threat while others mentioned the pirates in tandem with 
                                                 
123 Daniel Bowden & Son to Nicholas Low, 7 July 1785, Nicholas Low Papers, LC. 
124 Manchester Mercury, 11 Oct. 1785. 
125 Though Madeira was technically in the Atlantic, reports showed that the pirates would pursue vessels ‘between 
200 and 300 leagues farther to the Westward than at any former period’, see, Manchester Mercury, 11 Oct. 1785.  
126 Below, I will address the part loyalists played in Low’s business as important middle-men.  
127 Mendonsa & Brush to Nicholas Low, 24 Aug. 1783, Box 3, Nicholas Low Papers, LC. The extent of Low’s 
involvement in the Madeira trade can also be charted through the advertisements he placed in local papers. On 9 
Dec. 1784, Low advertised ‘Bowden’s best sweet Lisbon wine’, New York Packet, 9 Dec. 1784. Additional ads were 
placed in the New York Packet on 12 Jan. 1786 and in the Daily Advertiser, 17 May 1786, and 28 Dec. 1789. 
128 Dona Guiomar to Nicholas Low, 18 Sept. 1784, Box 5, Nicholas Low Papers, LC. 
39 
growing market demand.129 It was up to Low to decide if the potential reward warranted such 
risk.  
After the American Revolution, Madeira consumption in the United States dropped as 
Americans turned to Continental wines.130 The Madeira trade, however, remained profitable as 
Americans served as middlemen and carriers to other markets. Through Dona Guiomar, Low 
shipped pipes of wine on consignment to the East Indies; taking advantage of the rapid growth in 
the number of civil servants and military officers in India.131 The numbers reveal the growing 
profitability of the Asian market for Madeira; one vessel transporting Madeira to Bengal carried 
seven hundred pipes of wine in 1784. This market would only continue to grow and by 1815, 
one-quarter of Madeira’s exports went to Asia.132 Dona Guiomar’s initial agreement with Low 
was a consignment of one hundred and eighteen pipes of East India market wine. Trusting in 
Low’s ‘prudent management’, Dona Guiomar wrote that Low should attempt to make a 
remittance as quickly as possible, but if demand for the East India market slipped he should hold 
onto the wine as it would increase in value with time. In return for his services, Dona Guiomar 
provided valuable information about Madeira’s market. In January 1788, she informed Low of 
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the late severe weather, and recommended a shipment of 3000 bushels of Indian corn, 3000 
bushels of wheat and 300 barrels of flour.133 Low’s participation in a global trade which 
connected the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Indian Ocean highlights his continued dependence on 
the British Empire for both commercial contacts and available markets.  
 The immense profitability of the Mediterranean trade meant that even the threat of 
capture by Barbary pirates was not a sufficient deterrent for enterprising merchants. In order to 
safeguard his business, Low’s shipments needed to become British. Low took advantage of the 
widespread availability of Mediterranean passes and alternative bottoms to insure his ships at a 
lower freight and continue his trade in the Mediterranean.134 Though not an absolute guarantee of 
safety, American ships sailing under British colors and carrying a Mediterranean pass were able 
to pass by Barbary corsairs without examination as they sailed under the Royal Navy’s 
protection.135 This trade in identity through false papers was a common practice of early modern 
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commerce as merchants were able to take advantage of loose definitions of citizenship and 
nationality to gain access to forbidden markets.136  
For the British, the trade in passes, papers, and even British bottoms was part of a larger 
concern over the general violations of the Navigation Act in the 1780s. In Parliament, Charles 
Jenkinson, future President of the Board of Trade, described how ships sold their Mediterranean 
passes while at sea once they no longer needed protection. In reaction to the pass trade Jenkinson 
proposed a series of reforms to stamp out false registries and guarantee that “no ship should be 
deemed British built, that was not actually built in Great Britain or the British dominions.”137 As 
this debate continued in Parliament, some MPs mocked the collusion of local government 
officials and whole cities with the smuggling trade, deriding Londoners’ support for ‘Alderman 
Smuggler’.138 Newspapers recounted harrowing stories of cosmopolitan vessels of Scottish and 
Irish smugglers, navigating under American colors, and violently assaulting revenue cutters off 
the coast of Britain.139 Under William Pitt’s ministry, the government increasingly recognized 
the annual loss to the revenue from these violations of the Navigation Act.140 Attempts were 
made to stamp out smuggling by a reduction in duties, investment in new cutters, and a popular 
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campaign against the sins of smuggling.141 In order to understand the extent of the trade, more 
information was needed, and the ministry here relied heavily on its consuls in America for 
concrete knowledge of American complicity.  
After British consul-general John Temple learned of a counterfeiting operation in 
Mediterranean passes at Philadelphia he unconvincingly warned the U.S. Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, John Jay, that the Barbary Corsairs were experts in detecting counterfeit passes and he 
could only lament “the misery that such of your mariners will probably meet with should they 
with such counterfeit passes fall into the hands of the Barbary Corsairs…”142 Recognizing the 
scale of the trade, British Consul Phineas Bond requested permission from the Secretary of State, 
the Marquess of Carmarthen, to appoint agents for the different American ports in order to check 
Mediterranean passes. Bond clearly recognized the danger the pirates posed in motivating 
Americans to obtain passes, “the mischief is become more alarming, as the fraud is become more 
general: as far as I can learn most American vessels, sailing in the track of the Algerine cruizers, 
carry forged passes.”143  
So extensive was this trade in British identity that American newspapers featured 
advertisements selling ships with alternative papers. Low took out several advertisements 
through the 1780s, announcing in the New York Daily Advertiser in April 1788, “For Charter. 
The ship Philadelphia, George Tower, Master, lying at Murray’s wharf, British build, now under 
                                                 
141 Philip Henry Stanhope, Life of the Right Honourable William Pitt: With Extracts from His Ms. Papers, vol. 1 
(London: John Murray, 1861), 221; Hoh-Cheung and Lorna H. Mui, “Smuggling and the British Tea Trade before 
1784,” The American Historical Review 74, no. 1 (October 1968): 44–73.For the Parliamentary debates on 
smuggling see, Wraxall, Posthumous Memoirs, v. i, 78, 144. Newspapers also participated in this campaign 
supporting the actions of the government with the slogan ‘give unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s’, see, 
Hampshire Chronicle, 2 June 1783 and Northampton Mercury, 11 Aug. 1783. 
142 John Temple to John Jay, 7 June 1786, John Jay Papers, RBML. 
143 Phineas Bond to Marquess of Carmarthen, 14 May 1787, “Letters of Phineas Bond, British Consul at 
Philadelphia, to the Foreign Office of Great Britain, 1787, 1788, 1789,” 521–22. Bond repeated his concern about 
the passes on 4 Nov. 1787, and 3 Mar. 1788.  
43 
Dutch colors, with a Mediterranean pass. Enquire of Nicholas Low.”144 The multiple identities of 
a single ship with a British bottom, Dutch flag, and American ownership was meant to throw off 
any would-be aggressor. The identity of ships though could even confuse the merchants 
exploiting them. Because the particular identity of a ship and its papers determined its eventual 
market, it was important to pin down a ship’s origins. After a long discussion with Robert 
Gilmore over the identity of the ship Philadelphia, mentioned above, it was concluded that if the 
Philadelphia was a Dutch bottom and possessed a Mediterranean pass it would be well suited for 
shipping wheat to Lisbon or Cadiz. But if the Philadelphia ‘proved American’ the ship would go 
to Holland instead.145 Eventually it was decided to send the Philadelphia to Holland, but 
believing the ship possessed a valid Mediterranean pass, Low and Gilmore decided to charter her 
regularly between the Iberian Peninsula and New York.146  
 While the trade in Mediterranean passes clearly depended on a weak government and 
haphazard enforcement, it also reveals another layer of American dependence on the British 
Empire.147 The temporary acquisition of Britishness by American merchants offered them the 
opportunity to reduce costs and insure their vessels at cheaper rates. The general confidence in 
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the effectiveness of the Mediterranean passes to confer British identity and protection helps to 
explain why Low’s partners remained unconcerned when the Philadelphia was delayed overseas. 
Wooddrop & Joseph Sims explained to Low their optimism over the fate of the Philadelphia 
with the following: “The papers the Ship has on board doubt not will prove sufficient for her to 
pass unmolested from any of the Barbary Corsairs.”148 The continued consumption of Britishness 
through the purchase of Mediterranean Passes and British commodities reemphasizes the 
importance of the British Empire in the study of American transatlantic commerce.149 Americans 
depended on the British state and the Royal Navy to inadvertently protect their trade in the 
Mediterranean while British merchants continued to serve as the most important source for 
manufactured goods and liberal credit for American firms.  
The initial trade with the British Empire after the war was characterized by its 
multiplicity of schemes and diversity of origins. Some, like Nicholas Low, originated their trade 
through familial ties. These connections often offered vital information about markets and 
strategies for potential profit. This was the case with Alexander Wallace, Low’s brother-in-law, 
who retreated to Britain after the war with his loyalist family.150 At the onset of the French 
Revolution, Wallace lamented Low’s failure to ship tobacco to Ireland, mildly scolding his 
brother-in-law over a missed opportunity: “had she arrived here with a cargo of tobacco this 
month, you would have made a great voyage.”151 Such chastisement was characteristic of an age 
where the line between the personal and the commercial so often blurred. Low’s older brother 
Isaac, another loyalist, served as a middleman for Low, by first providing a necessary 
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150 Wallace was a prominent merchant in New York before the war, but in England he was forced to scrape together 
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introduction to the Madeira trade and then later Isaac set up a shipment of flour to Havre through 
the London firm, Turnbull, Forbes & Co.152 Loyalists like Isaac Low and Alexander Wallace 
were able to act as a conduit of information between two communities, leveraging their previous 
experience as transatlantic merchants to act as a necessary go-between for Anglo-American 
commerce.153 Just as Low exploited his loyalist and familial connections in order to carry on his 
firm’s business, others were forced to form completely new relationships with overseas firms. 
Often these merchants were set adrift in search of business and faced the full brunt of the risk 
and uncertainty of transatlantic commerce. 
 The strategies utilized by Caleb Davis to reestablish his business in the transatlantic trade 
required the assistance of state officials and the active solicitation of new commercial 
relationships. Within the new United States, Caleb Davis’s revolutionary credentials offered him 
the chance to influence state policy and access vital market information. A prominent merchant 
in Boston before the war, Davis served in the Sons of Liberty, and on the Boston Committee of 
Inspection, Correspondence, and Safety. After the war, Davis was a representative on the 
Committee of Tradesmen, served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, and acted as an 
elector in the first presidential election.154 Ever vigilant about the commercial prosperity and 
safety of Boston, Davis was a signer of a merchant’s petition in 1787 to the State Assembly, 
calling for an increase in the power of Congress to regulate commerce and guard against the 
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'insidious conduct ' of Great Britain. The petition accused Great Britain of imposing enormous 
duties on American commodities while British ships and goods enjoyed free passage to America. 
Recognizing the market conditions brought on by the post-war trade with Britain, the petition 
warned of a looming British 'monopoly of our trade' if immediate action was not taken.155  
As a public servant, Davis was able to leverage his position in order to benefit his private 
business. Besides his own public service, Davis exploited his friendship with Rufus King, a 
member of the Confederation Congress, to acquire the latest information before any of his 
competitors.156 It was through King that Davis learned of Congress’s attempts to form a treaty 
with the Barbary powers. King also informed Davis of a potential conspiracy between France 
and Britain to injure the commerce of America.157 King encouraged Davis to distribute this 
information to his merchant friends but to avoid at all costs publishing what he had learned, as it 
could lead to King’s censure before Congress.158 Davis’s relationship to state officials gave him 
important access to insider information not readily available to the general public. As a 
merchant, Davis’s reliance on state institutions and good order to carry on his business serves as 
a check on any type of cosmopolitan idealism that transatlantic trade is often associated with.159 
But just as Davis’s trade depended on state officials for transatlantic commerce, he also 
continued to rely on relationships with British merchants to carry on his trade. Davis’s search for 
                                                 
155 Continental Journal, 26 May 1785; repeated in the Providence Gazette, 28 May 1785. Besides petitions, Davis 
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British connections is representative of a wider commercial dependence by American merchants 
on the British Empire’s commercial stability and prosperity. 
In his quest to establish his business with overseas firms, Caleb Davis sent Captain Peter 
Cunningham to Liverpool in pursuit of a freight. Cunningham was told to seek out any house 
that would offer the best terms, but to give preference to the Liverpool firm, John Johnson & Co. 
Cunningham was given specific instructions to deliver an open letter to the house of his 
choosing. After terms were agreed upon, Cunningham was to sell his cargo and in exchange fill 
up the vessel with a return freight. Then the letter begins to falter, revealing the uncertainty of 
the voyage. Clearly uncomfortable leaving so much up to Cunningham, Davis suggested that if 
the freight was inadequate he should fill up the rest of the vessel with ‘well assorted ware or salt’ 
or instead proceed to Bristol for a freight. Most importantly, Davis stressed, it was necessary to 
acquire the ‘best information’ on Liverpool or Bristol as Davis planned to carry on an extensive 
trade with Great Britain. The ‘seeking voyage’ of Cunningham to ‘Liverpool or Bristol’ with 
such a loose set of instructions was not atypical of the period. The following year, Davis sent 
Captain Joshua Henshaw in search of a freight telling him to avoid London and its high port 
duties but that business may be found in ‘Liverpool or Bristol’ or even ‘Ireland, Holland or any 
other part of Germany’.160 Without a prior connection to a new port, merchants depended on 
‘seeking voyages’ to procure shipments and gather information about markets.161 With Captain 
Cunningham, Davis stressed his ultimate goal of forming a connection with a house in 
                                                 
160 Caleb Davis and Daniel Sargent to Capt. Joshua Henshaw 25 Nov. 1785, Box 12, Caleb Davis Papers, MHS. 
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‘Liverpool or Bristol’ and acquiring the best information about the articles that would answer at 
market.162 
Through Cunningham, Davis was able to establish connections with both Liverpool and 
Bristol. The arrangement with John Johnson & Co. though was strained from the beginning.163 
Freights were sent on credit from Liverpool because of the poor value of Davis’s goods, which 
resulted in a growing debt that Davis was unable to pay. In defense of their conduct towards 
Davis, John Johnson & Co. used Cunningham as a ploy, stating that he was sent with “such full 
powers from you that we made him privy to all our transactions…as if he had been one of 
yourselves.”164 In Bristol, Davis found a more reliable partner through Joseph Waldo. Waldo was 
one of the many merchants pursuing claims against Admiral Rodney for his treatment of their 
property on St. Eustatius. Before the Lords Commissioners of Appeals, Waldo successfully 
defended his claim and won an appeal for the restoration of his goods in June 1786.165 In the 
midst of Waldo’s court battle with Rodney, he began his partnership with Caleb Davis, primarily 
trading in tobacco, rice, and naval stores.  
On February 11, 1785, Waldo wrote to Davis notifying him of an ‘insuperable difficulty’ 
in supplying a return freight to Boston. Waldo had learned that the Barbary pirates had captured 
several American vessels, which advanced the premium on all American ships sailing without a 
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Mediterranean pass. Forced to use a British bottom, Waldo complained that it was “a very 
mortifying circumstance, that your ships are not equally privileged with British, which hope will 
soon be remedied, by some agreement with those piratical states, or by a commercial treaty with 
this, or other salutary measures, the Congress may think proper to adopt.”166 Waldo explained 
that he would delay the shipment while waiting for the American commissioners to reach a 
settlement with the Barbary States. Davis’s troubles with Waldo continued in May, when Waldo 
informed him that he was unable to fulfill any new orders as his credit was stretched “to its 
utmost baring,” due to the failure of remittances from America.167 Though Waldo was forced to 
suspend his formal business, he continued to supply commercial information to his 
correspondents, informing Davis of a potential demand for naval stores in London after a great 
fire engulfed the city’s existing supply. Waldo continued to pass on discouraging accounts of his 
market through 1785, complaining in October, “in short the American trade is attended with the 
greatest discouragmts & embarrassmts which nothing but a commercial treaty will relieve.”168 In 
the midst of disputes over remittances between Caleb Davis, John Johnson & Co. of Liverpool 
and Joseph Waldo of Bristol, these merchants traded in information while patiently waiting for 
the next market opportunity.169  
 Despite the setbacks Davis faced in Liverpool and Bristol, he continued to pursue 
relationships with British firms and even support pre-existing ties. Beginning in 1786, Davis 
began to gradually pay off outstanding debts and in the process gathered information about 
markets and British policies. In an exchange with a merchant from Glasgow, Davis learned of 
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two ships built in America by a Scottish firm that existed in a kind of legal limbo; the merchants 
had unsuccessfully applied to Parliament to recognize these ‘American’ ships as British but their 
application was rejected, “so that they are neither British nor American bottoms and must be sold 
to a foreign state.”170 After a brief hiatus, Davis’s relationship with Joseph Waldo was re-
established with a shipment of lumber in 1787.171 In 1791 Davis received a further solicitation 
from Waldo, Francis & Waldo, advising him of the payment of a dividend on the debt of Joseph 
Waldo and informing him of the ‘considerable’ demand for American lumber in Bristol.172 
Similarly, Davis received an offer from Edmund Lockyer of Plymouth, England who wrote, 
“there is not at present perhaps a port in England where the produce of America sells better than 
at this.”173 The sudden demand that Lockyer indicated in Plymouth was only one part of a wider 
desire for American goods beginning in 1788.174 Shortages in Great Britain, the Iberian 
Peninsula, France, Canada and the West Indies created immense demand for American suppliers. 
Britain’s Corn Laws prevented export once the prices had advanced to a certain level and the 
nation now required imported grain to offset its own poor harvest.175 The opportunities of the 
1790s created by environmental disaster, revolution, and war would continue to require the 
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active participation of British merchants and officials in providing credit, protection, and access 
to markets.  
 
Conclusion 
In the decade after independence, American and British merchants joined ministers of state, 
Members of Parliament, and popular pamphleteers in a creative effort to define British identity, 
empire, and the limits of licit commerce. Bernard Bailyn has argued that “Britain’s Atlantic 
world was far larger and more complex than its formal Atlantic empire.”176 An examination of 
merchant correspondence, Parliamentary debates, Admiralty Court reports and popular 
pamphlets reveals how the intellectual and commercial webs of empire stretched beyond the 
limits of mercantilist trade barriers. These events also emphasize that the end of the First British 
Empire was never a clean break with the past. After the war, the British Atlantic served as a 
space of continual commercial co-dependence and identity making. As a liminal space, the 
Atlantic enabled a series of transformations: British merchants became those who ‘call 
themselves British’ or ‘bayonet subjects’; the products of the ‘Alien States of America’ were 
turned into British goods; and defenseless American ships were re-labeled British vessels under 
the ostensible protection of the Royal Navy. In the lead up to the French Revolutionary Wars, the 
Atlantic would be transformed once again as natural disasters and revolutions shook the West 
Indies, opening up new opportunities for Anglo-American commerce. The next chapter examines 
the unexpected collaboration between British colonial governments and American and British 
merchants. The opportunities brought on by environmental disaster and slave rebellion led to 
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numerous violations of the Navigation Act and prompted further conversations about belonging 
in the British Empire. 
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Chapter 2: Tragic Opportunities for Anglo-American Commerce, 1784-1792 
 
In May 1788, the American Mercury reprinted an excerpt from Edward Ward’s infamous 
1698 description of Jamaica. Ward’s A Trip to Jamaica undoubtedly appeared relevant to the 
editors of the American Mercury, looking back on a decade of hurricanes, war, and disease. In A 
Trip to Jamaica, Ward satirically assessed what he viewed as the chief characteristics of Great 
Britain’s crown jewel in the Caribbean:  
“Jamaica is the dunghill of the universe: the refuse of the whole creation: the 
clippings of the elements; a shapeless pile of rubbish, confusedly jumbled into an 
emblem of chaos, neglected by Omnipotence, when he formed the world in its 
admirable order; the nursery of Heaven’s judgments…the receptacle of 
vagabonds, and the sanctuary of bankrupts, as sickly as an hospital, as dangerous 
as the plague, as hot as [hell], and as wicked as Satan; subject to tornadoes, 
hurricanes & earthquakes.”1  
 
The excerpt, printed without attribution to its authorship or original publication, continued for 
two more columns. All aspects of life on the ‘dunghill’ were mocked, from the general cost of 
living to the scarcity of supplies. The underlying argument was clear, Jamaica was a place where 
in the aftermath of a hurricane the richest man could hardly afford a cask of butter. The excerpt 
would be republished periodically over the next thirty years in a series of American newspapers, 
seeming to punctuate periods of costly military adventures, wild swings of the market, and slave 
insurrections.  
The frequent publication of this scathing description of Jamaica reflects two underlying 
truths: the constancy of natural disaster which loomed over the daily lives of colonists in the 
region; and the tendency of contemporary newspapers to treat half-truths, rumors, and biased 
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accounts as the latest intelligence. In such a place, provisions were generally short and demand 
dependable. In fulfilling this demand, American traders played a vital role in the British West 
Indies. So much so, that John Adams forcefully proclaimed the West Indies as part of the 
“American system of commerce,” a claim which would provoke many troubling questions about 
the loyalty of the British West Indies over the next thirty years.2 As the previous chapter has 
shown, contemporaries hotly debated America’s role in the West Indies. Going beyond the 
debates over Lord Sheffield’s Observations, this chapter will examine how the British state 
grappled with Anglo-American trade in the Caribbean in the decade after the American 
Revolution. 
From 1784 to 1792 American trade with the British West Indies went through a series of 
phases: an initial post-war rush to meet the demand caused by repeated hurricanes; a temporary 
slump as new Orders in Council limited the role of American goods in the British islands; and 
finally, a pre-war upswing of the market in reaction to new disasters, both environmental and 
political. Yet, despite the volatility of the market, opportunity was still there for those merchants 
who could adapt to new Orders in Council and take advantage of the natural disasters that 
marked the 1780s. This chapter looks at the processes by which the state regulated the empire 
during the natural and man-made disasters that plagued the British Caribbean in these years. For 
the state, focus here is primarily placed on the activities of the Board of Trade, which managed 
an immense administrative apparatus that monitored conditions throughout the empire. The 
Board’s main responsibility was the enforcement of the provisions of the Navigation Act, which 
guaranteed the commercial and military strength of the empire. A task which was made more 
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difficult by the independence of the thirteen North American colonies in 1783. While statesmen, 
pamphleteers and merchants debated the Navigation Act and America’s role in the empire, the 
Board was forced to deal with a series of disasters which struck the West Indies in the years 
between the American and French Revolutions. 
In response to a crisis, the Board collected information, interviewed planters and colonial 
officials, and attempted to come to a solution which would uphold the Navigation Act and 
provide relief for the affected colonies. For merchants looking to navigate around new mercantile 
restrictions, ready information on the West Indies was necessary. Even as the British state took 
greater control of the provisioning trade and attempted to force the Americans out, economies of 
information persisted. Merchants, governors, diplomats, and the Board of Trade all participated 
in the exchange of the latest news, rumor, and gossip through the spread of correspondence, 
newspapers, and state decrees. For merchants, this information served as a didactic tool that 
continuously instructed and corrected those who participated in its exchange. In navigating a 
region characterized by amorphous borders and transnational cooperation, the latest news helped 
merchants to configure their identities to meet the needs of the market. States also participated in 
the information economy, both as repositories of information to guide policy and as a bulwark 
against the demands of enthusiastic merchants and frantic colonial governors.  
The first section of this chapter examines the opportunities and challenges created by the 
repeated hurricanes that struck the West Indies in the 1780s. Disasters brought competing and 
contradictory reports of scale and direction which merchants, colonial officials, and the Board of 
Trade were forced to discern. To understand the impact that storms had on the imperial 
economy, this section will focus primarily on the island of Jamaica as a case-study. Jamaica’s 
port of Kingston represented the most important port in the British West Indies. A dynamic 
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entrepôt, Kingston connected the British and Spanish empires under the Free Port Act. Jamaica’s 
size allowed for greater diversification and less reliance on foreign supplies for provisioning its 
slaves. While these factors helped shield Jamaica from the devastation experienced by many of 
the empire’s smaller islands, the 1780s served as a reminder that Jamaica was hardly immune to 
regional disasters. While merchants and colonial officials attempted to exploit the aftermath of 
these storms, the state was forced to chart a course between enforcing mercantilist regulations 
and uncovering the truth behind colonist claims of widespread destruction and supply shortages.   
Section two moves into the early years of the French Revolution and its impact on the 
economic life of the Caribbean. At the turn of the decade, when the hurricanes had tapered off 
and supply lines were fortified, the immediate need for American provisions diminished and 
Americans were forced to consider new commercial strategies.3 The crisis of the Haitian 
Revolution offered the promise of immense profit for enterprising merchants. Opportunity, 
however, came with serious risks. The ensuing price fluctuations, caused by the loss of the most 
important sugar island in the West Indies, destabilized the market. Amidst the general 
uncertainty of revolution, contradictory reports of market glut and widespread demand forced 
merchants to choose which version of the truth to invest in. Merchants who attempted to profit 
from the crisis on Saint-Domingue gambled dangerously with disaster. By studying how 
merchants and the state not only attempted to ‘manage risk’ but also exploited disasters, we can 
better understand the ways in which individuals and institutions interpreted market information 
and adapted to shifting political climates.  
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This chapter draws on the official records and merchant correspondence on both sides of 
the Atlantic which fueled the economy of information. The proclamations and correspondence of 
British colonial governors in the West Indies reveals how these governors justified the opening 
of the ports to the public and to the home government. Every opening of the ports to foreign 
trade was a violation of the Navigation Act, which required a written defense by the governors. 
These papers serve as a useful tool for understanding the inner-workings of colonial 
governments. As a general source for the latest commercial information, newspapers provided 
accounts of devastating events that offered opportunities for adventurous merchants, as well as a 
platform for state officials.  
In 1783, American commerce in the West Indies was loosely controlled through vague 
state decrees and unspoken tradition. Under the Shelburne Ministry, the Americans were largely 
treated as if the war had never happened. At the onset of peace, Americans flocked to the West 
Indies to exchange lumber and grain for colonial produce. The Board of Trade attempted to limit 
commerce between the West Indies and the United States to British bottoms, but merchants 
quickly exploited loopholes in the law. British colonists, for example, remained convinced that 
the order did not apply to single decked vessels going to free ports.4 In subsequent years, the 
Board of Trade continued to clarify its position by increasing controls over the American trade 
through a series of Orders in Council, which dictated the types of commodities Americans could 
bring to the West Indies and further restricted the shipping of American goods to British owned 
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ships.5 In response to the actions of the Board of Trade, Massachusetts and New Hampshire 
issued retaliatory Navigation Acts targeted at British shipping in order to strong-arm the British 
government into reforming their policy. While there was much enthusiasm for these measures in 
the American press, and the Board of Trade even began an inquiry into the possible effects of the 
American Navigation Acts, the Orders in Council nevertheless persisted until 1788 when an Act 
of Parliament made the provisions permanent.6  
The restrictions placed on American shipping by the Board should not be viewed as part 
of a firm and coherent system of rules enforced by the home government.7 At local and imperial 
levels, the British government constantly made alterations to existing policy to fit the needs of 
the moment. Even when regulations became more stringent, the language used by the 
government revealed an unspoken uncertainty about how to handle the American trade. This 
incoherence was partly due to the unpredictability of the weather, but also a product of general 
economic demand for the empire’s goods. Navigation Acts were relaxed and customs officials 
looked the other way to meet the growing demands for colonial produce in these years.8  
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Generally historians of this era tend to focus on many of the events discussed above. 
Economic historians note the dwindling number of American ships destined for British ports in 
the Caribbean. Scholars such as L.J. Ragatz, Selwyn Carrington, and Seymour Drescher only 
mention this trade to debate the dependence and unsustainability of the West Indian slave 
economy. For historians of the British Empire, the period after the American Revolution serves 
as a marker for the first stirrings of Caribbean independence, which were only suspended by the 
subsequent twenty years of war with France. Finally, historians of early America, such as 
Charles Ritcheson and Andrew O’Shaughnessy, have focused on the political ramifications of 
these insults to national honor from capricious Orders in Council and the rising specter of 
impressment.9  
None of these schools are necessarily wrong, but by focusing on macroeconomic 
performance or by marrying American merchant activity to national policy they fall short of 
recognizing the depth and complexity of commerce in this period.10 Rather than a story of 
incessant conflict, this chapter focuses on continuity and cooperation at the local level. Under the 
auspices of unofficial colonial approval, Americans continued to exchange goods and ideas with 
the empire despite the official policies of the British and American governments. American 
merchants were not merely agents of either state’s policies, and focus should be placed on the 
                                                 
9 For these scholars, the most important question of this era was the relative ‘decline’ of the West Indies, see,  
Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean, 1763-1833; Carrington, The British West Indies 
during the American Revolution; Seymour Drescher, Econocide British Slavery in the Era of Abolition (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2010); Herbert C. Bell, “The West India Trade Before the American 
Revolution,” The American Historical Review 22, no. 2 (January 1917): 287; Trevor Burnard, “Harvest Years? 
Reconfigurations of Empire in Jamaica, 1756-1807,” The Journal of Imperial And Commonwealth History 40, no. 4 
(November 2012): 534; Albion, “New York Port In The New Republic, 1783-1793”; Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit 
of Enterprise: Merchants and Economic Development in Revolutionary Philadelphia; Ritcheson, Aftermath of 
Revolution: British Policy toward the United States, 1783-1795; O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided: The American 
Revolution and the British Caribbean; C. A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-
1830 (New York: Longman, 1989), 91. 
10 Bailyn, Atlantic History: Concept and Contours, 84. 
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ability of merchants to adapt to new situations and even take on new identities. In these years, 
there was in fact no contradiction for an Atlantic merchant to act as both a loyal citizen of the 
new American republic and a participant in the British Empire.  
Recent scholarship has reoriented our understanding of the Caribbean as a transimperial 
region, rather than a site of clearly delineated national borders. Historical surveys of the Greater 
Caribbean’s ecology illustrate how natural disasters broke down mercantilist regulations and knit 
disparate communities together. Stuart Schwartz has applied Fernand Braudel’s argument for the 
role of climate in shaping culture and politics to the circum-Caribbean region. Schwartz has 
further identified a cross-regional solidarity; a common thread of ‘fatalism’ balanced with the 
pursuit of profit running through Caribbean communities of various nationalities.11 Matthew 
Mulcahy’s groundbreaking work on hurricanes in the Caribbean has argued that historians have, 
for too long, ignored the impact of natural disaster on shaping market conditions, cultural 
attitudes, and notions of loyalty and state responsibility.12 Mulcahy’s study of disaster and 
disaster relief relocates the Caribbean from the periphery to the center of the empire. For 
Mulcahy, the British Caribbean was a central ‘hub’ from which goods, people, and ideas spread 
throughout the Atlantic World. Similarly, Berland and Endfield have expanded on the work of 
Schwartz and Mulcahy by looking at the impact of drought on the Lesser Antilles. Echoing 
earlier scholars, Berland and Endfield have concluded that the American Revolution was a 
“watershed in free-trade,” that established an emergency policy for the empire of opening the 
                                                 
11 Schwartz’s adaptation of Braudel and studies of the Mediterranean World is important not only for how historians 
conceive of space in the Caribbean but also how they view identity and its malleability, even during the birth of 
nationalism. Schwartz, Sea of Storms: A History of Hurricanes in the Greater Caribbean from Columbus to Katrina, 
Introduction and p.165. 
12 Matthew Mulcahy, “Weathering the Storms: Hurricanes and Risk in the British Greater Caribbean,” The Business 
History Review 78, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 635–63; Mulcahy, Hurricanes and Society in the British Greater 
Caribbean, 1624–1783; Mulcahy, Hubs of Empire: The Southeastern Lowcountry and British Caribbean. 
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ports to foreign traffic. In other words, the pressures of the Caribbean climate overwhelmed the 
closed commercial systems of European empires.13 This chapter will further extend the 
geographical and political limits of the Greater Caribbean by looking north to the merchant firms 
of the new American republic. It also pushes the literature on disaster in a new direction by 
emphasizing the potential profitability of disaster for those operating outside the British empire. 
A severe information shortage, especially in moments of crisis, forced merchants and 
state officials to rely on unsubstantiated intelligence in crafting their market strategies. Rumors, 
like other types of knowledge, circulated through the empire. Rather than viewing the 
transmission of knowledge as a zero-sum power struggle between center and periphery, it is 
necessary to see rumors as ideas which evolved to meet particular societal demands.14 The 
concept of rumor here draws on the work of Tamotsu Shibutani who argued that rumors were 
‘improvised news’ rather than simply pathological lies. For Shibutani rumor was a result of the 
‘failure of formal news’; a product of a situation where the public demand for news exceeds the 
available supply of information from official channels.15 Shibutani’s supply and demand problem 
helps to make sense of the numerous conflicting reports featured in contemporary newspapers in 
periods of crisis. Michiel van Groesen argues that early modern newspapers in the Low 
Countries engaged in a ‘culture of anticipation’ in which editors speculated on the latest 
commercial news to maintain their readership while waiting for information to trickle in from 
                                                 
13 A. J. Berland and G. Endfield, “Drought and Disaster in a Revolutionary Age: Colonial Antigua during the 
American Independence War,” Environment and History, 2016. 
14 For more on the circulation of knowledge in the Circum-Caribbean, see, Cameron Blair Strang, “Entangled 
Knowledge, Expanding Nation: Science and the United States Empire in the Southeast Borderlands, 1783-1842” 
(The University of Texas at Austin, 2013), 6; Simon Schaffer et al., eds., The Brokered World: Go-Betweens and 
Global Intelligence, 1770-1820 (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2009). 
15 Tamotsu Shibutani, Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966). 
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foreign lands.16 Inspired by Shibutani’s ‘improvised news,’ scholars have also looked at how 
rumor acted as a driving force in shaping early colonial history in America. Gregory Evans 
Dowd notes that rumors of hidden treasures and native violence shaped and reflected perceptions 
on the colonial frontier.17 According to Dowd, if rumors did not drive history, they at the very 
least determined how individuals reacted to historical events. This chapter contributes to the 
growing interest in Shibutani’s ‘improvised news’ by examining how merchants and the state 
reacted to rumors of disaster and attempted to exploit unsubstantiated intelligence for their own 
ends.   
For the broader picture of the impact of the American Revolution on the region, this 
chapter emphasizes continuity over conflict and actively questions narratives of revolutionary 
rupture that supposedly ended the first British Empire. Despite American independence, and 
increasingly stringent Orders in Council, American goods continued to flow into the West Indies. 
Even when the ‘American trade’ hit a temporary downturn after 1789, Anglo-American 
merchants continued to correspond and depend on the British state to create new opportunities 
for trade in the wider Caribbean. During moments of crisis the distinction between American 
citizens and British subjects seemingly broke down, allowing Americans to push back into the 
empire. Finally, the information exchanged and gathered by merchants and states offers valuable 
insight into how those who participated in the economy of information understood risk, 
opportunity, and politics, as they attempted to anticipate the next move of the market.  
 
 
                                                 
16 M. van Groesen, “(No) News from the Western Front: The Weekly Press of the Low Countries and the Making of 
Atlantic News,” The Sixteenth Century Journal XLIV, no. 3 (2013): 739–60. 
17 Gregory Evans Dowd, Groundless: Rumors, Legends, and Hoaxes on the Early American Frontier (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015); Christopher Daniel Vernon, “’News, Intelligences and ‘Little Lies’” 
(University of Warwick, 2012). 
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Environmental Disaster and Breaking into West Indian Markets 
 
On October 22, 1785, the American newspaper The Providence Gazette, reported on a violent 
hurricane that had devastated Jamaica and threatened the island with famine.18 At about the same 
time, the English Hereford Journal confidently claimed that Jamaica had ‘felt nothing’ from the 
recent storm. In the midst of these competing accounts, the London Times joined the debate by 
predicting devastation on such a level that it made the opening of the British West Indies to 
foreign traffic inevitable:  
"The late hurricane in the West Indies will occasion such a demand for provisions 
and lumber, that the Governors of the different islands will be obliged to open the 
ports for the importation of those articles from America. This is one instance of 
the inconveniency that may arise from our ports in the West Indies being totally 
shut by Act of Parliament against American vessels, and of which the planters 
have loudly complained; it being possible, that from a public calamity, their 
necessities may be so great, as to bring on a famine...”19  
 
According to these newspapers, the very same hurricane had at once produced a famine, created 
an opportunity, and completely passed by the island of Jamaica. These three articles illustrate the 
immense hurdles faced by merchants who attempted to profit from a calamity when reliable 
information was less than accurate and speculation ran rampant. Conflicting reports similarly 
made governing the empire through the Navigation Act a nearly impossible task.  
The threat of inconsistent information was an unending battle for merchants trading in 
provisions. During moments of crisis, to combat the general dearth of reliable knowledge, 
merchants turned to their correspondents to gauge demand in the ports and acquaint themselves 
with alternative strategies to bypass trade barriers. The Board of Trade faced a similar problem 
of unverified intelligence. While naturally suspicious of reports of widespread destruction, the 
                                                 
18 Providence Gazette, 22 Oct. 1785; Hereford Journal, 27 Oct. 1785; Whitehall Evening Post, 27 Oct. 1785. 
19 The Times, 7 Nov. 1785. 
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Board found that the process of verifying the facts about a disaster was even more difficult. 
Locals had a vested interest in opening the ports to foreign traffic, and colonial officials often 
experienced divided loyalties while in the path of a hurricane.  
In response to a natural disaster colonial governors had a variety of choices available to 
them, ranging in degrees from: the opening of the ports for certain enumerated articles (carried in 
British ships); the temporary suspension of trade barriers; and the liberalization of trade in cases 
of extreme emergency. The willingness of officials at various levels of the British government to 
relax the Navigation Act in the face of such disasters has often been overlooked in this period in 
favor of bellicose Orders in Council and heated Parliamentary rhetoric. This section examines 
the reaction to natural disaster and impending famine by looking at major environmental 
catastrophes from 1784 to 1789. To understand the complexities of this trade, multiple 
commercial and official sources need to be consulted including: contemporary newspapers, the 
records of colonial governments and the Board of Trade, and the papers of several New York 
merchant firms. The letters received and sent by American merchants represent the difficulties 
and potential opportunities merchants faced in navigating an ever-changing field of legal 
restrictions and furious demand. Often merchants located in the same port received their 
intelligence at the same time, but the news they received could differ markedly. The 
contradictory experiences of the merchants examined below, further complicates any attempt at 
generalizing on the nature of commercial activity in this period.  
By studying the multiple reactions to an environmental crisis, we can attempt to grasp 
how merchants and state officials conceived of risk, and acted on the vague reports and 
unsubstantiated claims found in newspapers and daily letters. The information available to an 
enterprising speculator was often the most valuable commodity to be traded. While official 
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proclamations announced to the world the opening of a port, and newspaper accounts provided 
striking details of recent hurricanes, information was also exchanged in secret and steeped in 
rumor and wild predictions. In order to be the first at market, such flimsy evidence of impending 
demand was often more important than official accounts. Disasters loosened restrictions on 
foreign nationalities providing a time and space for identity manipulation and the movement of 
illicit goods past mercantilist barriers.  
Rather than being limited by the goals of a nation state, merchants operated in a 
commercial world full of choices. When New York merchants learned that the Spanish would 
bar American trade with Havana, they turned to New Orleans, and when that failed merchants 
considered shipping in Spanish bottoms.20 In planning a speculative venture, ports of call could 
vary, as might the identity of an individual ship and its cargo. When the 1784 hurricane struck St. 
Augustine, “a captain's nationality or port of origin was irrelevant when it came to providing 
food to a desperate population.”21 Unexpected events also had the potential to redefine the 
importance or dangers of certain identities. Even the most spurious rumors of war could double 
insurance costs on certain flags and offer exciting opportunities for those with access to neutral 
bottoms. Time was also a determining factor in self-fashioning a business endeavor. An ‘early 
freight in British bottoms’ made Nicholas Low's shipment of flour to Dominica profitable while 
the failure to accumulate the proper papers in a timely manner could sink a venture before it ever 
                                                 
20 William Constable to Thomas McIntire, 19 May 1783, reel 1, Constable-Pierrepont Collection, NYPL. Similarly, 
when American merchants overestimated the stature of their flag in the East Indies, they took on new identities and 
traded under the French flag instead. See, William Green to Christopher Champlin, March 1788, in Commerce of 
Rhode Island, 1726-1800. (Boston: Published by the Society, 1914), 358. Such methods were not limited to 
American merchants, as they were a common practice for early modern traders. For example, a British merchant in 
Jamaica complained of being attacked for his commercial method of trading to Americans as a Danish merchant and 
British colonists as a British subject, see, Henry Kelly to Nicholas Low, 10 Nov. 1784, Box 5, Nicholas Low Papers, 
LC. 
21 Sherry Johnson, “Climate, Community, and Commerce among Florida, Cuba, and the Atlantic World, 1784-
1800,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 80, no. 4 (Spring 2002): 466. 
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got off the ground.22 Such strategies depended entirely on mutual trust between merchants. It was 
vital for a merchant to recognize potential options in order to properly navigate a market full of 
risk.23   
For New York merchants Nicholas Low and Thomas Stoughton the initial Orders in 
Council were viewed as irritating hurdles for the provisioning trade. The London Chronicle 
noted that by October 1783, the new Orders were already in force in Jamaica and American 
vessels were commanded to leave empty-handed. Stoughton lamented to a contact in Alicante 
that, “[Between us] the restrictions of the British to their West India Islands is a heavy blow, our 
intercourse with them was great, the quantities of Jamaica Rum consumed in America 
immense.”24 At the same time that Stoughton complained to his Spanish contact about the impact 
of new regulations, Nicholas Low received letters from the West Indies soliciting business. From 
Jamaica, Abraham Cuyler informed Low that flour was already selling for double its rate at Cap-
Français, and if a cargo was to arrive by the middle of March it would sell to a ‘good profit’.25 
By June, a contraband trade was already well-established in order to circumvent the Orders in 
Council, and the Royal Navy was forced to maintain two men of war at Port Royal to combat the 
smuggling of salt from Turks Island to the United States.26  
                                                 
22 The prospect of a war between Great Britain and France doubled the insurance premiums on British and Irish 
vessels, see, Edward Forbes to Nicholas Low, 10 Sept. 1787, Box 9, Nicholas Low Papers, LC; Samuel Chollet & 
Co to Nicholas Low, 12 Sept. 1785, Box 4, Nicholas Low Papers; William Constable to Forrest & Seton, 22 Sept. 
1791, reel 2, Constable-Pierrepont Collection, NYPL. 
23 When Thomas Handasyd Perkins of Cap-Français sent a ship to Baltimore for provisions, he instructed his 
supercargo to conceal that the ship had come under French colors and from a French port from the consul, Perkins, 
Burling & Perkins to James Clarke, 9 Jan. 1787, Extracts from the Letter books of James & Thomas Handasyd 
Perkins, MHS. 
24 London Chronicle, 25 Dec. 1783; Lynch & Stoughton to Peter Arabet, 15 Jan. 1784, vol. 1, Lynch & Stoughton 
Letter book, 1783-1787, NYHS. Stoughton was not the only New York merchant suffering from the effects of the 
new Orders in Council, William Constable also had difficulty turning a profit with his Kingston contact, see, 
William Constable to John Moore, 19 May 1784, reel 1, Constable-Pierrepont Collection, NYPL.  
25 Abraham Cuyler to Nicholas Low, 17 Jan. 1784, Box 5, Nicholas Low Papers, LC. 
26 London Chronicle, 17 June 1784. 
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In response to these restrictions, Stoughton solicited business from a number of West 
Indian merchants. His letters inquired about the state of various West Indian markets while also 
informing the potential associate about Stoughton’s credentials, the firm’s interest in shipping 
goods, and their access to ‘English colors’ if necessary. Finally, Stoughton was sure to mention 
the firm’s London contact and intermediary, James Sutton & Co., in order to facilitate any 
business with Jamaica and other colonial markets.27 Stoughton’s emphasis on his London 
contacts was meant to instill confidence in prospective investors that the firm had access to credit 
and available markets whenever necessary. By leaning on his British connections and access to 
British identity, Stoughton’s tactics reflected the willingness of many American merchants to 
rejoin the British empire, however briefly, in order to make a profitable sale.  
In the British West Indian colonies, the Orders in Council were met with increasing 
hostility. It was announced in The Ipswich Journal in January 1784 that the inhabitants of 
Jamaica refused to pay the British forces stationed on the island until the American trade was 
resumed. Despite official prohibition, by June there was already a considerable contraband trade 
between America and Jamaica.28 Recognizing the important role of American merchants in the 
West Indies, The West India Committee, led by Lord Penryhn, petitioned the Board to permit an 
official trade between the American states and the sugar colonies.29 Such measures though had 
                                                 
27 Lynch & Stoughton to Bell & La Touche, 10 April 1784, vol. 1, Lynch & Stoughton Letter book, 1783-1787, 
NYHS. 
28 The Ipswich Journal, 31 Jan. 1784. Similarly, a petition was issued from Antigua warning of the dangers of 
famine due to shortages and price fluctuation, see, Morning Post and Daily Advertiser, 28 Jan. 1784. For the 
contraband trade see, London Chronicle, 17 June 1784. 
29 New York Packet and the American Advertiser, 1 July 1784. It would be a mistake to assume uniform adherence 
to the Orders in Council by colonial governments. Governor Maxwell of the Bahamas established himself as a friend 
to the Americans by first opening the Bahamas in June 1784 in direct contravention of the Orders and then by 
defending the American flag from insult, see, South Carolina Gazette, 3 June 1784 and Providence Gazette, 26 June 
1784. 
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little effect on official policy. Instead, it was environmental disaster, which determined the real, 
albeit unofficial, change in policy. 
For the island of Jamaica, the hurricane of 1784 arrived in the middle of a disastrous 
decade for the colony. Five hurricanes had struck the island in seven years. For the region as a 
whole, the 1780s are regarded as the most meteorologically active and destructive on record. The 
first, and the largest, was the Great Hurricane of 1780 which killed approximately 30,000 in the 
region and left only sixteen houses standing in Kingston.30 The storm which struck Kingston and 
Port Royal on the night of July 30, 1784, was said to have stripped the trees bare, struck down 
buildings and reefed ships.31 The American poet Philip Freneau was inspired by his harrowing 
trip to Jamaica during the storm and penned an eyewitness account, titled, “Verses, made at Sea, 
in a Heavy Gale,”  
“While death and darkness both surround, 
And tempests rage with lawless power, 
Of friendship’s voice I hear no sound, 
No comfort in this dreadful hour – 
What friendship can in tempests be, 
What comfort on this raging sea?”32 
 
The hurricane of the summer of 1784 ended a long period of tense scheming and market 
manipulation for American merchants. Before the hurricane, business contacts in Nicholas 
Low’s network were informing him of poor demand in the West Indies for grain and little chance 
                                                 
30 Mulcahy, Hurricanes and Society in the British Greater Caribbean, 1624–1783, 111; Schwartz, Sea of Storms: A 
History of Hurricanes in the Greater Caribbean from Columbus to Katrina, 93. It is estimated that as a result of the 
decade of hurricanes over 15,000 slaves perished, a figure which contributed to the growing call for abolition. 
31 For a description of the hurricane, see, Connecticut Courant, 28 Sept. 1784; Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, 
13 Oct. 1784.   
32 Philip Morin Freneau, The Poems of Philip Freneau: Poet of the American Revolution (Princeton, NJ: University 
Library, 1902), 251. 
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of tangible profit.33 Matters changed at the end of July when reports flowed into London of a 
hurricane which struck several islands in the British West Indies. The news forced the Board of 
Trade to open the ports of Bermuda to the importation of lumber and provisions in British 
bottoms.34  
Knowledge of the extent of the devastation reached American merchants by September 
1784, where it was quickly apparent that the level of demand would outstrip the immediate 
supply and force merchants to choose their preferred markets carefully. On September 3, 1784, 
the New-Jersey Gazette featured a sensational account of the hurricane. The report, based on ‘a 
letter from Kingston’, described a scene of absolute devastation as almost all of the vessels in the 
port were destroyed. On land, the sugar-works were hit particularly hard and the writer lamented 
that “no pen can describe the havock, and what is worse, there is not provision in this town 
sufficient for two weeks.”35 The article also noted that the inhabitants had petitioned the 
Lieutenant Governor requesting the admission of American provisions for six months. Though 
the article claimed that Lieutenant Governor Alured Clarke had initially refused the petition, by 
the end of the month, newspapers were announcing that plans were going forward to open the 
port for four months for provisions and lumber.36 Despite the contradictory information offered 
                                                 
33 James Heron to Nicholas Low, 4 July 1784, Box 6, Nicholas Low Papers, LC. For Dominica, Low was informed 
by his contact there of a rumor that the port was about to be converted into a free port and that ‘means’ were already 
used to allow in American vessels, see, Samuel Chollet & Co to Nicholas Low, 10, Box 4, 13 July 1784, Nicholas 
Low Papers. 
34 Order in Council, 30 July 1784, Liverpool Papers, UMSC. The Order was reported in the New York Packet, 9 
Sept. 1784. The Order came in tandem with several reports over the next month describing in great detail the 
hurricane’s effect on the West Indies, see, New Jersey Gazette, 13 Sept. 1784, and Connecticut Courant, 28 Sept. 
1784. 
35 New-Jersey Gazette, 3 Sept. 1784. 
36 Massachusetts Spy, 30 Sept. 1784; United States Chronicle, 1 Dec. 1784. 
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to merchants, the article concluded that the above rumors had already resulted in a mad rush to 
ship out flour to Jamaica as quickly as possible.37 
 The effects of the hurricane were severe; as late as December 1784 building materials for 
Jamaica continued to fetch a high price and the demand for flour remained steady. Amidst the 
chaos, it appeared as if the colonies had completely broken with the commercial regulations 
imposed by Whitehall. Ships were advertised for charter in local newspapers with British 
registers and bound for the West Indies. At the same time, West Indian merchants informed their 
American contacts of repeated renewals of proclamations allowing American vessels into 
Jamaica well into the following year.38 A supposed letter from Kingston, printed in the United 
States Chronicle, declared that the hurricane had accomplished in a single hour, “more for these 
ports and for the continent of America than all the negociations which have taken place on the 
American commerce, since the conclusion of the definitive treaty. For our Governor, affected by 
the exigence that was likely to ensue has opened our ports to all the world for four months to 
come.”39 Most of all, the crisis that beset the British West Indies in 1784 seemed to declare to the 
world the inadequacy of Lord Sheffield’s plan for British North America to supply the sugar 
colonies. The Freeman’s Journal even speculated that any lumber shipped from Canada to the 
West Indies was originally acquired in the United States.40 
                                                 
37 The temptation to focus on the West Indies over safer alternatives was often too much for some merchants. 
Thomas Stoughton recognized this dilemma and informed his contact in Cadiz that his shipments of flour to Europe 
were on hold until orders from Jamaica had been fulfilled. Lynch & Stoughton to Farrel, Strange & Co, 20 Sept. 
1784, vol. 1, Lynch & Stoughton Letter book, 1783-1787, NYHS. According to the Pennsylvania Packet, 11 Dec. 
1784, over twenty ships went from America to Jamaica between September and October carrying provisions. Lynch 
& Stoughton’s focus on Jamaica is hardly surprising given its prominent place among New York merchants trading 
with the Caribbean, see, Albion, “New York Port In The New Republic, 1783-1793,” 395. 
38 Independent Journal, 24 Nov. 1784; Daniel Major to Nicholas Low, 9 Dec. 1784, Box 4, Nicholas Low Papers, 
LC. 
39 United States Chronicle, 8 Dec. 1784. 
40 Freeman’s Journal, 4 Aug. 1784. By the end of 1785, The Essex Journal declared the idea of Canada and Nova-
Scotia supplying the West Indies as a groundless ‘bugbear’ which would not take place for a century. For more on 
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 Though ships continued to embark for the British West Indies into 1785, access began to 
close as early as January of that year. Peregrine Bourdieu of Dominica noted to Nicholas Low at 
the end of January that it was impossible to introduce North American lumber, the chief 
American commodity, into the island. Nevertheless, Bourdieu hinted that Americans continued 
to travel to the port, often without displaying any colors.41 A subsequent investigation by Charles 
Jenkinson, later Lord Hawkesbury, into the trade between the American states and Jamaica, 
concluded that the distress of the colony was largely exaggerated, and “that in fact there never 
was the smallest necessity for opening the ports on account of the hurricane.”42 Jenkinson’s 
investigation largely blamed the Lieutenant Governor of Jamaica for overreacting. The report 
argued that the decision to open the port “does not stand justified either by necessity or good 
policy,” because it led to the influx of American ships. These ships glutted the market, caused 
massive price fluctuations, and left Jamaica with fewer resources than during the previous war. 
Planters, it was said, only reacted to the ‘interest of the moment’ and failed to recognize that a 
‘temporary rise in the market’ did not warrant a violation of the Navigation Act. It was 
concluded that greater adherence to the Navigation Act was necessary and foreign supplies 
                                                                                                                                                             
the limitations of British North America to supply the West Indies, see, Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution: British 
Policy toward the United States, 1783-1795, 193; Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States during the 
Confederation, 1781-1789, 165. 
41 Peregrine Bourdieu to Nicholas Low, 30 Jan. 1785, Box 7, Nicholas Low Papers, LC. Despite these restrictions, 
the Governor of the Bahama Islands had issued a proclamation as late as November permitting the importation of 
Indian corn into the island, see New-Hampshire Gazette, 4 Jan. 1785, reprinted in the New York Journal, 20 Jan. 
1785 and Essex Journal, 19 Jan. 1785. 
42 Narrative of Circumstances respecting the Trade between North America and the Island of Jamaica in the year 
1784, reel 2, Liverpool Papers, UMSC. For more on Jenkinson’s role in the debates over the American trade, see, 
Crowley, “Neo-Mercantilism and the Wealth of Nations: British Commercial Policy after the American 
Revolution”; Johnson has shown that the Spanish faced a similar issue of questioning whether to trust reports of 
disaster in Florida, see, Johnson, “Climate, Community, and Commerce among Florida, Cuba, and the Atlantic 
World, 1784-1800,” 472; For a contemporary discussion of exaggerated disaster claims, see, Joseph Horan, “The 
Colonial Famine Plot: Slavery, Free Trade, and Empire in the French Atlantic, 1763-1791,” International Review Of 
Social History 55, no. 18 (2010): 103–21; Johnson’s work challenges the view that disaster claims were merely a 
strategy meant to force the opening of ports, see, Sherry Johnson, “El Niño, Environmental Crisis, and the 
Emergence of Alternative Markets in the Hispanic Caribbean, 1760s-70s,” The William and Mary Quarterly 62, no. 
3 (July 2005): 365–410. 
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should come from North America only in British bottoms.43 In sum, for the British government, 
the disaster at Jamaica was made by man, not the weather. In the Board’s view, if the planters 
and local officials had used ‘better information’ they never would have made such claims of 
distress and famine. The results of Jenkinson’s investigation would take on a new importance in 
1786 when Jenkinson was made Lord Hawkesbury and President of the Board of Trade. 
Jenkinson’s conclusions would then come to define official British policy towards the West 
Indies going forward. 
The British government was not completely passive in maintaining the wellbeing of its 
Caribbean possessions. As Johnston has shown, over the course of the eighteenth century the 
Board of Trade proactively monitored the public health of the colonies, even at the expense of 
potential economic benefits.44 After the Great Hurricane of 1780, Parliament granted relief for 
the islands of Barbados and Jamaica amounting to £120,000, but relief was typically limited to 
private subscription campaigns and local charity.45 More locally, planters and colonial officials 
produced a distinct built environment in response to disaster by reducing the height of buildings 
and investing in alternative construction materials. While historians have noted the state’s 
growing interest in providing disaster relief by the turn of the century, most still acknowledge the 
limitations placed on contemporaries to ‘manage’ the everyday risks associated with life in the 
West Indies within the constraints of the British mercantile system. This was largely due to the 
demands placed on planters and merchants to fulfill orders and meet the immense demand for 
                                                 
43 Narrative of Circumstances respecting the Trade between North America and the Island of Jamaica in the year 
1784.  
44 Johnston argues that the debate over the relocation of the capital shows that the Board was not limited to 
economic concerns when coming to a decision, see, Katherine Johnston, “The Constitution of Empire: Place and 
Bodily Health in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic,” Atlantic Studies 10, no. 4 (2013): 448. 
45 Schwartz argues that the growing liberal movement of the nineteenth century increasingly meant that the colonists 
were expected to rely on self-help over government assistance. Schwartz, Sea of Storms: A History of Hurricanes in 
the Greater Caribbean from Columbus to Katrina, 98 and 163. 
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colonial produce in the eighteenth-century. Despite knowledge of a hurricane season, British 
ships plied the treacherous waters of the Caribbean in every month of the year. To meet growing 
consumer demand, colonists throughout the empire were forced to ‘weather the storm’ and the 
most common government response was not relief but the opening of ports to foreign trade.46 
The persistent need for American relief ensured the continuation of business 
relationships, despite decrees from the home government.47 Even in the relative stability of early 
1785, the inhabitants of the West Indies repeatedly petitioned the government to end the 
restrictions on the American trade.48 But as governors became more hesitant to issue blanket 
proclamations there was much confusion about the extent of the damage done by a storm. As 
Jenkinson’s investigation had already shown, the British government thoroughly questioned the 
validity of the information received from the West Indies.  
What followed was a constant competition between merchants and officials for control of 
the market. New hurricanes resulted in begrudging proclamations that allowed in American 
ships, which resulted in tighter controls once the crisis had ended. With each successive Order in 
Council, smuggling into the islands became more prevalent.49 False papers, the variable change 
                                                 
46 For the argument that colonists “weathered” rather than “managed” risk, see, Mulcahy, “Weathering the Storms”; 
Mulcahy; Pérez has similarly shown that the Spanish Empire’s built environment was still vulnerable as late as the 
mid-nineteenth century, see, Louis A. Pérez, Winds of Change: Hurricanes & the Transformation of Nineteenth-
Century Cuba (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 79. On government disaster relief and 
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Dreadful Visitations: Confronting Natural Catastrophe in the Age of Enlightenment (New York: Routledge, 2013), 
164–66; Horan, “The Colonial Famine Plot: Slavery, Free Trade, and Empire in the French Atlantic, 1763-1791”; 
According to Steele, hurricanes were “predictable hazards”, see, Steele, The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An 
Exploration of Communication and Community, chap. 2; Alternatively, Koot argues that hurricanes were “as 
unpredictable and devastating as fires,” but they encouraged interimperial trade, see, Christian J. Koot, Empire at the 
Periphery: British Colonists, Anglo-Dutch Trade, and the Development of the British Atlantic, 1621-1713 (New 
York: New York University Press, 2011), chap. 3. 
47 By May 1785, the Governor of Bermuda had declared the opening of the ports for the importation of salted 
provisions due to a recent shortage, see, Columbian Herald, 2 May 1785. 
48 Norfolk Chronicle, 2 April 1785. 
49 Carrington argues that the failure to establish a new system of commerce that excluded the United States started 
the West Indies on its eventual decline, see, Carrington, The British West Indies during the American Revolution, 
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of colors, ‘drifting’ into port, and trade through foreign proxies were all strategies pursued by 
American merchants attempting to get back into the empire. One common practice was to rely on 
the flourishing trade in British registers in order to ensure regular access to British ports. Similar 
to the methods used to ship American goods into the Mediterranean, Americans purchased or 
chartered vessels that were sold as ‘well-calculated for the West India trade’. Advertisements 
reassured buyers of the safety of the proposed voyage by referring to ships that were ‘last from 
Jamaica’ or in possession of an ‘undeniable’ British register.50 One possible alternative method 
was to simply rely on a London merchant firm to send a vessel to America and then to the West 
Indies, a kind of elongation of the earlier triangular trade.51 Regardless of the strategy pursued, 
an examination of merchant correspondence and newspapers from 1785-1789 shows that 
American merchants continued to regularly trade with the British West Indies well into the 
French Revolution.52  
In these same years, British officials put forward a series of measures aimed at stamping 
out the smuggling trade. The Antigua Gazette noted the sale in June 1785 of a Maryland ship 
seized by customs officials while carrying twenty thousand shingles and twenty-five hundred 
bushels of corn.53 As the clampdown continued, newspapers carried the sensational story of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
180. Several historians have noted the broad adoption of smuggling by all levels of society, Wim Klooster, “Inter-
Imperial Smuggling in the Americas, 1600-1800,” in Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent Structures and 
Intellectual Currents, 1500-1830, ed. Bernard Bailyn and Patricia L Denault (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2009), 142; Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean, 1763-1833, 182. 
50 South-Carolina Weekly Gazette, 6 Sept. 1785; Daily Advertiser, 5 May 1786; Daily Advertiser, 27 Dec. 1786. 
51 The Liverpool firm Sparling & Bolden sent several ships to their Virginia contacts to load with lumber and 
continue on to Jamaica, see, Sparling & Bolden to John Lawrence & Co 10 Feb. 1789; The Board of Trade upheld 
such practices in 1790 when they approved of British bottoms venturing to North America for relief while still 
keeping the ports closed to foreign traffic, Lord Grenville similarly stating in the House of Commons that bills to 
regulate the trade with America were meant to protect the navigation of Great Britain rather than operate against the 
trade of the West Indies, see, Newcastle Courant, 31 March 1787; Board of Trade Minutes, 6 May 1790, BT 5/6, 
TNA, f.310-311. 
52 Richard Curson to Nicholas Low, 14 June 1785. 
53 Excerpt from the Freeman’s Journal, 24 Aug. 1785. 
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ship owned by Robert Morris which put into Barbados in distress and was turned away before a 
leak could be fixed.54 In the Leeward Islands, Horatio Nelson earned a name for himself as a 
tenacious opponent of the smugglers. At Nevis, Nelson captured four American vessels, but 
without any support from the local vice-admiralty court, his campaign was fruitless. Eventually, 
the planters were able to successfully turn the tables on Nelson and sue him for £40,000 in 
damages. Nelson was forced to remain onboard his ship until the matter was settled out of fear of 
arrest.55 
Recognizing the complicity of the planters and colonial officials in illicit trade, Charles 
Jenkinson pushed for tighter controls on ships’ registers in the House of Commons. Jenkinson 
claimed that registers should not be granted to any vessel lacking a certificate showing that the 
ship was built in a British dock. Further, vessels should only belong to an individual owner and 
the British government should maintain a master list of all British vessels over fifteen tons.56 The 
increasingly vigilant British government managed to cut sugar exports to the United States from 
the British West Indies by half in 1787.57 For Bermuda, the loss of the American trade and the 
most important market for the island’s commerce, ripped the island apart. Governor Browne 
announced plans to prevent future abuse of the law by citizens of the United States and 
proclaimed his intention to adhere to an “exact conformity to the spirit and intention of his orders 
aforesaid.” The reaction to Browne’s vigilance was extreme. The ‘country party’, which had 
participated in the illicit trade, became violent and the Governor responded by closing the 
                                                 
54 Newport Mercury, 17 April 1786. 
55 James Stanier Clarke and John McArthur, The Life and Services of Horatio Viscount Nelson (London: Fisher, 
Son, & Co., 1840), 108–12; Carrington, “‘Econocide’ – Myth or Reality? – The Question of West Indian Decline, 
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ships sailing as British, see, The Times, House of Commons Debate, 12 April 1786 
57 Carrington, The British West Indies during the American Revolution, 178. 
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Assembly.58 Even in islands where officials did not participate in the American trade, local 
planters could attempt to forcibly modify government policy in favor of American merchants.  
A variety of factors influenced the government’s change in policy. The new Board of 
Trade, which was restructured in 1784, was not made up of mercantilist demagogues looking to 
prop up an aged colonial system. Constructed initially as an experiment, the Board constantly 
investigated the state of navigation and the flow of trade by interviewing corn factors, consuls, 
merchants, and planters. The motives that influenced policy also varied, from a desire to revive 
the old triangular trade, to protecting the peacetime employment of British sailors by maintaining 
a vibrant commercial fleet.59 
The pressure on a governor to supply a colony while maintaining the spirit of the 
Navigation Act was extreme. Governors were forced to open the ports in order to guarantee 
steady supplies after a hurricane, but in the face of repeated inquiries by the Board into the 
conduct of colonial officials, these decrees were increasingly delayed while waiting for absolute 
proof of famine.60 Lacking a clear way out, Governor Shirley of the Leeward Islands wrote to the 
Board of Trade in January 1790 requesting that the Board take back the governor’s discretionary 
power to open the ports. Shirley complained that his council was full of self-interested planters 
who would never advise against opening the ports, and that there were already so many small 
American ships coming to the islands that an official opening would never be necessary. Though 
                                                 
58 The Times, 6 Sept. 1785; General Evening Post, 24 Nov. 1785. 
59 The complex reasons behind a decision to affirm or deny a policy change can be seen in the Board of Trade’s 
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Shirley wished to no longer be put in the ‘disagreeable situation’ of refusing to open the ports, 
the Board of Trade disagreed and upheld the existing discretionary power. The Board further 
reminded Shirley of his duty to only open the ports in cases of public emergency.61 Recognizing 
the American trade as a necessary evil, the Board refused to take away the governors’ 
discretionary power to open the ports, instead reserving for itself the role of oversight and 
management of colonial officials who overstepped their duty and violated the Navigation Act. 
Just as Americans continued to rely on the empire for markets and commercial contacts, the 
empire still needed American goods to support itself. 
The debate over environmental disaster and British dependence on American supplies 
naturally took on a moral dimension over contemporary concerns about the slave trade. 
Hurricanes had a direct connection to the mortality rates among enslaved Africans in the islands. 
This created a vicious cycle wherein planters imported slaves in increasing numbers after a 
hurricane in order to support the sugar economy. Beginning in 1784, James Ramsay’s two-part 
indictment of slavery in the British West Indies called into question the economic viability and 
loyalty of Britain’s sugar colonies. Ramsay’s strategy focused on the economic shortcomings of 
the planters’ monopoly over William Wilberforce’s indictment of the brutality of the slave 
trade.62 Ramsay alleged that the sugar colonies, crippled by their opulence and monopolies, 
would gradually drift into the new American empire.63 Reliance on America did not come out of 
unexpected environmental disasters. Rather, Ramsay described the West Indian planters, 
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gluttonous and blinded by luxury, pursuing profit over the sanctity of the Navigation Act. Instead 
of investing in domestic provisions, the planters only produced more sugar and starved their 
slaves.64 Anti-planter editorials repeated Ramsay’s position, arguing that a free society could not 
hold men in bondage, and even suggesting that the repeated hurricanes that struck the West 
Indies were a result of Providence judging the planters who “torture their fellow creatures from 
Africa.”65 By 1792 an association in London had formed to promote the boycott of sugar in order 
to force an end to the slave trade. The ‘sugar-haters’, as they became known, even penned a 
formal address detailing how a single family could affect the profitability of the sugar industry 
and arguing for individual complicity. These ‘sugar-haters’ claimed that for every pound of sugar 
purchased, “we may be considered as consuming two ounces of human flesh.”66 
The response from anonymous West India planters, the West-India Planters and 
Merchants Committee, and their representatives in Parliament was a resounding defense of the 
necessity of their trade, and their roles as the stalwart defenders of the British Empire. Early on, 
the planters perceived an assault on their interests as Parliament considered several measures that 
would undermine the sugar monopoly of the British West Indies.67 When Parliament considered 
passing the export duty on sugar from the consumer to the planter, in order to lower the price, 
planters in Barbados petitioned the House of Commons that it was a violation of their rights as 
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Englishmen to fix the price of sugar.68 The petition reminded Parliament that the planters had 
already suffered from the economic shortcomings of the fixed colonial system and further 
concluded that any new duties on sugar would only affect the living conditions of the slaves in 
the islands.  
Pro-planter pamphleteers emphasized the importance of the sugar trade to British 
commerce, arguing that the abolition of the slave trade would be “the annihilation of the 
colonies.”69 It was argued that abolition would not end slavery but rather increase the duties on 
colonial articles exponentially and even threaten the security of the islands by reducing the 
number of white inhabitants. An Address of the Assembly of Jamaica in 1792 strongly asserted 
the importance of the West Indian colonies to Britain’s identity as a commercial nation, and 
portrayed the planters as daring pioneers braving a hostile climate in order to contribute to the 
wealth of the mother country.70 In London, the West-India Planters and Merchants Committee 
published their official response to the abolitionists in order to encourage all those associated 
with the sugar trade to petition Parliament.71  
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The abolition debate eventually stalled in Parliament as news of the Haitian Revolution 
began to spread, and war with France became a distinct possibility. It was nevertheless taken 
seriously by contemporaries at the time. This debate not only attacked the planter’s way of life 
but also encouraged the public to consider the planters and merchants as traitors looking to 
undermine the empire out of a desire for greater profit and luxury. For many, the planters had 
become, like their American correspondents, reckless speculators in their own right with no 
allegiance to any country.72  
In recognizing the potential disloyalty of speculative merchants, the British government 
was not alone in pushing back against increasingly aggressive American commercial practices. 
As part of the several Navigation Acts passed by the American states, Americans were restricted 
from trading in British bottoms. Thomas Stoughton warned his contact in Jamaica that recent 
laws in New York had prohibited him from having “any connection in British bottoms.”73 There 
were rumors that mobs would burn down English ships coming from the Dutch West Indies, 
even if they were owned by Americans.74 Similarly, Thomas English in Boston also noted the 
prohibition, but he still believed that his shipment from Jamaica in a British bottom would be 
received as American upon arrival.75 Former allies of the United States in the West Indies also 
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resisted the American trade. By 1786 all American vessels were refused entrance into Havana 
and similar measures had been taken in the French West Indies to suppress foreign trade with 
American merchants.76 
As the push against American commerce continued, British colonial governors believed 
that trade with the other European colonies would limit American commerce while also 
provisioning the sugar colonies. In 1787, the Governor of Antigua announced the opening of the 
ports to goods shipped from any island in the West Indies.77 The British had long used their free 
ports to break down the monopolies of competing colonial empires. As these ports traded in 
necessary raw materials without infringing on the monopolies of Great Britain, they were seen as 
a viable alternative to trading with America. Yet the free port system was unsuccessful in 
excluding American merchants who used foreign ports as a go-between with the British Empire. 
Among the foreign ports trading in American provisions, the Dutch island of St. Eustatius was 
once again ascendant, but the Swedish, Danish and French islands also offered similar 
opportunities.78 Through these islands, American merchants traded lumber, flour, and corn for 
colonial produce. The increasing interest in alternative markets is evident in the correspondence 
and newspapers of the period. When a hurricane wiped out the sugar cane in the Danish and 
Dutch West Indies in 1789, William Constable of New York lamented the loss of two islands 
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“from where almost all our supplies of sugars were drawn, that article will of course become 
both scarce & dear in our market.”79 These islands were important as markets in their own right, 
but they also served as conduits into the British and French West Indies. With such fluid 
markets, ships were sent out with vague directions to stop at a variety of islands in search of a 
profitable sale. In 1788, Thomas English ordered Captain John Taylor to stop at the Swedish 
island of St. Bartholomew’s from which goods could be carried into Guadeloupe in exchange for 
sugar. In order to carry out the trade, Captain Taylor would need to hire a small boat to carry the 
sugar down to St. Bartholomew’s as the French would seize any article of colonial produce going 
to America.80 Similar covert strategies were also used to continue trade with the British islands.  
The nature of this trade did not go unnoticed. This is seen as early as December 1785 in 
the correspondence of Edmund Lincoln, Governor of St. Vincent’s, with Foreign Secretary Lord 
Sydney. Governor Lincoln described a commerce carried on by sloops and schooners going to 
Martinique, Guadeloupe and St. Eustatius to pick up American lumber and provisions. The 
Americans sold these goods to the planters at a 50 to 100 percent profit. The restrictions on the 
trade merely ensured a period of extreme price inflation and short supplies.81 Governor Lincoln 
claimed Parliamentary regulations had only served to ‘irritate’ the Americans rather than stop 
their commerce and worst of all, this trade had enriched Britain’s ‘natural enemies’ in the West 
Indies.82 The trade reached such a height by the summer of 1787, that the British government 
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began to contemplate targeting American produce from foreign islands. In June, rumors 
circulated of new duties for vessels coming from foreign islands, and by August there were 
already stories of armed ships targeting smugglers.83 Yet such measures were only effective so 
long as the weather cooperated. By the summer of 1792, American newspapers again featured 
devastating accounts of the latest hurricane to hit the West Indies. Bermuda and Antigua were hit 
particularly hard and by the time the hurricane was reported in American newspapers, the 
Governor of Bermuda had already opened the ports in order to rectify the ‘very alarming 
situation’ of the island.84 
 The American trade continued because the Navigation Acts were constantly reinterpreted 
to suit the needs of the British government. Laws were modified, amended, and even ignored in 
colonial governments and at Whitehall in order to ensure the steady continuation of British 
commerce. American merchants continued to gain access to the British Empire by manipulating 
these loose rules but also through mutual cooperation and dependence on their British 
counterparts. Rather than trading in a vacuum, these merchants used local contacts to learn about 
the best market opportunities and methods of subverting maritime regulations. With the coming 
of the French Revolution, American merchants would continue to find new opportunities for 
their commerce within the empire. Primarily, they sought the chance to act as neutral carriers in 
any conflict Great Britain entangled itself in.85  
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Gambling with Disaster in the Haitian Revolution 
 
Compared to the numerous disasters of the previous decade, the opening years of the French 
Revolution were relatively calm for the British West Indies. Prices were stable and the British 
islands had managed to avoid the latest hurricanes to strike the Caribbean and continue to 
prosper despite the limitations placed on American trade. When the slave rebellion in Saint-
Domingue began in 1791, it was immediately viewed as a contagion that threatened the stability 
of the British colonies. To protect themselves from a revolutionary epidemic, British colonial 
officials responded with increasingly stringent border controls and the monitoring of foreigners 
in the islands.86 As an unprecedented slave rebellion, the commercial impact of the Haitian 
Revolution provoked the involvement of a wide range of actors throughout the Caribbean, 
including: American statesmen, British colonial governors, and American suppliers operating 
throughout the West Indies. The rebellion spurred on American merchants into action and 
supplies were sent in vast quantities to Saint-Domingue. This led to an inevitable over-saturation 
of the market, which was further exacerbated by the dwindling supply of colonial produce as 
sugar and coffee plantations were burned to the ground. The British government also attempted 
to profit from the revolution by filling the void created in the sugar market by the fall of Saint-
Domingue, but the rapid expansion of sugar production required the British to rely further on 
American suppliers. For everyone involved, the competing forces of the oversupply of provisions 
and the undersupply of colonial produce complicated the potential opportunities offered by such 
a crisis. The Haitian Revolution, then, represents the limitations of a trade centered around 
disaster, and the importance of having the latest information in order to sort out possible 
opportunity in-between the lines of general devastation.  
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By the time the insurrection began in 1791, American merchants were already well-
established in Saint-Domingue. Just as in the British islands, Americans faced several hurdles in 
gaining access to the French West Indies. Early on, the French government had opened up trade 
with American shipping, but specifically prohibited American flour and the exportation of 
valuable French colonial produce. While merchants were able to use several methods to subvert 
these mercantile barriers, the danger of being caught had real consequences for smugglers. The 
American firm of Perkins, Burling & Co. at Cap-Français recognized the dangers of exporting 
coffee, as they warned a contact that if caught they could be banned from doing business in the 
island.87 To ensure that their vessels did not ‘drift’ too close to the shore, American vessels were 
also seized by guarda-costas if they remained near Cap-Français for more than twenty-four 
hours.88 These restrictions could persist even in the aftermath of a devastating hurricane hitting 
the island, and Americans were specifically mentioned in an edict prohibiting all foreign trade 
under pain of imprisonment and confiscation of goods.89 The actions taken by the French 
colonial government still proved ineffectual in preventing Americans from accessing the islands. 
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By 1786, the French West Indies imported goods worth an estimated £21 million from the 
United States.90 
 The French Revolution further opened West Indian markets for American goods. 
Inspired by the actions of the National Assembly, the colonial elite of Saint-Domingue saw the 
Revolution as an opportunity to gain a degree of independence. In April 1790, the town of St. 
Marc attempted to separate from the rest of the colony. When the Assembly in St. Marc 
announced its intention to open the ports to foreign merchants, a civil war broke out.91 At the 
same time that merchants on the island learned of the rebellion at St. Marc, news also came of a 
revolt by troops stationed in the Antilles. These disturbances brought about an immediate halt to 
business for several firms at Cap-Français as they waited for further information in order to 
better assess the market.92  
During the general uncertainty on the island some merchants were more than willing to 
brave the risks. From Paris, Gouverneur Morris wrote to William Constable of a potential 
scheme to supply Hispaniola with lumber, and carry in return sugar from the island to Holland.93 
American merchants also clearly recognized similar opportunities in the island; the following six 
months witnessed widespread market fluctuations as American produce flooded the market. In 
June 1790, and again in March 1791, newspapers carried hundreds of advertisements and lists of 
arrivals from Hispaniola as well as accounts of American produce selling at low prices in the 
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French West Indies. The trade reached such heights that merchants at Cap-Français claimed that 
they were unable to sell anything due to the “great number of vessels in this harbor.”94 Coffee 
from Hispaniola quickly became the only produce that could turn a profit, and often this was 
purchased by American merchants for re-export to Europe.95  
These occurrences of market glut and downturn were also interspersed with periods of 
intense activity. ‘Troubles’ at Martinique had prevented the cultivation of the sugar-cane, which 
in turn increased demand and resulted in extravagant prices for sugar in Europe.96 This was 
reiterated by New York and Philadelphia firms, which noted the increasing demand for sugar in 
America by May 1791.97 Despite the confusion caused by the parties vying to control Saint-
Domingue, The Connecticut Gazette confidently asserted in June of the same year that, “peace 
and tranquility are returning, and the prospect of a good crop is very flattering.”98 
Only a few months later the Gazette was proven wrong as news of the slave insurrection 
reached America and prompted another surge in mercantile activity. The widespread availability 
of news about Hispaniola meant that any delay in informing a business contact could be 
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catastrophic to a speculative venture. On September 17, 1791, New York firm Gelston & 
Saltonstall began formulating plans for a massive investment in sugar loaf but their scheme was 
already too late. On the same day, the Independent Gazetteer reported on a letter from Port-au-
Prince which claimed that flour was no longer selling in the colony due to the scale of the 
arrivals, and added that a dry season had ruined the sugar cane. Despite these horrible conditions, 
the letter noted that merchants continued to invest, “notwithstanding all our advices, the 
shipments are continuing.”99 By October, it was proclaimed in the New York Journal, that 
“American produce is a drug at present in this place.”100 Gelston & Saltonstall were forced to 
call off any further sales of produce as the destruction of the island’s staple crops had made 
prices completely unpredictable. The firm was forced to wait for further information before 
proceeding, yet as they indicated to a fellow American merchant, “[we] dread the information 
that may come next.”101 Only a month into the insurrection it seemed as if the demand for 
American goods had already disappeared. The firm concluded that any participation in the trade 
at this point was merely gambling and would lead to the ‘ruin of many’.102 
While historians have largely focused on the impact of the slave revolt on the psyches of 
America’s slave-holding elites, contemporaries were much more concerned with the political and 
economic implications of the slave rebellion.103 Newspapers provided merchants with the latest 
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arrivals, price currents, and printed reports from faraway markets, which acted as an addendum 
to their existing commercial networks. Indeed, as merchants waited for news of prices to 
stabilize, they consumed the latest accounts of the insurrection from the island in great detail. 
Often these accounts contradicted one another, and merchants were forced to determine which 
version of an event they would invest in. The dependence on newspapers again illustrates the 
inherent risks and uncertainty of business ventures based on disaster. 
It was within this context that merchants read the news that over 200 sugar plantations 
had been burned by October 1791. Newspapers reported that business had come to a complete 
halt as the merchants of Port-au-Prince and Cap-Français were busy fighting the rebellion. The 
port cities were under siege and all the citizens were arming to protect against the possibility of 
an ‘insurgent’ setting fire to the town. Each issue brought new totals of the number of dead on 
each side, and more importantly for merchants, economic intelligence on the number of 
plantations burned and the total cost of the damage to the island – estimated at 111.8 million 
livres by the end of the year.104 
For the neighboring British islands, the impact of the Haitian Revolution was two-fold. 
First, the British colonial government viewed the spread of the revolutionary spirit as a disease 
that could potentially infect their own slaves. In response, colonial governments exerted 
increasing control over borders and immigrants through a series of state decrees. Second, the loss 
of Saint-Domingue offered an invaluable opportunity for British planters. The importance of 
Saint-Domingue for the world’s supply of colonial produce is difficult to overestimate as the 
island provided forty percent of the world’s sugar and fifty percent of its coffee. Yet the 
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economic advantages for the British islands were limited by an inability to meet the level of 
demand created by the loss of such an important market. This was largely due to the 
extraordinary demand in Europe for sugar. In fact, despite the collapse of Saint-Domingue, 
Europeans were consuming more sugar by 1807 than before the French Revolution.105 
The identification of the Haitian Revolution as an epidemic came out of similar fears of 
the French Revolution. Contemporaries clearly recognized the link between the two, and 
discussed a general ‘fear of infection’ for other islands.106 The instability of the islands in the 
West Indies led to an expansion in local government’s internal policing powers in order to 
monitor foreigners, and foreign slaves, who might carry with them the ‘levelling influenza’. 
Inquiries were made into the state of neighboring islands, and intelligence about Saint-Domingue 
was passed across imperial borders as all West Indian planters feared the consequences of a new 
outbreak.107 According to the Governor’s Council of Jamaica in November 1791, slaves on the 
island had so far remained peaceful but additional forces were required to check against 
immigrants who might come with “symptoms of the same phrenzy which rages a few leagues 
distant.”108 Colonial officials responded to the contagion by continuing to issue proclamations 
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which monitored foreigners and targeted slaves specifically. Slaves from Saint-Domingue were 
barred from Jamaica in December 1791, unless they were accompanied by ‘two responsible 
housekeepers’.109  
Taking place within a broader context of state expansion and growing rationalization of 
the police and the army, the home government also recognized the dangers their colonial 
possessions faced in this period.110 This appears most evident by the initial orders given to 
Ninian Home, Lieutenant Governor of Grenada, at the commencement of his office in 1792. 
Home was told to remain vigilant to the ‘movements’ of the nearby foreign islands in order to 
guard against the admission of “all strangers of a dangerous and suspicious character.”111 Taking 
his orders seriously, Home published in the public papers an act for regulating ‘strangers’ and the 
government began collecting the names of immigrants and requiring security for their good 
conduct. Despite these measures, Acting-Governor Samuel Williams, wrote anxiously of the 
immense numbers of French émigrés flooding into the island, threatening Grenada with 
instability and famine.112 While the outbreak of war in 1793 gave colonial governments the 
power to expel all dangerous foreigners, the islands still faced the very real threat of famine. 
Indeed, the ever-present danger of famine in the West Indies now took on a more sinister 
dimension in the shadow of the Haitian Revolution. As the Governor’s Council of the Bahamas 
warned, any scarcity in the islands now had the potential to spark another slave revolt.113 The 
dual specters of slave rebellion and war with France made it absolutely necessary that colonial 
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officials guarantee a regular supply of provisions from the United States in order to avoid 
another Saint-Domingue. So long as these two threats remained, American merchants would 
have a place in the empire.  
 
 
1. Price of sugar in Jamaica April 1790 to December 1792 
The dangers of famine and ‘strangers’ only further hindered British attempts to replace 
Saint-Domingue as the world’s chief supplier of sugar and coffee. From the outset, this was an 
uphill battle, as the prices in Jamaica in the eighteenth century were commonly 22 to 93 percent 
higher than in Saint-Domingue. While British sugar eventually made up 57 percent of the total 
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market, the immediate result was a rapid increase in the price of sugar.114 From October to the 
end of December 1791, the price of sugar in Jamaica increased 110 percent. Making the market 
more unpredictable, the relative increase in the price of sugar was interspersed with wild 
fluctuations in the market, echoing the price changes in the French West Indies. In one week in 
January 1792, the price dropped 60 percent.115 The high cost of sugar ruined several London 
houses as sales ground to a halt.116 Desperate to meet the extraordinary demand, it was reported 
that British merchants had sent agents throughout the West Indies to buy up all of the available 
sugar. To offset these drastic prices, the British government also considered regulating the price 
of sugar at home as well as granting permissions for the manufacture of foreign sugar, to the 
outrage of West Indian merchants and planters.117 The demand for increased production was a 
third factor in the empire’s continued reliance on American merchants to ensure the steady 
supply of provisions and a market for British sugar.  
The New York firm Stewart & Jones recognized the opportunities the Haitian Revolution 
brought to the British West Indies. Weathering the storm brought on by months of price 
fluctuations, the firm proposed a new venture with Alexander Longlands & Co. of Jamaica in 
1792 to carry rum and sugar to North America. In March they assured their Jamaican contact that 
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the market had improved for West Indian produce as the ‘tumults’ in the French West Indies 
worsened, resulting in even greater demand.118 Yet their confidence soon waned. By May, 
Stewart & Jones noted that the high price of rum and low price of provisions had forced a 
suspension of the commerce between the two houses.119 The situation remained fluid over the 
summer of 1792. By the end of May, Stewart & Jones believed that the price of rum would 
decline due to a massive shipment which had just arrived at port. In July the firm revised their 
projections again, they now claimed that trade with the island was only profitable for ships 
coming from Europe, as there was a prohibition against American vessels to guard against 
another glutted market.120 It was only by the end of the summer of 1792 that Stewart & Jones 
had finally managed to send a ship to Jamaica. The firm continued to correspond over the course 
of the year on the high price of colonial goods with contacts in London and Jamaica, supplying 
market information to their British commercial contacts when they could not provide 
shipments.121 
The Haitian Revolution opened up several opportunities for daring merchants willing to 
risk unstable markets and even the ‘infection’ of liberty for great profits. In comparison to earlier 
crises, merchants had access to the latest information from local officials, diplomats, and 
prominent local businesses. Yet the widespread availability of ready information on Saint-
Domingue could not help merchants manage the risk of investing in a shipment to the West 
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Indies. Provision merchants required a crisis in order to exploit the loopholes and loose 
enforcement of mercantile barriers, but the scale of the revolt in the French West Indies had 
disastrous market implications for everyone concerned. Profiting from a revolution proved to be 
a costly endeavor.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated the stories of several American merchant firms as they tried, and 
largely failed, to continue American commerce with the British West Indies. Not every merchant 
venture was a failure, but by studying commercial mishaps over windfalls we can further 
understand the conditions under which transatlantic merchants operated. Failure also offers a 
window into how contemporaries understood the historical moment. As merchants adapted to 
new markets based on preconceived notions of identity and commerce, they often 
underestimated the ability of states to adapt with them. Rather than a series of failures, this 
period should be more accurately defined as one of intense commercial creativity for states and 
merchants. The inherent risks involved in complex speculative ventures required the 
participation of only those men who had an ‘aggressive, atavistic, speculative streak’.122 Often 
disregarding their own country’s political ambitions, American merchants broke through the 
commercial barriers of several different European empires. For Great Britain, this was a period 
of experimentation as well, as officials attempted to grapple with the practical meaning of empire 
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in the aftermath of the American Revolution.123 In a period defined by reaction and 
experimentation, the latest news was vital to guiding both states and merchants. 
Perhaps most importantly, given the failure of their schemes, American merchants 
participated in the exchange of commercial information with the empire. Price lists and state 
edicts were coupled with rumors of war and baseless speculations as the foundation for 
commercial news. This information was most vital in light of so many failures as merchants 
attempted to learn from past mistakes in order to avoid future hazards. While merchants used this 
information to ‘manage’ risk, the quality of the information they exchanged shows how limited 
they were in that endeavor. Gambling on a venture based on dubious information, their schemes 
reveal how they understood international politics, diplomatic relations, and the inner-workings of 
empires. The latest information allowed merchants to choose the best port, vessel, and flag for 
their commerce. In this regard, commercial nationality was often constructed around market 
opportunity. The following chapters will explore how American merchants negotiated their 
conceptions of national identity with the British admiralty courts during the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.  
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Chapter 3: Neutering ‘Real Americans’, 1793-1802 
 
This chapter and the next use the typical merchant voyage during wartime as an 
analytical lens. Chapter 3 looks at the debate over the identity of the crew and the ship at sea 
during the initial stages of the war (1793-1802). Chapter 4 then examines the fate of American 
ships captured and tried by the British admiralty courts during the Napoleonic Wars (1803-
1809). Taken as a whole, these two chapters highlight how the different parties (sailor, merchant, 
privateer, admiralty court judge) understood and attempted to manipulate national identity for 
their own ends. The different interpretations of what it meant to belong to a certain nation 
illustrate how immensely difficult it is to define national identity in the eighteenth century. 
Despite trade barriers and passionate rhetoric, ships, products, merchants, and seamen all 
travelled seamlessly across borders between 1793 and 1809 in their pursuit of greater profits.  
It is particularly important to complicate the study of the origins of nationalism as the field has 
flourished in recent years. Works by Nathan Perl-Rosenthal and Nathan Rafferty have shown 
how American sailors fought in court and aboard ships to force the government into producing 
an official definition of national citizenship.1 Scholars of the British Empire have similarly 
looked at debates over nationality in this period and have highlighted the increasingly narrow 
and strict definition of belonging pursued by ministers in London, often to the detriment of 
colonial subjects. As seen in Chapter 2, the British state increasingly viewed West Indians as 
disloyal because of their economic ties to American merchants. Coupled with this was an 
increasing sense, from the perspective of domestic Britons, that British West Indians were 
racially inferior. While these recent studies have served to highlight the parameters of identity by 
focusing on the disenfranchised periphery, they also run the risk of reaffirming national identity 
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as a tangible, concrete fact of history; implying that those at the center possessed a uniform sense 
of what it meant to be American, British, or French. Rather, national identity should be seen as a 
concept that was continuously manipulated and renegotiated by many members of the 
community. As Kathleen Wilson has recently explained, national identity, like all identification, 
generally lacked a stable and continuous frame of reference.2 As is shown below, the transient 
nature of overseas commerce makes this point even more important, since sailors and merchants, 
whose court cases contributed to nationality laws, often were not permanent residents in any 
given country. 
The first section of this chapter looks at the impressment of American sailors in the 
British Empire. It considers how merchants and state officials dealt with the issue of 
impressment amidst a general scramble for men to man merchant and naval ships. The forceful 
removal of seamen from merchant vessels by the British Royal Navy has garnered much 
attention from historians of the Early Republic in recent years, despite the relative indifference of 
most Atlantic merchants of the period. While diplomats – and historians – tended to discuss 
impressment and the capture of neutral ships in the same breath, they were in fact distinct 
phenomena, involving two very different social classes. The demands of the war and the 
maintenance of the empire required vast numbers of able-bodied seamen to man British ships; as 
such, the British government was often indifferent to appeals for the release of ‘American’ 
seamen impressed into the Royal Navy. As is shown below, this intransigence did not limit the 
creativity of the British government in expanding the definition of ‘Britishness’ to include 
foreign sailors to meet the needs of the moment. On the part of merchants, who relied on sailors 
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to man their ships and facilitate the movement of goods across the sea, impressment is 
surprisingly absent from their correspondence. If the amount of ink expended on a topic is any 
reflection of interest or concern, then merchants were far more concerned with sailor desertion 
than the dangers of the press-gang. The harsh reality was that, from a commercial perspective, 
individual sailors were imminently replaceable on a neutral merchant vessel in wartime. The 
general disinterest of the commercial class to defend national honor and fight the press-gangs 
suggests that historians need to reassess the relative impact of such national issues on all levels 
of society.  
While the first section highlights the many similarities between British and American 
seamen in the eyes of the British government, the second section focuses on the suspicion of 
difference that led privateers and customs agents to target American commerce as a secret 
invading force. As a point of entry, this section looks at the business interests of New York 
merchant William Constable during the French Revolutionary Wars. Constable’s global business 
connections came into frequent contact with the British and French governments as both a victim 
and military contractor. Like many Americans, Constable soon discovered that the key to 
wartime profits was in successfully proving one’s own Americanness while abroad. A task made 
immensely more difficult by the willingness of neutral American merchants, like Constable, to 
adapt and self-fashion their way into new markets. Such strategies made all neutral commerce 
suspicious to the privateers that swarmed the Caribbean and Atlantic waters. The continual 
contact with the West Indies made Americans appear subversive and dangerous to British 
officials, who had already called into question the loyalty of their own subjects.3 This 
simultaneous expansion and contraction of British identity, to include foreign sailors and exclude 
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American (and West Indian) merchants, allows us to situate British nationalism within the 
broader context of the discriminatory and universalizing trends found in the United States and 
France in the same period.4  
In order to dig further into the competing views of nationality at sea, this chapter draws 
on a wide range of sources. Contemporary newspapers featured sensational accounts of 
American sailors and ships captured by Great Britain and France. As the previous chapter 
discussed, newspapers often passed on rumors and unsubstantiated reports as the latest 
intelligence. These unverified accounts contributed to a rising national discourse of America 
pitted against the belligerent powers, and it also shaped the strategies of merchants looking to 
avoid wartime hazards. American and British diplomatic dispatches reveal how the two 
governments negotiated competing philosophies of nationality, but also the striking disconnect 
on the part of British diplomats between theories of unbreakable allegiance and impressment 
practices. Finally, admiralty court papers and merchant correspondence demonstrate how neutral 
American merchants stretched the bounds of neutrality in wartime while supplying the British 
military in the West Indies. All of these documents show how individuals and institutions 
reshaped and molded nationality for their own ends. In fact, what united the neutral American 
merchant to the press gang and the statesman crafting new wartime policies was a similar 
understanding of the fluidity of national identity at the end of the eighteenth century.  
In studying the ship and the crew, this chapter examines American merchants and sailors 
as they constantly negotiated their identity as distinct from the British Empire and even the 
                                                 
4 For the American version of this see, Bradburn, The Citizenship Revolution: Politics and the Creation of the 
American Union, 1774-1804; Philipp Ziesche, Cosmopolitan Patriots: Americans in Paris in the Age of Revolution 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010); For the evolving French view of who belongs to the nation, 
see, Sahlins, Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After; Michael Rapport, Nationality and 
Citizenship in Revolutionary France: The Treatment of Foreigners 1789-1799 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000). 
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French Republic. The chapter argues that while war in 1793 technically brought new 
opportunities for neutral American commerce, the war also called into question how states 
should go about defining American identity. The British, American and French governments all 
issued repeated and often contradictory decrees concerning national allegiance during the war. 
Added to this, was the immense power of commerce to spontaneously reshape national identity. 
Origin, destination, family, war service or even general suspicion could condemn a sailor to the 
press gang or a vessel to the privateers swarming the coast. While the American government 
strove to maintain its neutrality, American commercial practices often called into question this 
neutral identity. In looking at the first part of the voyage from port to court, negotiation over 
identification is the key to understanding how merchants, naval officers, and admiralty court 
judges grappled with the limits of national identity and legitimate commerce.  
 
 
The British State (Im)presses the ‘American’ Sailor  
 
On April 4, 1800 Captain James Steward arrived at New London, Connecticut, after a long 
voyage to the West Indies. Captain Steward brought with him a damning report of British 
conduct towards American seamen in the British Empire, reprinted in several local papers:  
“I was retaken by the Acasto of 44 guns, a British ship, commanded by Capt. 
Edward Fellows, who came on board the Sally himself, ordered my chest open, 
and with his own hands took out of it 1250 dollars, and ordered one of his people 
to take about 200 oranges, (being all I had) for himself, and carried them away; 
the people plundered the cabin and steerage of other articles…Capt. Waterman of 
New York was treated in the same manner, with many others; and Mr. Savage, 
the American agent at Kingston, informed me that he forwarded to the Secretary 
of State, by commodore Truxton, an attested list of the names of one thousand and 
one American seamen, who had been impressed by the British in that single 
port.”5 
                                                 
5 Captain Steward’s formal deposition was reprinted in the Connecticut Gazette, 7 May 1800 and then repeated in 
several other papers, see, American Mercury, 15 May 1800; Spooner’s Vermont Journal, 20 May 1800; Connecticut 
Journal, 21 May 1800; Impartial Register, 22 May 1800.  
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Captain Steward’s story highlighted some of the most notorious aspects of British policy towards 
American seamen: the indiscriminate seizure of men, the robbery of the vessel, and the general 
disrespect shown to American officers. Yet Steward’s account, printed in the Connecticut 
Gazette and other newspapers, is only a partial story. The inconsistencies in Steward’s version of 
events began to emerge in other papers, revealing a general uncertainty about the nature of 
impressment.  
 The story first appeared in the American Mercury on April 17, 1800. Here, it was printed 
with a warning from the editor that the report came from a ‘stranger’ and therefore the paper was 
unable to vouch for its authenticity.6 In the first version of Captain ‘Stewart’s’ story 1001 ‘bona 
fide’ American seamen were discovered to be impressed in the West Indies, and the British 
officers stole 1,250 dollars from Steward/Stewart. Subsequent versions tripled the amount of 
money stolen by the British but nevertheless maintained the claim of 1001 impressed seamen. 
But later investigations into Steward/Stewart’s story concluded that only 53 seamen were 
claiming American protection, instead of 1001. It was further argued that the ‘American’ ship 
captured and robbed by the British was actually Swedish property, sailing under Swedish colors, 
and taken as salvage by the Court of Admiralty at Jamaica.7  
 Deciphering Steward/Stewart’s account, and uncovering the fate of American sailors 
impressed in the West Indies, reveals the continued uncertainty and liminality of national identity 
for mariners in the late eighteenth century. Beyond the realm of public discourse and high 
politics, the role of impressment in American commerce takes on a much more ambiguous 
                                                 
6 American Mercury, 17 April 1800. Though a retraction was promised in the following issue if errors were found, 
no such retraction has been located.  
7 For the challenges to Steward/Stewart’s account see, Daily Advertiser, 28 April 1800; Connecticut Courant, 28 
April 1800. For the tripling of the amount stolen by the British see American Citizen, 23 April 1800.  
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dimension. This section explores impressment through two avenues of analysis. First, it looks at 
how the British state and sailors understood national identity through the impressment of 
‘foreign’ sailors. Here, I argue that the state proved highly adaptable to meet the needs of the 
moment and often responded to diplomatic demands for the release of American sailors. 
Impressment resulted in the negotiation of specific identity claims between state officials, 
merchants, the Royal Navy, and sailors in their travels across the Atlantic. When accused of 
Englishness and impressed into the Royal Navy, sailors participated in an explosion of official 
documentation produced by consuls, customs officials, and traders. Yet impressment was merely 
one facet of a wider story of commerce and identity manipulation. Sailors also transitioned 
between identities through desertion from one ship to another. Therefore, this section secondly 
looks at the relative silence on the issue of impressment in merchant correspondence and 
highlights the few and sporadic discussions of sailors aboard merchant ships. Desertion, rather 
than impressment, I argue was a much more pressing concern for transatlantic merchants. From 
the perspective of commercial correspondence, sailors were essential cogs but also dangerous 
burdens that could hold back the success of a voyage. 
Since the seventeenth century, the Royal Navy faced a continual ‘manning problem’, 
which only became more difficult at the onset of each new war. By the time of the French 
Revolutionary Wars, the Royal Navy had mobilized a force of 130,000 men, a feat which placed 
extraordinary demands on the maritime population of the British Empire.8 While the navy first 
focused on the collection of experienced volunteers, it was soon forced to turn to the official 
Impress Service on land and the loosely regulated press gangs on the high seas to meet wartime 
demands. Impressment, too, initially searched for experienced or ‘able seamen’ to man the Royal 
                                                 
8 J. Ross Dancy, The Myth of the Press Gang: Volunteers, Impressment and the Naval Manpower Problem in the 
Late Eighteenth Century (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer Ltd, 2015), 122. 
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Navy, and these men were offered bounties to join up. Exemptions were also offered to all 
masters, chiefmates, fishermen, whalers, privateers, and other protected persons in order to 
ensure that the steady flow of overseas trade continued uninterrupted.9 In essence, skilled seamen 
were a commodity, at times in great demand, but also susceptible to devaluation based on 
fluctuations within the market. Contrary to contemporary opinion, impressment was never a 
universal system directed at once towards all seafaring individuals in the empire.10  
Despite its gradual approach and own internal logic, the controversy surrounding 
impressment was multifaceted. Impressment threatened traditional English liberties by forcefully 
controlling the movement of sailors who acted as essential cogs in Great Britain’s overseas trade. 
In the French Revolutionary Wars, this violation of English liberty was echoed by American 
politicians, pamphleteers, and impressed sailors who all claimed that foreign impressment was a 
challenge to American independence and an insult to republican liberty. When pushed to it, the 
press gangs themselves contributed to their tyrannical and arbitrary reputation by seizing every 
man in a seaport town or by blatantly disregarding official documentation while onboard 
American ships. A ‘hot press’ had the potential to pick up hundreds of men, but it could also 
                                                 
9 N. A. M Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (London: Folio Society, 2009), 154; 
Dancy, The Myth of the Press Gang, 188. 
10 The New York Daily Advertiser recounted the press in preparation for a war between Spain and Great Britain in 
June 1790, according to the paper, entire ships were emptied of all their sailors but the officers, see, Daily 
Advertiser, 19 June 1790. According to Dancy, the vast majority of sailors were volunteers, see, Dancy, The Myth of 
the Press Gang; Brunsman’s discussion of the eighteenth-century Knowles riots throughout the Atlantic world 
indicates that many rioted over Admiral Knowles’s failure to discriminate in the sailors he impressed, see, Denver 
Brunsman, “The Knowles Atlantic Impressment Riots of the 1740s,” Early American Studies 5, no. 2 (Fall 2007): 
324–66; For an alternative view that reflects contemporary opinion on impressment, see, Marcus Rediker, Between 
the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
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provoke a mob, which would forcefully assault the press gang as it conducted the men on board. 
In 1803 there were as many as 88 riots in Great Britain alone in response to the press gangs.11  
This reputation for brutality was widely repeated throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries and by historians of the Royal Navy and Early American Republic. Nicholas 
Rogers has described impressed sailors as slaves serving the state in perpetuity in order to 
“preserve other people's freedom and independence.”12 Echoing this view, Paul Gilje has 
described seamen as survivors and symbols for American liberty in a ‘capricious world’ ruled by 
the Royal Navy.13 Other scholars still have connected the plight of impressed sailors to other 
disenfranchised classes including enslaved Africans and victims of forced migration.14 More 
recently, J. Ross Dancy’s study of the press gang has moved beyond defending or attacking 
impressment, by relying on statistics to establish the chief characteristics of the press gang. In the 
end, these statistics are inevitably used to prove that masses of men were not ‘thrown into a 
foreign world’.15  
Recent scholarship shifts attention away from the violence associated with impressment 
to its effects on contemporary notions of citizenship, nationalism, and maritime culture. The 
works of Douglas Bradburn, Nathan Perl-Rosenthal, and Denver Brunsman greatly expand our 
understanding of impressment’s role in shaping the political climate of the French Revolutionary 
Wars. They show how sailors played a role in the formation of American citizenship, the 
                                                 
11 Nicholas Rogers, The Press Gang Naval Impressment and Its Opponents in Georgian Britain (London: 
Continuum, 2007), 112. 
12 Rogers, 11. 
13 Paul A. Gilje, Liberty on the Waterfront (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 157–58. 
14 Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden 
History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002); Though Brunsman has contributed to the study 
of impressment, as described below, this is still a surprising comparison, Denver Brunsman, “Subjects vs. Citizens: 
Impressment and Identity in the Anglo-American Atlantic,” Journal of the Early Republic 30, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 
561. 
15 Dancy, The Myth of the Press Gang, 123, 152. 
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maintenance of the British Empire, and as a catalyst to the entrenched political divisions of the 
Early Republic. By politicizing sailor activity, these scholars have offered a new lens into how 
we view the movements, petitions, and court cases of seamen. 
Douglas Bradburn has situated impressment in a wider story of English emigration policy 
towards the United States. Bradburn shows how republican idealism for the universal rights of 
man came into conflict with Medieval English laws preventing a subject from renouncing his 
allegiance to the king. For Bradburn, the debate over the right of expatriation helped to establish 
formal American naturalization policy, and contributed to the tone of every political debate in 
America in the 1790s.16 Yet by solely focusing on periods of conflict, Bradburn has charted a 
continuity in English policy that fails to explain the well-known mobility of merchants and 
sailors in the early modern period.17  
Denver Brunsman has similarly looked at impressment from the British perspective to 
show how ‘cultures of impressment’ helped to shape the British Empire. Instead of an arbitrary 
system of state tyranny, Brunsman outlines the debates surrounding impressment to show how it 
possessed real legal limits and was forced to react to local social, political and economic 
conditions.18 Brunsman’s work stresses the agency of sailors who either resisted the press gangs 
or chose to serve on naval vessels. In response to previous critics of the system, Brunsman asks 
the pertinent question, “If impressment was so bad, why was the British Royal Navy so good?”19 
In attempting to answer this, Brunsman challenges historians to recognize more than just the 
                                                 
16 Bradburn, The Citizenship Revolution: Politics and the Creation of the American Union, 1774-1804, 125. 
17 N. Frykman, “The Mutiny on the Hermione: Warfare, Revolution, and Treason in the Royal Navy,” Journal of 
Social History 44, no. 1 (Fall 2010): 160; Perl-Rosenthal has recently argued for a more narrow interpretation of 
allegiance in this period, see, Perl-Rosenthal, Citizen Sailors: Becoming American in the Age of Revolution, chap. 1. 
18 Brunsman, The Evil Necessity: British Naval Impressment in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World, 13. 
19 Denver Brunsman, “Men of War: British Sailors and the Impressment Paradox,” Journal of Early Modern History 
14, no. 1 (2010): 9; Rodger asked a similar question of historians thirty years ago, when he asked how such brave 
and skilled men could possibly be the daily subjects of tyranny, Rodger, The Wooden World, 314. 
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agency of sailors who chose to resist. Participation in the navy, though perhaps less admirable, 
was an equally valid expression of individualism. 
 In examining how identity was worked out at sea and in the admiralty courts, Nathan 
Perl-Rosenthal argues that sailors were ‘border crossers,’ or a transnational group whose 
movements between states helped to establish official laws on American citizenship.20 In 
studying the documents created by sailors, consuls and the federal government, Perl-Rosenthal 
argues that sailors themselves took the first steps in helping to define American national identity. 
Between 1796 and 1803 sailors and the American government attempted to produce a coherent 
system of naturalization in response to British impressment.21 Much of this rested on the 
question of whether allegiance was a choice or an inherited trait. Most importantly, Perl-
Rosenthal makes two significant contributions to the study of impressment and commercial 
identity. First, Perl-Rosenthal expands his study to include Admiralty Court trials for captured 
neutral prizes, which has enabled him to consider how Admiralty Courts conceived of allegiance 
and national origin in relation to ships and the masters of vessels.22 Second, Perl-Rosenthal offers 
a chronological distinction between the British state’s treatment of naturalized Americans in the 
postwar 1780s from their situation in the Revolutionary Wars. In making this distinction, Perl-
Rosenthal has shown how mariners were able to navigate between states before the war while 
also accounting for the tense period of conflict after 1793.  
Impressment, then, is placed uncomfortably in a period of increasing restrictions on 
claims to British identity. Despite the early attempts by Lord Sheffield to limit British identity by 
forcing the Americans out of the empire and Ramsay's claims that the British West Indians were 
                                                 
20 Perl-Rosenthal, Citizen Sailors: Becoming American in the Age of Revolution, Introduction. 
21 Perl-Rosenthal, chaps. 3 & 4. 
22 I have followed a similar method but with different conclusions below. 
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disloyal and corrupt; war prompted the Royal Navy and the British government to pursue an 
incredibly expansive approach to British citizenship. Any sailor, native born or foreigner, who 
had previously served for at least two years in the Navy was eligible for impressment. By 1805, 
at least 12 percent of the seamen who served in the Royal Navy were from outside of the British 
Isles.23 Further, British merchants were permitted in times of war to supplement their crews, to a 
maximum of three-quarters, with foreign sailors to make up for any losses they sustained from 
press gangs.24 In this climate, British claims of a strict adherence to ‘Once an Englishman, 
always an Englishman’ proved incredibly imprecise. Pressed by the American government to 
return American sailors, the need to distinguish ‘American’ sailors from British tars arose 
quickly - a task made exponentially more difficult by the general makeup of the American 
merchant marine during the war. From the British perspective, the matter of wrongfully 
impressed American seamen paled in comparison to the considerable “part of the navigation of 
the United States carried on by British seamen…”25 It was estimated by Admiral Nelson that as 
many as 40,000 British sailors had entered into American service by 1803.26 
The challenge of distinguishing between British sailors and native-born Americans 
proved particularly acute. It was well-noted that the similarity of manners and language hindered 
any quick judgment by a press gang as to a sailor’s identity. Numerous sources over the course 
of the decade confirm a pervasive concern on both sides of the Atlantic that very little could be 
                                                 
23 Brunsman, The Evil Necessity: British Naval Impressment in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World, 246; 
Hatfield similarly argues that sailors were essential go-betweens, carrying the latest news of religion and politics 
between empires, see, April Lee Hatfield, “Mariners, Merchants, and Colonists in Seventeenth-Century English 
America,” in The Creation of the British Atlantic World, ed. Elizabeth Mancke and Carole Shammas (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015). 
24 Peter Earle, Sailors: English Merchant Seamen 1650-1775 (London: Methuen, 1998), 201. 
25 Lord Grenville to Phineas Bond, 19 May 1796, FO 5/13, TNA. 
26 Charles R. Ritcheson, “Thomas Pinckney’s London Mission, 1792-1796, and the Impressment Issue,” The 
International History Review 2, no. 4 (October 1980): 535. 
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done to uncover the ‘real’ or ‘bona fide’ Americans.27 This was reflected in Captain 
Steward/Stewart’s controversial list of ‘1001 bonafide American seamen’ and in the 
correspondence of American diplomats abroad. Thomas Pinckney, American Minister in 
London, complained to his superiors in 1792 that a sailor could declare “that they belonged to 
whichever nation might suit their present inclination or convenience.”28 Matters did not improve 
with Pinckney’s successor, Rufus King, who continued to press the Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Grenville, for a system of mutual recognition between the two governments. Faced with 
increasing numbers of impressed seamen, and no clear way of devising a method of 
distinguishing ‘real’ from pretended Americans, some American officials could only advise 
American captains coming to the British Isles to take ‘only American born seamen’.29 This 
uncertainty over a sailor’s true identity testifies to the fluidity of national identification in this 
period. Sailors, like ships and merchandise, could ‘circulate’ through different markets and cross 
national borders on a whim.30 
In attempting to chart a path towards a formal policy of dealing with ‘American’ sailors, 
both sailors and state officials turned to paperwork as a means of solidifying, at least 
                                                 
27 Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, 7 Feb. 1792, Founders Online, NARA.  
28 Thomas Pinckney to Thomas Jefferson, 5 Oct. 1792, Founders Online, NARA. Pinckney continued to pursue the 
theme of a common language and culture with Lord Grenville in his letter, Thomas Pinckney to Lord Grenville, 31 
Dec. 1792, Pinckney Papers, LC; and repeated again at the end of his tenure, see, Thomas Pinckney to Lord 
Grenville, 1796, Pinckney Papers, LC. 
29 Rufus King to Lord Grenville, 7 Oct. 1799, Rufus King, “The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King,” vol. 3 
(New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1896), 115–18. For the ‘only American born seamen’ reference see, Joshua 
Johnson to Thomas Jefferson, 19 May 1792, RG 59, T168, NARA. The French experienced similar frustration in 
distinguishing between the British and Americans, see, for example, Consul-General Fulwar Skipwith’s resignation, 
Fulwar Skipwith to Talleyrand, 1 May 1799, Causten-Pickett Papers, LC. The American government considered 
barring British sailors from service in the American merchant marine in 1807, but after an extensive study Treasury 
Secretary Gallatin concluded that such a move would “materially injure our navigation,” and the matter was 
dropped, see, Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, 13 April 1807, Founders Online, NARA.  
30 For the fluidity of national identity, see, Raffety, The Republic Afloat: Law, Honor, and Citizenship in Maritime 
America, 189; Frykman, “The Mutiny on the Hermione: Warfare, Revolution, and Treason in the Royal Navy,” 160; 
Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime 
World, 1700-1750, 83. 
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temporarily, a sailor’s identity. Initially, captains obtained citizenship oaths, attesting to their 
crew’s status as American citizens, from their men before leaving port. This method was, of 
course, liable to abuse and was generally under strict scrutiny from British authorities. On top of 
the disadvantage faced in identifying British subjects on American ships, the British consul 
Phineas Bond worried about widespread fraud in citizenship oaths, “the similarity of language & 
of manners renders it difficult to discover the fallacy of such oaths, which is certainly too 
frequent.”31 Consequently, British press gangs at times chose to ignore these oaths, along with 
any associated documents, and pressed men onto their ships anyway.32  
American consuls quickly recognized the insufficiency of oaths, and on their own 
initiative issued certificates of citizenship to impressed mariners. The relative success of these 
documents was mixed. British officials would not technically support any protections for foreign 
sailors deemed British, and protections did not ensure immunity. This is made evident by the 
case of the American ship Lydia in 1796. Pinckney claimed that documents and oaths on the 
Lydia were ignored by a British lieutenant who left the vessel with only three men and a boy to 
complete its voyage. Pinckney, now at the end of his tenure in office, openly criticized the 
truthfulness of the lieutenant’s testimony and Lord Grenville’s assurance that ‘bonafide 
American seamen’ would undoubtedly be released.33  
The sporadic refusal to recognize oaths or citizenship certificates, and the generally 
unregulated system of impressment that allowed British officers to make sweeping decisions, 
                                                 
31 For an example of the practice of the oaths taken by seamen to avoid impressment, see, Gouverneur Morris to 
George Washington, 26 Sept. 1790, Gouverneur Morris Papers, LC. For Bond’s letter see, Phineas Bond to Lord 
Grenville, 1 Feb. 1793, FO 5/2, TNA. 
32 Morris complained of this to the Duke of Leeds, see, Gouverneur Morris to Duke of Leeds, 24 Sept. 1790, 
Gouverneur Morris Papers, LC. The British government did not always ignore oaths of allegiance. After the 
conquest of the French islands in the West Indies, the Board of Trade proposed oaths of allegiance for French 
mariners entering on board Royal Navy ships, see, Board of Trade Minutes, 25 March 1794, BT 5/9, TNA. 
33 Thomas Pinckney to Lord Grenville, undated [1796], Pinckney Papers, LC.  
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contributed to the view that the entire system of impressment was corrupt. This view was 
heightened by repeated delays in court and the forceful confinement on ship of sailors who 
attempted to apply for American protection. All of this led many to believe that no proof would 
save a mariner caught by the press gang.34 American officials, however, attested to the 
usefulness of protections in rescuing impressed seamen from the Royal Navy, and defended the 
practice when Lord Grenville questioned the authority of consuls to issue certificates of 
citizenship.35 While Lord Grenville eventually forced American consuls to halt their issuing of 
certificates, he discovered that his own consuls were granting similar documents to British 
petitioners in America. This came to light after an impressed seaman presented a certificate 
provided by the British consul in Virginia to the Lords of the Admiralty.36   
These protections were also inherently controversial for some in the American 
government. Thomas Jefferson especially found passports and certificates to be an affront to 
republican liberty, as they implied an innate distrust of an individual’s word. As Secretary of 
State, Jefferson barred ambassadors from issuing these documents without his permission. 
During his presidency, he continued to espouse the view that all individuals found on board 
American ships should be regarded as citizens.37 Both governments were deeply uncomfortable 
                                                 
34 It was claimed that British judges would support anyone the press commander claimed was born in Britain, see, 
Diary or Loudon’s Register, 10 Dec. 1793. Delays could also ensure the continued service of impressed seamen, 
see, Rufus King to Lord Grenville, 24 Jan. 1797, Rufus King, “The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King,” vol. 2 
(New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1895), 137–38. Sailors in the West Indies even experienced ‘corporal 
chastisement’ for attempting to acquire certificates of citizenship, see, Robert Liston to Timothy Pickering, 30 Aug. 
1797, FO 5/18, TNA. 
35 Rufus King to Timothy Pickering, 8 Sept. 1796, King, 85–86. Lord Grenville to Rufus King, 6 Nov. 1796, RG 59, 
T168, NARA. Yet King himself was less certain about the matter and encouraged the consuls to suspend their 
certificates until he received further orders from the Secretary of State, see, Rufus King to George Knox, 18 Nov. 
1796, King, 121–22.  
36 Lord Grenville to John Hamilton, July 1796, FO 5/15, TNA. 
37 Ritcheson, “Thomas Pinckney’s London Mission, 1792-1796, and the Impressment Issue,” 531. Though 
Gouverneur Morris initially issued passports and certificates to seamen while he served as an unofficial ambassador 
in England in 1790 he later opposed the measure as he believed that issuing passports to some vessels would 
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with the current state of affairs but unwilling to make any change that might result in a drastic 
loss in seamen. 
The rate of impressment had drastically increased by 1796 leading Congress to pass An 
Act for the Protection and Relief of American Seamen. The act attempted to formalize protection 
documents by deputizing customs collectors at American ports with the responsibility of issuing 
certificates to American seamen before departure. The act even appointed agents to be sent to 
London and the West Indies, David Lenox and Silas Talbot respectively, to help expedite the 
process of saving American mariners from the Royal Navy. These agents represented an 
unprecedented move by a foreign power and their reception was always tenuous. Silas Talbot’s 
initial treatment by the Admiralty in Jamaica was so scornful that he was forced to return home 
and a replacement was eventually sent in 1799. His replacement, William Savage, had a similar 
experience at first and only began to successfully secure the release of American sailors in 1801 
with peace on the horizon. Yet Savage’s early experience helps to explain why impressment had 
such an enormous impact on popular politics in the Early Republic. Savage claimed that on 
several occasions he feared for his life as armed men roamed the docks attempting to prevent 
him from carrying out his duties.38 The disrespect these agents experienced made claims of a hot 
press all the more believable. It was Savage, after all, who supposedly dealt with Captain 
Steward/Stewart and gave him the list of 1001 names of impressed seamen discussed above.  
The official reports of the American agents never reached those numbers in any one 
location and their successes were monitored closely by American newspapers. The Alexandria 
Times in 1801 carried an official list of 82 American seamen on board British vessels at 
                                                                                                                                                             
immediately put suspicion on American ships without passports. For Morris’s earlier support see, Gouverneur 
Morris to George Washington, 29 May 1790, Founders Online, NARA. For the later debate over these documents in 
the American government, see, Thomas Pinckney to Thomas Jefferson, 13 March 1793, RG 59, M30, NARA.  
38 William Savage to James Madison, 24 March 1801, Founders Online, NARA. 
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Kingston, of which, “3 have died on board. 6 have made their escape, and 36 have been 
discharged.”39 While the numbers may not have appeared encouraging, Savage was optimistic as 
a ‘great number’ of American seamen had been recently liberated and local officials had begun 
to pay ‘proper respect’ to his position.40 This optimism was echoed by David Lenox in London 
who boasted, “in a short time I shall be able to effect the discharge of every Seaman claiming 
protection as an American Citizen.”41 
By 1801 the British government was increasingly willing to release American seamen, 
but this new generosity was also in the context of an end to the war at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. The complicated negotiation of Anglo-American identities persisted into the 
Napoleonic Wars, leading one historian to describe the U.S. Navy in 1808 as a ‘British-
American body’.42 Rather than helping to establish a coherent system of citizenship, the 
continual mixing of British and American seamen undermined the effectiveness of naturalization 
and allegiance policies for both countries. While sailors often relied on state protection in order 
to guarantee their freedom of movement and employment, it would be wrong to assume that 
sailors, the most diverse and well-traveled body of laborers in any empire, naturally felt the 
nationalistic impulses of the revolutionary era.  
As described above, impressment inspired widespread political action and offers up a 
unique window into how sailors, captains, diplomats and the general public understood national 
                                                 
39 For the earlier treatment of American agents, and the Admiralty’s refusal to release any seamen to them see, 
Rufus King to Lord Grenville, 7 Oct. 1799, King, “The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King,” 1896, 115–21.; 
Alexandria Times, 20 Aug. 1801.  
40 Vermont Centinel, 27 Aug. 1801. Savage also claimed to James Madison that he had liberated ‘hundreds’ of 
Americans from the press gangs during his time in office, see, William Savage to James Madison, 9 Oct. 1801, 
Founders Online, NARA.  
41 David Lenox to James Madison, 12 Oct. 1801, Founders Online, NARA. 
42 Christopher McKee, “Foreign Seamen in the United States Navy: A Census of 1808,” The William and Mary 
Quarterly 42, no. 3 (July 1985): 389. 
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identity. Yet notably silent from the historical record are the views of the merchants whose 
voyages mobilized these transnational seamen. In the twelve merchant collections consulted for 
this chapter, impressment is almost completely invisible from the daily correspondence of 
merchants in New York, Boston, Nova Scotia and London. When impressment is mentioned, it 
often is merely in reference to the high cost of shipping and other wartime hazards.43 In fact, 
merchants were generally unwilling to do anything that might disrupt their wartime trade with 
Britain.44 Merchant silence on impressment in itself does not discount the importance of the 
press for sailors caught in its web, for diplomats debating the implications of existing policies, or 
the emotional weight of protecting a new nation’s honor abroad. What it does tell us though, is 
that merchants may have had more immediate concerns than the fates of men whose names they 
simply did not care to know.45  
Outside of impressment, when sailors do appear in merchant correspondence they are 
very different from the liberty-seeking radicals so popular with historians. Sailors were seen as 
essential to any voyage, but they also appear in letters as potential hazards to business. A sailor’s 
testimony could undermine a prize case in the Admiralty Court, their exorbitant wartime wages 
served as a continual drain on profits, and their desertion, like impressment, could potentially 
cripple a ship. By studying sailors on the ship, rather than in the consular office, we can gain a 
further understanding of how they navigated a world rife with opportunity and risk. Desertion, 
                                                 
43 William Constable to Cruden, Pollard & Stuart, 23 June 1796, reel 2, Constable-Pierrepont Collection, NYPL. 
44 N. A. M Rodger, The Command of the Ocean (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2005), 565. 
45 Perl-Rosenthal has recently contradicted this view, claiming that reports of impressment “flooded into American 
merchants’ cabinets.” A claim my own evidence is unable to verify. See, Perl-Rosenthal, Citizen Sailors: Becoming 
American in the Age of Revolution, chap. 5. A more balanced view can be seen in an article by Denver Brunsman 
which describes impressment as a system which merchants disliked but were nevertheless complicit in, Brunsman, 
“The Knowles Atlantic Impressment Riots of the 1740s,” 339. 
 
115 
then, should be studied in conjunction with impressment as it equally emphasizes mariner agency 
and identity claims.  
For sailors, wages served as the engine of mobility. Higher wages tempted sailors to 
move from ship to ship, to desert, or even to take the bounty offered by the Royal Navy. It was 
widely considered that wages, rather than the appeal of liberty and natural rights offered by the 
new republic, was the prime factor in encouraging so many foreigners to join the American 
merchant marine. This was understandable, given that wartime wages were always high. By the 
end of the Seven Years’ War merchant marine wages went up to 70 shillings a month in winter, a 
35 percent increase from standard peacetime pay.46 When at war, merchants complained of few 
available men to man their ships and wages without limits. The sudden rise in wages could also 
prove extremely disruptive to a voyage planned months in advance, as it could lead to the 
suspension of costly ventures to faraway ports. In the midst of war, wages, coupled with rising 
insurance premiums, could prove 'too extravagant’ for most, cutting merchants off from 
perceived dangerous, but valuable, markets in the Mediterranean and the West Indies.47  
Nonetheless, many at the time criticized these economic inducements as poor 
compensation for the “loss of honor, liberty, limb and life” Americans suffered on board English 
‘prison ships’. This contemporary view has led historians to downplay economic factors in favor 
of patriotic rhetoric.48 Though economic rationalism cannot solely explain any historical actor’s 
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decisions, it should be noted that American officials also recognized the consequences behind 
such a rampant rise in wages. Governments were generally unable to compete with the merchant 
service, especially as war dragged on, and were forced to turn to impressment. This uncontested 
truth of naval warfare and the maritime labor market led Rufus King to admit that even America 
would one day need to turn to impressment to supply the navy.49   
Many volunteers and impressed seamen in the Royal Navy took the bounty offered to 
new recruits, but in doing so they made a choice of sacrificing any future defense for their 
impressment to meet an immediate economic need.50 When an impressed seaman’s brother 
applied to Secretary of State James Madison for protection in 1801, his case rested on the 
question of whether the seaman had received a bounty for his service. Despite the validity of the 
seaman’s claims that he was an American, receiving the bounty had made him a de facto British 
tar.51 In pursuing such a policy, the Royal Navy essentially claimed that the contract of the 
bounty overrode any previous allegiances and accompanying documents. The uncertainty of 
impressment may also have encouraged some to enter the Royal Navy on their own terms. 
Despite the obvious danger of naval service, the navy generally offered a guarantee of better 
food, less work and steady pay.52 Because of this, American captains in the 1790s wrote home 
repeatedly on the topic of seamen deserting their ships for British men of war.53  
It would be a mistake to assume that captains were mere victims of desertion. Life aboard 
ship was a constant negotiation for wages and privileges. Captains could demand strict discipline 
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from their crew and even offer recalcitrant seamen to the press gang in extreme cases.54 More 
commonly, captains would desert crew members to lower the cost of the voyage. The frequent 
sale of merchant vessels often meant the abandonment of its crew at the point of sale. This was 
the case of the schooner Jay, whose captain was ordered to sail to Barbados, sell the ship, and 
return home, leaving the crew behind on a foreign island with a month’s wages.55 Vessels sold in 
foreign ports could leave a sailor destitute without any means of travelling back home. 
Abandoned by their captain, deserted sailors were forced to choose between the relative 
generosity of the local consul or joining a rival nation’s vessel.56  
Desertion by the crew or the captain should not be seen as an exceptional reaction to 
wartime demands. Rather, desertion has accurately been described as “a normal part of life in an 
extremely mobile profession.”57 Reports of desertion from merchantmen and naval vessels filled 
the newspapers in the 1790s. To combat desertion, it was said that Dutch sailors were treated to a 
‘continual succession of amusements’ with vessels playing music and distributing liquor to 
distract the fleet when inactive. Advertisements were also displayed in local papers offering a 
reward for the return of deserting seamen.58 In the Royal Navy, desertion rates in the eighteenth 
century rose to 30 percent of the total number of recruits. Deserters from the Royal Navy risked 
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court-martial but prosecution relied on proof of intention to desert, as opposed to being 
accidentally left behind, which meant that execution was rare and repeat offenders common.59  
While general sailor desertion remained a problem for merchants during the war, 
desertion from a merchant vessel to the Royal Navy posed a whole new set of problems. As early 
as 1792, merchants were reporting that their captains had lost men to the navy. The merchant 
firm of Blow & Milhado wrote to Secretary Jefferson that their schooner, the David & George, 
had lost three seamen who deserted at Sierra Leone for a British ship. The seamen claimed that 
they had been abused by the captain of the David & George and convinced the British 
commander at Sierra Leone to demand their wages from the American captain. Despite the 
captain’s claims that the crewmen had failed to fulfill their end of the contract, the British 
commander demanded their wages claiming that “he cared not what became of the vessel and 
cargo, but if the whole crew said they were British Subjects, and demanded a discharge, that they 
should have it.”60 British officers then proceeded to seize part of the David & George’s cargo, 
and the slave ship was forced to carry on its voyage with only seven men and a boy. In the 
aftermath of cases like the David & George, twenty-eight merchants of New York submitted a 
petition to President Washington in 1796 complaining of widespread desertion to the Royal 
Navy in Kingston upon Hull and requesting an American consul to protect merchant interests.61  
Given the incredible demand for new recruits, the British government was unwilling to 
stop American deserters from joining the navy and American seamen continued to desert to 
naval vessels throughout the British Empire. Thomas Pinckney reported that in 1792 alone four 
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men deserted an American vessel at the Cape of Good Hope, and he noted another case of 
desertion at Ramsgate by Americans coming from the East Indies. All of these deserters alleged 
that they were British subjects and demanded their wages from American captains.62 A letter to 
the Salem Gazette claimed that a British officer compromised a cargo worth £15,000 by taking a 
seaman and threatening the captain “with cutting away the rigging and masts of the ship, if 
payment of the man's wages…is not made.”63 Rather than the standard-bearers of liberty, sailors 
onboard American ships were occasionally willing to exploit a British identity in order to escape 
an unfavorable vessel and leverage their wages. Their actions serve to complicate any account of 
the experiences of sailors in the Revolutionary Wars. Despite growing state interference in the 
negotiation of maritime identity, sailors still operated in a world full of choices. The continued 
conflict over the ‘real’ and ‘true’ identity of sailors opened up essential gaps in navigation laws, 
allowing seamen to operate in-between the borders of states.   
The British and American governments continued to struggle to define a concrete policy 
towards their mariners because the flow of labor from one state to another was hardly ever as 
clear-cut as the popular pamphleteers alleged. In 1797, Robert Liston, the British Minister to 
America, suggested to Lord Grenville a revision to the Jay Treaty which would allow for the 
recovery of deserting seamen. Grenville recognized the appeal of such a policy, but warned that 
any amendments to the treaty would need to guard against American consuls “claiming as 
deserters from American ships all seamen being the king's subjects and who may have entered 
into his service or been impressed under due authority for that purpose.”64 No settlement could 
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be reached on the question of British and American deserters, as each side depended too heavily 
on the mobility of the workforce to meet their demands. As Rufus King explained to Secretary 
Pickering, there would be no agreement until a convention had decided on the propriety of 
British vessels seizing “not only Seamen who spoke the English Language and who were 
evidently English or American Subjects, but also all Danish, Swedish, and other foreign 
Seamen.”65 
As foreign policy on both sides failed to solve the issue of mariner identity, the Board of 
Trade turned to internal reforms in 1794 to help define the nationality of seamen. The Board 
feared the increasing influx of foreign seamen onto British merchant ships over the course of the 
eighteenth century and proposed a revision to the Navigation Acts in order to protect the 
employment of British tars. As Lord Sheffield had claimed in 1784, the carrying trade was 
essential to the empire because it served as a “nursery of our seamen.”66 Overseas trade was 
meant to train seamen for naval service when the empire was at war. Foreign sailors, unless they 
served in the navy, were dangerous as they took employment opportunities away from British 
seamen and potentially trained foreign navies. This very fear was celebrated sarcastically in the 
Washington Spy in 1796. The paper asked its readership to recognize the hidden benefits of 
impressment: “Besides, is there a better school for naval discipline than a British man of war, 
and ought we not to be extremely happy, that our seamen are so well situated on board those 
vessels for a thorough training by the time our frigates are built. The British, the fools, are 
working their own destruction by their impressment of American seamen.”67 The Board put 
forward a series of proposals in March 1794 requiring that all vessels in the future maintain a 
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‘due proportion’ of British sailors, except in cases of sickness or desertion. Masters who 
unexpectedly lost the ‘due proportion’ of British sailors would have to apply to the local British 
consul for a certificate testifying to their current condition.68 The Board further proposed in the 
same month that vessels lacking all British subjects should be barred from importation and 
exportation of British goods.69 Lord Hawkesbury, President of the Board of Trade, brought these 
reforms before Parliament at the beginning of April 1794 with the stipulation that nothing should 
be done until “after the conclusion of this war, when no less than 60 or 70 thousand men must be 
discharged from His Majesty’s navy.”70 Similarly, in 1792 it was suggested in the U.S. House of 
Representatives that measures were needed for the encouragement of ‘our national seamen’, 
which would include a drawback on seamen’s wages and the establishment of an apprentice 
system to ensure the growth of a more domestic labor force.71 These proposed reforms clearly 
reflected a desire by many state officials to end the transnational mixing of seamen. Yet 
sweeping reforms were incompatible with wartime demands, postponing any chance of a drastic 
change in the national makeup of sailors until after the Napoleonic Wars.  
Together, desertion and impressment continued to challenge any attempt to define a set 
national identity for sailors during the French Revolutionary Wars. By looking at impressment 
and desertion as two parts of a negotiation between sailors and states over wages and mobility, 
this section has complicated the polemical debates surrounding impressment both in the 
eighteenth century and by present-day historians. The successful negotiation of an identity claim 
was not an impossible task and the historical record shows that the British government was 
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willing to release certain sailors on a case-by-case basis. Rescue, though, was hindered by the 
near impossibility of distinguishing between British and American sailors in a period of loosely-
defined emigration policies, few available documents, and the overriding demands of the 
marketplace. Further, by looking at desertion along with impressment, this section has shown 
how sailors interacted with merchant vessels and the Royal Navy, often playing one off of the 
other in order to achieve a better position for themselves. Similar to the experiences of merchants 
attempting to navigate the stormy commercial waters of the 1790s, sailors recognized the risks 
and opportunities offered by war.   
The second part of this chapter continues this theme and examines how merchants 
balanced their valuable neutral identity as Americans with their continued participation in the 
British Empire. Like sailors, merchants struggled to distinguish American merchandise and ships 
from those of the British. Similarities in language and national character continued to make 
American neutrality a tenuous idea in the face of French cruisers and British Admiralty courts. In 
taking advantage of this identity, Americans relied on economies of information in order to gain 
access to new markets and avoid capture. Increased competition with other neutrals and rapid 
changes in foreign markets made the latest news, rumor and gossip essential tools for overseas 
trade with nations at war.  
 
Shipping ‘Americanness’ in Suspicious Waters 
 
The declaration of war in February 1793 was greeted with much anticipation by the commercial 
classes on both sides of the Atlantic. War would mean the suspension of navigation laws in the 
West Indies, increased charges on freight, and immense demand for provisions from states 
looking to supply their military forces and colonies. War, in many ways, simply exaggerated 
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existing market demands. Yet war also confused the rules of the market as states unpredictably 
opened ports or embargoed traffic. The establishment of blockades and embargoes, seemingly 
the death of any commercial transaction, could provide new opportunities elsewhere as these 
barriers artificially inflated demand and prices in neighboring ports and for those vessels willing 
to run the blockade. In uncovering these opportunities, despite the inconveniences of war, 
merchants relied on information about how a port, and the navy nearby, understood identity. As 
American merchants discovered, their new identity made them vital carriers of other nations’ 
goods, but as the previous section has shown, American identity was largely undefined in these 
years. During the war, the belligerent parties often viewed Americans suspiciously as French 
smugglers or English spies. The task of merchants was to avoid or disprove these assumptions in 
order to successfully gain access to foreign markets. In order to do so, Americans first needed to 
prove their Americanness in order to claim neutrality. The letters sent back and forth further 
reveal a larger debate taking place between merchants and state officials regarding the limits of 
national identity and belonging in the eighteenth century.  
It has long been established that the war between Britain and France gave American 
merchants a commanding presence in markets as the sole supplier of colonial produce. Douglas 
North famously recognized the impact of this trade on the American economy, declaring that 
events in Europe from 1793 to 1814 helped to explain “every twist and turn” in the fortunes of 
America. For these years, North charted the millions of pounds of sugar, coffee, tobacco, and 
food stuffs that Americans carried to Europe and the West Indies. These goods mobilized a 
massive domestic shipping force, which in turn led to a rapid expansion in the American 
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economy.72 North’s argument has since been challenged by historians who have claimed that the 
benefits of American neutrality were offset by the nature of a trade that was socially limited, 
commodity-specific, and costly for the nation.73 Yet the relative economic merits of neutrality 
are perhaps beside the point. More recently, scholars have moved beyond the question of the 
North thesis to consider this trade in the context of American interaction with foreign states in 
the Atlantic. Peter Hill, for example, has looked at American trade from the French viewpoint, 
arguing that French seizures of American vessels were prompted by the overriding suspicion that 
Americans were greedy and unscrupulous traders who were constantly suspected of concealing 
their true British identity.74  
Suspicions of American merchants concealing their identity were only a symptom of the 
greater uncertainties in transatlantic shipping in this era. Silvia Marzagalli and Javier Cuenca-
Esteban have each focused on the ambiguity of trade during the Revolutionary Wars. 
Marzagalli’s research into American trade with Bordeaux and the ‘failure’ of the establishment 
of greater commercial ties between the two countries has revealed that the ‘French’ merchants 
trading with America were often really settled American or Irish traders. These men were fluent 
in English and already possessed deep commercial ties to the United States, making the trade 
                                                 
72 Douglass C. North, The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-1860. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
1961), chaps. 4 & 5. 
73 Donald R. Adams, “American Neutrality and Prosperity, 1793-1808: A Reconsideration,” The Journal of 
Economic History 40, no. 4 (December 1980): 734–35; J.H. Coatsworth even claimed that along with the dangers of 
the carrying trade, it also meant that peace in Europe could lead to a depression in the United States. J. H. 
Coatsworth, “American Trade with European Colonies in the Caribbean and South America, 1790-1812,” The 
William and Mary Quarterly 24, no. 2 (1967): 243–66; Updating this argument, O’Rourke has argued that the wars 
and repeated embargoes “seriously impeded trade”, see, Kevin H. O’Rourke, “The Worldwide Economic Impact of 
the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815,” Journal of Global History 1, no. 01 (2006): 146; 
Lance Davis and Stanley Engerman, Naval Blockades in Peace and War an Economic History since 1750 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
74 Peter P. Hill, “Prologue to the Quasi-War: Stresses in Franco-American Commercial Relations, 1793-96,” The 
Journal of Modern History 49, no. 1 (1977): D1046, D1054; Most damning, the French suspected that the 
Americans were funneling French specie to London to payoff American debts. For the French perception of 
Americans in the Napoleon Era, see, Peter P. Hill, Napoleon’s Troublesome Americans Franco-American Relations, 
1804-1815 (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005). 
 
125 
between the countries a narrow and exclusive enterprise. Cuenca-Esteban has approached 
transatlantic commerce in this period from another angle to show that British exports to the 
United States during the war were really ‘ghost’ exports that were subsequently reshipped to 
promising markets in Spanish America.75 In considering the identity of the merchants and 
products moving across the Atlantic, these historians have highlighted the unsettled nature of 
transatlantic commerce in the eighteenth century. Exports for one country could be secretly 
spirited away to another continent and new American trades with foreign countries may have 
simply acted as an extension of preexisting commercial ties.   
Given recent historiography, it is safe to assume that war saw an intense interest from all 
sides into the nature of American commercial identity. In the previous decade, Americans had 
struggled to reacquire the old privileges they enjoyed as British subjects while also avoiding the 
immense dangers associated with their new national identity in the Mediterranean. With the war, 
Americans were ‘neuter’, meaning neither British nor French, and could therefore move in-
between empires. In this sense, to be ‘American’ during the war was to have all European 
markets open to trade. Like impressed seamen, merchants defended their claims of American 
identity in courts and on the high seas. This section looks at how merchants attempted to avoid 
capture, and position their transactions as neutral and American. In doing so, it also highlights 
how the state conceived of commercial identity during war and how flexible such definitions 
could be to meet wartime demands. The following chapter will complete the merchant voyage by 
looking at how this neutrality was debated in the Admiralty courts and in the popular press.  
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 Merchant firms throughout the British Empire quickly recognized the commercial 
consequences of war for their American contacts. Within a week of the declaration of war in 
February 1793, London firm Edward MacCulloch & Co. wrote hurriedly to Nicholas Low that 
“[t]he American flag & produce will feel the advantage of being neutral on this occasion.”76 This 
sentiment was echoed by other British firms to their American contacts in the following weeks; 
the war that many merchants had anticipated for the last five years had finally arrived. The 
general consensus of these firms was that Americans would command the carrying trade ‘while’ 
and ‘if’ they remained neutral.77 The question of commercial success, then, became a conditional 
one, equally as dependent on American merchants appearing neutral as it was on their 
government acting neutral. Even then, the appearance of being neutral was deeply complicated 
since British privateers did not capture American vessels for technically violating their 
neutrality. Instead, the language used to justify a prize in these initial years of the war, tended to 
focus on the identity of the property on board rather than broader violations of international law.  
 Privateers claimed that the suspicion of French property and the intended destination of a 
ship effectively altered the American character of the voyage. When capturing vessels, suspicion 
was given priority over any hard proof in a privateer’s possession. When the American brig 
Aurora was captured in June 1793, for example, it was reported that the sole reason for its 
detention was the privateer’s suspicion of the American vessel having French property on board. 
Similar captures throughout the West Indies were repeatedly justified on this suspicion of French 
property. In capturing vessels without real evidence, the privateers were shielded by the 
unprecedented new instructions sent to commanders of men of war and privateers on June 8, 
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1793. These instructions considered grain as contraband, arguing that the French government 
was the only real importer of provisions into French ports. If the French government was the 
only real buyer of grain, it was argued, then the possession of any kind of grain warranted 
capture. Once a vessel was brought before an admiralty court, emphasis was finally placed on 
actual evidence discovered after the vessel was seized. But even in court, suspicions could alter 
the degree of proof necessary to prosecute a case.78 Contributing to this web of suspicion, the 
British minister to America, George Hammond, declared to Lord Grenville that he would 
regularly supply British cruisers with information on all vessels leaving Philadelphia “which I 
may suspect of having French property…”79 Hammond’s spying apparently garnered results as 
American vessels were repeatedly captured in the West Indies and carried into British ports 
during the summer of 1793 under suspicion of hiding their true French identity.80  
 By February 1794, the British government had declared all of the French West Indies 
under blockade. This blockade – really a paper blockade – could never have been successfully 
enforced by the navy. The use of privateers though allowed the British to make fixed claims on 
territories they could not possibly hold.81 Instead, the point was to push forward a guiding 
principle for British privateers, which justified the capture of American ships based on their 
suspected destination to the French islands. Capture based on destination was an incredibly 
difficult case to settle as smuggling was rampant and legitimate voyages often changed their 
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ports of call to meet new market demands. Even insurance policies were generally taken out with 
a vague destination in mind, often avoiding only specific areas of piracy or blockade. Otherwise, 
captains were given a broad ‘liberty to touch’ at any port in Europe or the West Indies.82 This 
practice was widely known and perceived as extremely liable to abuse. The American consul in 
Hamburg, for example, believed that American captains were secretly shipping wheat to France 
while claiming to go to Lisbon. Despite swearing to their destinations, the consul continued to 
worry that American ships would sneak off to French ports, which would eventually lead to 
capture by British cruisers.83 Like with suspicion, capture because of intended destination rested 
on appearances above all else. 
 Due to the British blockade, and the liberties granted to privateers in the initial months of 
the war, the prizes captured in the West Indies were numerous. These successes led Governor 
Henry Hamilton of Bermuda to boast in 1793 that his ships had captured £18,000 worth of prizes 
in a few months, and that the spirit of privateering had only increased with these successes. Yet 
Hamilton also noted in the same year that Bermudians and Americans had intermarried since the 
previous war and knowledge of how to subvert the islands’ customs agents was well-known in 
America. Hamilton believed the intermingling of Americans and Bermudans had thus far 
contributed to the success of the privateers (as Bermudans also possessed knowledge of 
America), but he also worried about the potential consequences if a future war with America 
occurred.84 Hamilton’s misgivings about the Bermudians were hardly surprising. According to 
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Michael Jarvis, Bermuda maintained a much closer commercial relationship with North America 
than with Great Britain in the eighteenth century. Moreover, much like the Americans before and 
after independence, Bermudians were notorious for their disregard of the Navigation Acts in the 
pursuit of profit.85 
Hamilton’s uncertainty over the allegiance and identity of Bermudans went beyond the 
capture of American vessels. In March 1794, the Attorney General of Bermuda tried Josiah 
Meigs for sedition based on comments that Meigs had made in the Attorney General’s presence. 
Meigs allegedly insulted the admiralty jurisdiction of the government by insinuating that 
America should go to war with Great Britain for the instructions issued to privateers. Even more 
damning, it was said that Meigs had offered tacit support for the French Republic, which made 
Meigs, in the Attorney General’s view, a “maintainer & abettor of the French republicanism.”86 
Meigs was eventually released on condition of good behavior, but not before his friends were 
examined to discover any hidden sympathies Meigs may have held for French republicanism. 
Meigs’s examination before the Governor’s Council illustrates the increasingly tense and 
suspicious atmosphere of the British West Indies in the war years. It also draws attention to the 
instability of identity during the revolution; in the eyes of their own government, Bermudians 
were at once: French republicans, disloyal Americans, and British privateers.  
                                                                                                                                                             
soon declare war on Britain and never tired of sending the Home Government evidence to support his views, see, 
Henry Hamilton to Henry Dundas, 12 March 1794, CO 37/45, TNA. 
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Fear of sedition was not helped by the state of the island in 1793. Despite Hamilton’s 
boasting to Dundas about the value of his prizes, Bermuda was as poorly supplied during the war 
as in any other period in its history. To feed the inhabitants of the British West Indies, it was still 
necessary to depend on American goods.87 Despite his fears of American knowledge, Hamilton 
opened the ports to the importation of provisions for six months in 1793, and the proclamation 
was renewed almost continuously through 1795. British governors in Barbados, Grenada, 
Jamaica and in the conquered French islands similarly followed suit.88 Just as in the previous 
decade, letters from Whitehall strongly opposed opening the ports to neutral traffic as “highly 
dangerous” and as a “measure not only illegal and contrary to the commercial policy of this 
kingdom, but subject to improper communications.”89 The Board of Trade echoed this sentiment, 
and condemned the opening of the ports to foreign vessels as unjustifiable except in cases of 
‘absolute necessity’.90 By 1795, the Jay Treaty temporarily settled the question of foreign trade 
in the British islands, but it did not alleviate the fears of the colonial and home governments that 
suspicious persons were working in the islands to undermine the war effort.91 
Nervous about these ‘improper communications’ with foreigners, Parliament in 1793 
attempted to limit the continued border crossings that characterized so many relations in the 
West Indies. In order to better control wartime commerce, Parliament passed the Bill for 
Preventing Traitorous Correspondence. As the Attorney General explained to Parliament, this 
bill was merely meant to prevent trade with His Majesty’s enemies by expanding the definition 
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of treason to include the sale of provisions and arms. In doing so, the bill also implicitly 
recognized that letters between belligerent powers could not be stopped, as it would “destroy all 
commercial communication.”92 It would have been uncharacteristically harsh, from the 
perspective of the government, for merchants to be barred from carrying on commercial 
correspondence with their business contacts in enemy territory. In the same spirit as the 
Traitorous Correspondence Bill, foreigners were expelled from the British islands or forced to 
justify their presence before the local government. Over the course of the decade, orders were 
issued by the Earl of Balcarres of Jamaica (1795) and Governor Beckwith in Bermuda (1799) 
ordering the expulsion of all unauthorized foreigners from British colonies.93 Fear of foreign 
influence continued despite these efforts, leading Home Secretary Portland to claim that the 
insurrection of the maroons in Jamaica was brought about by a cabal of “His Majesty’s Enemies 
in Saint Domingo, in concert with those residing in the North American Provinces, and in 
Jamaica itself.”94  
The tense and confused atmosphere that pervaded the British West Indies during the war 
made commerce a dangerous game. In pursuing a profitable voyage, merchants traded in 
information about the latest policies, blockades and embargoes. The demands offered by the war 
and the repeated opening of the ports often offset the risks of a venture to the West Indies. Each 
capture of a neutral vessel increased the risk for all shippers and could potentially explode the 
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price for colonial goods at home and in Europe, making risky ventures even more alluring.95 The 
temptation to dominate the carrying trade also forced merchants to make sense of British policies 
that both welcomed foreign commerce and suspected foreigners as hidden insurgents or enemy 
smugglers. In order to understand how merchants handled the risks associated with trade during 
the war, it is necessary to look more closely at an individual merchant’s experience. A qualitative 
approach has an advantage over considering merchants en masse as it is better able to reveal the 
nuances of identity negotiation particular to this study. William Constable of New York provides 
an invaluable example of this experience, as his trade with both countries during the war allowed 
him to experience these commercial policies, and their inconsistencies, firsthand. 
  William Constable, born in Dublin in 1752, began his career as a fur trader to the 
important London firm of Phyn & Ellice in 1769. By 1800, Constable owned about ten percent 
of New York State. While growing his business, Constable made important connections to 
several prominent New York families. These connections included the Morris family of New 
York, a relationship which he used to his advantage in acquiring a tobacco contract with France, 
and as a vital source of commercial information on French policies during the Revolution. Along 
with his transatlantic commerce, Constable also participated in land speculation and the early 
China trade with mixed results.96  
Constable spent the initial years of the war in Europe, where he coordinated his business 
transactions with contacts in London, Cadiz, Lisbon, Bordeaux, Canton, and the British and 
French West Indies. As has been shown in previous chapters, the breadth of Constable’s business 
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contacts was not exceptional when compared to other transatlantic merchants. Nor was he 
particularly successful at navigating the stormy waters of commercial traffic during the war. In 
fact, Constable fell victim to both the British and French governments despite his valuable 
network of informers. Nevertheless, much like the American traders in the 1780s, Constable’s 
failures offer exceptional insight into the nature of transatlantic trade and identity manipulation 
during the French Revolution. Constable lost ships to the French during the Bordeaux embargo 
(1793-1794) and to British privateers while trading in the British East Indies under a foreign flag 
(1793). While the belligerent powers seized his property, Constable pursued a scheme to furnish 
British troops in the West Indies with cattle, hoping to profit from a valuable victualing contract. 
For a study into how merchants attempted to prove their American identity, Constable is 
essential. Captured by both, he was forced to learn how best to negotiate his identity, and 
because of his troubles we are offered a window into how merchants and states differed in their 
interpretations of true allegiance and national identity.  
 Given the dangerous situation in Europe, Constable believed that the only market left for 
American trade was the West Indies. There though, French privateers swarmed the West Indies 
searching for British property onboard neutral vessels and declaring all the British islands under 
siege. As is described above, Britain pursued similar measures against neutral commerce in their 
search for French property, leaving few gaps for American traders to exploit. Nevertheless, 
Constable noted eagerly to a contact in 1794 that there was considerable demand for flour in the 
islands, and the current American crop was so abundant that it warranted speculation.97 More 
importantly, Constable hoped to acquire a valuable government contract to supply British troops 
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in the West Indies with cattle. Such a measure by a ‘neutral’ merchant clearly invited 
condemnation by French privateers.   
 At first, Constable’s willingness to pursue a government contract with the British army 
appears wholly incompatible with his earlier experience dealing with the British government. 
While in Britain in 1793, Constable claimed to have spent every day for six months waiting in 
the Admiralty Court of Appeals for a hearing on his vessel, the St. Jean de Lone, in order to 
prove his American identity. According to the records of the case, Constable’s goods were found 
on board a French ship travelling to America in May 1793. The ship was captured while carrying 
goods from the British East Indies, which were to be reshipped to America after stopping in 
Europe. Though Constable believed his bill of lading proved that the goods belonged to him and 
were American, the admiralty judge was nevertheless struck by the case of a ship so blatantly 
“exporting the goods in question from an English settlement upon a foreign bottom.”98 The 
captors, similarly struck with the creative identity politics at play in this single voyage, argued in 
court that Constable should be considered in fact as a British merchant. The captors claimed that 
Constable’s extended residence in London altered his commercial identity and therefore as a 
British merchant he and his partners were ‘carrying on an illegal trade’ with the enemy. 
Constable claimed his long residence in England was unintentional, but due to the drawn out 
proceedings of the current case and his involvement in the bankruptcy proceedings of a 
prominent London merchant.  
In response to the judge’s questions, Constable tried to prove that he was in fact an 
American based on his frequent trips to the Continent and the shipments he had made since 
arriving in London to America under consignment to his British contacts (rather than in his own 
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name). Further, according to Constable, the goods in question were ‘clearly calculated’ for the 
American market rather than any market in Europe or Great Britain. For Constable, his intention 
to leave the country and his purchase of goods for America clearly revealed his true identity. The 
court was less sure though, and the vessel and the goods were again condemned by the Lords 
Commissioners of the Admiralty. In 1795, Swiss merchants Pourtales & Co. were able to recover 
their portion of the cargo from the Saint Jean de Lone on appeal as neutrals but Constable was 
less successful in ever proving his American identity.99 While scholars have been quick to 
identify the advantages of neutrality for American commerce in these years, there has been little 
consideration of the hurdles put in the way of American merchants making citizenship claims 
abroad. As is described in the next chapter, the Admiralty Court offered an important venue for 
asserting identity claims, but it also reveals the very different and fluid conceptions of national 
origin held by captors, judges and merchants.  
 Reflecting on his failed trip to Europe, Constable complained that the policies of Britain 
and France had forced neutrals to take sides: “The very unsettled state of affairs in Europe deters 
us from adventuring thither, for it appears no power is allowed to remain neuter in the contest 
with France.”100 At least in Europe, the war had forced everyone to make a choice. Remaining 
‘neuter’ only invited suspicion that a merchant was in fact wearing a mask to conceal a more 
sinister identity. Perhaps because Constable believed that he was now forced to take a side, at 
least outwardly, he turned to directly supplying the British military in the West Indies with 
provisions.  
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Constable was willing to join with other Americans in supplying the British military 
forces in the West Indies due in part to the encouragement of his London correspondent, John 
Inglis, of the firm Phyn, Ellice & Inglis. In the spirit of greater cooperation after the Jay Treaty, 
Inglis excitedly informed Constable in August 1795 that 20,000 soldiers were destined for the 
West Indies, and that they would need to be fed. Inglis explained that the contract was time 
sensitive as the troops would sail by September in order to retake Guadeloupe, “[i]f you can 
persuade any smart Yankey to set immediately about procuring proper means to carry cattle to 
the army you may depend upon it, he will do well & I think I can insure him encouragement & 
preference.”101 Less than a month later, Inglis wrote three additional letters to Constable pushing 
the deadline back to December of that year and again directing him to send cattle, horses and 
mules to the West Indies. By the end of the month, Inglis warned that other merchants had 
become interested and it was necessary for Constable to send an agent to New London to buy ‘all 
the good fat cattle’ and hire as many ships as necessary for the voyage. Inglis ended his letter 
stating that the army being sent to the West Indies, “is such as never appeared in these seas 
before.”102 Inglis’s letters further emphasize the importance of acting quickly on information and 
the demand for regular letters from a correspondent. By October, Inglis had learned that a 
competitor had won the contract to provide livestock for the army, “contrary to my expectation,” 
but he nevertheless encouraged Constable to send flour to the military in the West Indies from 
America, in order to still profit from the war effort.103 
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 At Inglis’s continued urging to get involved in the victualing trade, Constable formed a 
partnership with the winner of the cattle contract, Cruden, Pollard & Stuart of Barbados, to assist 
in shipping livestock for the army. Under the contract, Constable shipped regularly to Barbados 
five or six cargoes per month, with the promise of more frequent shipments if the cost of freight 
went down.104 Though the business was in high demand, Constable complained frequently of 
‘irregular & contradicting’ correspondence, explaining to one of his partners that if he had 
followed their earlier advice of stopping the shipments they would have been in a ‘bad scrape’.105 
The victualing plan depended partially on Spanish cattle, which was cheaper, to fill the order, but 
Britain’s deteriorating relations with Spain endangered this supply system. By September 1796, a 
‘Spanish War’ promised an even greater opportunity for American shipments as the sole supplier 
of cattle, but it also threatened to put immense strain on the available supply of American beef.106 
In response to the rumored war, the cost of shipments increased, but as late as October 12, 1796, 
Constable had still not learned of an actual declaration of war and was confidently reporting 
contrary information to his contacts. A week later, he learned of the British declaration of war 
and wrote worriedly about the future of the contract. In order to avoid privateers, Constable 
suggested that they would need to send the vessels first to a French port, but he was concerned 
this maneuver would endanger the entire venture as “[the French] seem to know for whom the 
cattle are shipped, they will condemn the cargoes nevertheless.”107 Despite his earlier defense in 
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a British admiralty court, Constable now clearly understood that his business would make him 
appear British in the eyes of French privateers.  
Coupled with a renewed French decree targeting neutral shipping in 1796, Constable 
worried that the cost of freight and available supply would make it impossible to fulfill the 
complete contract. If the government insisted that they hold up their end, he believed it would be 
a ‘ruinous undertaking’.108 In response to the new market uncertainty, Constable’s London 
contacts ordered a suspension of shipments and purchases for the West Indies in December 
1796.109 Further advice from London the following year suggested that the shipments continue 
but Constable was dubious, explaining that the French “take all American vessels they can lay 
hold of & we must therefore wait for a change.”110  
Constable’s position as a neutral in the British empire was always tenuous. While the 
French continued to harass American shipments to the West Indies, and consequently postpone 
further shipments of cattle, Constable also informed his contact in Barbados that the British were 
just as dangerous. He claimed that the British Men of War threatened every voyage, as they 
would chase American vessels carrying supplies for the British military ‘upon a suspicion’ that 
they were really intended for French ports. Constable complained of his vessels being ‘treated as 
enemies’ when his supplies meant for British troops were fired on by the Royal Navy.111 The 
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widespread suspicion of American commerce meant that the British were unable to recognize 
their dependence on certain neutral trades to continue the war effort.  
 The main challenge for Constable’s business was effectively proving his American 
identity in order to enjoy the neutral protections that came along with Americanness. Constable 
attempted to prepare for privateers by equipping his ships with ‘every document, passport & 
paper’ that the government would provide for his shipments, but claims of only shipping 
American property fell flat. Business was further hurt by the capture of American ships carrying 
correspondence to Constable’s contacts in the West Indies. To compensate for this, letters were 
sent in ‘duplicates & triplicates & frequently quadruplicates’ but these precautions were offset by 
nervous American captains who would throw all their papers overboard when stopped by a 
privateer, “for fear their real destination should be discovered…”112 The destruction of papers 
was an insurmountable stopgap to commerce. Without regular letters, orders could not be placed 
or cancelled, and correspondents remained in the dark to the latest moves of the market and 
disposition of privateers. Most importantly, regular correspondence informed merchant 
nationality strategies. Letters informing Constable of dangers to American property in the West 
Indies were tacit instructions for self-fashioning; to make his property appear less American. 
Avoiding risk meant using this intelligence to invest in different ships, cargoes, and destinations.  
The only solution to guarantee the delivery of correspondence was the use of other 
neutrals as middlemen who would forward letters to contacts in one of the belligerent countries. 
This method, while popular and somewhat effective, also increased the time between each letter. 
Opportunities were often lost while waiting for a response from months ago. Delays could be 
equally destructive to merchant ventures. In 1797 Constable wrote to a contact in Lisbon 
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informing him that he had just received the last six months of letters sent to his address, the poor 
timing of which resulted in goods coming to a ‘bad market’ and arriving when ‘the season was 
too far advanced’.113  
 The situation of American commerce by 1797 was desperate. Repeated French 
depredations threatened the viability of American merchant firms and many suffered bankruptcy 
due to the general uncertainty of trade.114 American newspapers reported that the French and 
Spanish privateers captured so many vessels in 1797 that it was impossible to reach the 
Windward Islands.115 The victualing business was so hazardous that Phyn, Ellice & Inglis 
informed Constable in July that American trade could only continue under British protection. 
Recognizing the need to protect some American trade, the British regularly convoyed American 
vessels through the islands and even across the Atlantic. Yet, this protection was also limited as 
American vessels were often abandoned during the voyage and the French viewed any British 
protection of neutral vessels as proof of British nationality.  
Since official British protection had its own inherent dangers, it was necessary for 
merchants to pursue strategies they had used in the previous decade in order to save their vessels. 
Recognizing the dangers associated with their American identity, merchants attempted to cover 
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American property through the use of foreign vessels. A typical example of this can be seen in an 
insurance policy taken out by the New York firm Gouverneur & Kemble, for their property on 
board a Danish ship headed to Saint-Domingue: “The vessel will be cleared out and invoiced as 
Danish property bound for Cape Nicola Mole in Hispaniola from St. Thomas altho she is 
intended to take another direction.”116 Similar to the previous decade, newspapers advertisements 
further reveal American firms actively trading in foreign flags, offering: British prize ships, 
Bermuda-built sloops ‘to any of the Windward or Leeward Islands’, Danish vessels for Europe 
and India, and Swedish ships for the Mediterranean.117 The trade in foreign flags was not perfect, 
and vessels flying foreign neutral colors were captured after Britain occupied the Danish West 
Indies in 1801.118  
The hostility of the French and the undependable protection of the British convoy led 
American officials to become concerned with their merchants provisioning the British military. 
When the French consul in Charleston learned that American merchants in the city had 
contracted to supply the British troops in the West Indies with a shipment of horses, he formally 
protested the transaction as a violation of American neutrality. In response, local officials 
requested the suspension of the shipments. Bewildered by these actions, the British consul, John 
Hamilton, protested that the Governor of Virginia must have been aware of the deal and accused 
the Americans of waiting until a postponement would have caused the most ‘heavy expence’ to 
the British. Hamilton further argued that any blockage of the deal was a violation of American 
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neutrality in favor of the French.119 After several men attacked American ships carrying British 
property in the port of Charleston, Hamilton even claimed to know of a conspiracy of men in 
town to undermine the British war effort, but the mayor refused to act without further proof.120 
For Hamilton, American refusal to supply the British was a sign of their failure to live up to their 
neutral American identity. Increasingly, as the war progressed into the nineteenth-century, 
American merchants would discover that if their business interests did not lead them into taking 
a side, a side would be chosen for them.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Even as peace was on the horizon in 1801, the need for supplies for the British military persisted. 
In 1801, William Savage, the American agent in Jamaica, indicated to Secretary Madison that 
the British demand for American beef was still great, and the island alone would purchase twenty 
thousand barrels.121 Though the signing of the Jay Treaty saw a noticeable shift from British to 
French depredations, the British continued to capture American ships, despite their dependence 
on foreign supplies. By 1799 Constable was clearly done with the cattle scheme, telling his 
brother that the West Indians held an irresponsible amount of debt, and concluding dismissively, 
“These West Indians will not do.”122  
 Dependence on foreign vessels, the constant intermingling of nationalities, and the 
sharing of seamen across navies all served to undermine the legitimacy of American identity 
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during the war. The Napoleonic Wars in the following decade continued many of these same 
issues as ‘American’ seamen were once again impressed into the Royal Navy and American 
merchants took an even larger part of the carrying trade during the first four years of the war. 
Though impressment continued, the debate over proper commerce shifted from a question of 
relative ‘Americanness’ to the limits of neutrality in wartime. Given American conduct during 
the 1790s, many, especially in Great Britain, questioned their role in perpetuating the war. In 
these debates, Americans were compared to the Dutch during the Seven Years’ War who 
unscrupulously traded with both sides and profited from the suffering of all of the participants. 
As the next chapter reveals, the debate over neutral identity in the admiralty courts and the 
popular press attempted to finally limit American participation in the British empire by 
representing neutral commerce as a subversive act of war against Great Britain and its interests. 
Chapter 4: Intentional Enemies: Neutrals before the Court, 1800-1809  
 
On February 2, 1800, Sir William Scott, the newly-appointed judge of the High Court of 
Admiralty, decided the fate of an American ship known as the Polly. Scott’s ruling for this single 
ship travelling with colonial produce from Havana to Spain, by way of Boston, would have an 
enormous impact on the future of neutral trade in the early years of the Napoleonic Wars. In this 
case, Scott declared that neutral vessels were able to legally trade between enemy colonies and 
the mother country so long as the goods were first imported into a neutral port. As a result of 
Scott’s ruling, the American neutral trade grew rapidly, quickly overtaking European rivals in 
transatlantic shipping. By 1805, this trade had become so extensive that European merchants 
tended to describe valuable West Indian commodities as American exports. Yet, as Britain 
gained control over the Atlantic, and Napoleon attempted to seal off the continent, the pressing 
need for American middlemen dwindled in comparison to the relative benefits of an economic 
war. Finally, by December 1807, the commercial landscape of transatlantic shipping had 
permanently shifted with the passage of the Embargo Act by the U.S. Congress. The decision by 
the American government to end their participation in neutral trade may have averted war, but it 
also opened up all remaining American shipping to confiscation by the two warring powers.  
The years between the Polly and the Embargo provide a framework for studying the 
changing position of neutrals within the British admiralty courts. By examining British admiralty 
court records within the context of state formation and economic warfare, we are able to chart 
how precedents established in superior courts affected debates over merchant identity taking 
place in the West Indies. Neutral merchants, and their captors, actively mobilized the language of 
Sir William Scott’s famous decisions in defense of their conduct while at sea. As the courts 
served as a venue for constantly renegotiating the meaning of neutrality, they also provided a 
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platform for new government policies. When the economic war between Britain and France 
intensified, the British government used the admiralty courts to secure the imperial economy, 
enforcing a protectionist agenda onto neutral trade. American merchants found in violation of 
state decrees were classified as belligerents and their property was condemned in court. This 
process of transforming former British subjects into enemies provides a window into how states 
and individuals understood nationality and the role of international commerce in war.  
This period, then, highlights the gradual evolution of American neutrals into enemies of 
the British government. In the years after independence, Americans trading abroad had struggled 
with the malleability of their identity, a challenge that became even more difficult when war 
broke out in 1793. As has been shown, privateers looking to seize an American ship depicted the 
Americans onboard as Frenchmen in disguise. Press-gangs claimed to be incapable of 
distinguishing between natural-born American citizens and recent British immigrants, and 
impressed members of both groups on the grounds of a perpetual British identity. Similarly, 
French officials, skeptical of English-speaking foreigners during the Revolution, accused 
Americans of concealing their English identity, seizing their ships in port while they searched for 
spies. While many of these ideas persisted into the Napoleonic Wars, the language used by 
belligerents changed subtly over the course of the war. Americans were no longer secretly 
French or English, but instead they were viewed as de-facto enemies: individuals whose actions 
had caused them to lose their neutrality. The argument that neutrals had failed to ‘remain neutral’ 
placed all of the blame on neutral conduct, essentially ignoring the active role of the state in 
redefining the limits of acceptable commerce.1  
                                                 
1 The idea of ‘remaining neutral’, a concept that implied the neutral’s actions rather than the state’s goals were to 
blame, was common at the time, for an example of this, see, The Rights of Neutrality in The Gazetteer, 27 July 1803, 
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The years leading up to 1807 witnessed the institutional growth of the British Empire, as 
Britain gained dominance over the sea after the Battle of Trafalgar (1805). With trade lines 
relatively secured, mercantilist regulations lost the loopholes and loose enforcement of the early 
modern period, taking on the characteristics that historians have often associated it with: a 
restrictive commercial system hostile to competing foreign interests. Along with exploring the 
more effective enforcement of commercial policy, this chapter focuses on the struggle of 
American merchants to supply European markets in the face of the steadfast opposition of both 
warring powers. An examination of the records of the High Court of Admiralty, American and 
British diplomatic dispatches, popular pamphlets, newspaper editorials, and merchant 
correspondence, illustrates the adaptability of merchants and the state to meet the commercial 
and political pressures of the war.  
 This chapter contributes to the recent interest in nationality and international commerce 
by placing complicated negotiations over the identity of the merchant, ship and voyage within 
the context of the growing ability of the British state to govern the empire. The rationalization of 
British mercantilist policies during the Napoleonic Wars effectively narrowed the field of 
legitimate commerce in wartime. The period from 1798 to 1807 saw the dynamic evolution of 
‘the neutral’ in law and public consciousness from a morally ambiguous supplier of consumer 
goods to a malicious war profiteer whose trade with belligerents undermined the war effort. This 
chapter argues that the debate over concepts of neutrality should be situated within the wider 
discussion of national allegiance and commercial identity which had consumed the British 
Empire since the American Revolution. The mercantilist rhetoric that pervaded reforms in 
                                                                                                                                                             
and George Cabot to Rufus King, 2 July 1798, in King, “The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King,” 1895, 353–
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colonial governance and admiralty courts attempted to force a choice on American merchants: to 
rejoin the British Empire or stand with Napoleon. 
The first section of this chapter examines admiralty court practice and the evolution of 
international law under the leadership of Sir William Scott (1745-1836). The chronological 
framework of section one is situated around a ten-year period beginning with Scott's appointment 
to the High Court of Admiralty in 1798 and ending with the Orders in Council of 1807. In these 
years, neutral merchants shifted from important sources of maritime trade to hidden enemies 
undermining Britain’s war effort. Scott’s appointment and reform of the British admiralty courts 
provides an invaluable lens for studying this period. The local courts were reformed under a 
singular vision of admiralty court practices and the rule of law. This served as a break with the 
previous system of local autonomy, which had allowed for a more fluid interpretation of 
commercial identity in admiralty court cases. These reforms were just one part of a broader 
project by the British state to increase control over transatlantic shipping and colonial 
governance.  
Section two examines the different types of evidence used in the admiralty courts to 
condemn neutral vessels. In focusing on the years after the Essex, this section shows how the 
standards of evidence used in court decisions relied heavily on the recent reforms to admiralty 
court law. Just as Chapter 3 highlighted the importance of ‘suspicion’ in the capture of American 
vessels, this section focuses on the role of ‘intention’ in determining the guilt of a vessel before 
the admiralty court. ‘Intention’ was always important in admiralty law to prove the violation of a 
blockade, but the focus on ‘intention’ by the court increasingly pushed the law into a largely 
indefinable area for the consideration of evidence. The value and nature of the goods onboard a 
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ship might inform a vice-admiralty court judge of a merchant’s true ‘intention’ to secretly land 
those goods on a French island, regardless of any exculpatory evidence.  
 The scholarship surrounding commerce during the Napoleonic Wars can be divided into 
two distinct but overlapping trends. The first looks broadly at commercial relations between 
Britain, France and the United States. These studies encompass everything from commercial 
policy to impressment and the decisions of the British admiralty courts. The literature on this 
topic has largely focused on the causes and characteristics of the economic war that resulted in 
the British Orders in Council, Napoleon’s Continental System and the American Embargo of 
1807, all of which eventually culminated in the War of 1812. The second branch examines the 
experiences of merchants trading in the Atlantic and the Caribbean as well as that of European 
and American neutrals operating within Napoleon’s Continental System. This scholarship has 
ranged from the macroeconomic results of neutral trade in relation to the fortunes of the nation-
state, to closer studies of individual men and women who smuggled coffee past customs agents 
and lone ships negotiating their neutrality in tumultuous wartime waters.  
 Histories of the economic effects of the Napoleonic Wars date back to Alfred Mahan and 
Henry Adams in the nineteenth century. These American historians largely focused on the 
economic aspects of the war as it benefited American neutrality and eventually led America into 
a war with Great Britain in 1812. From this nineteenth-century perspective, economic evidence 
mattered only so much as it related to national pride and power. While focused almost entirely 
on diplomatic figures and relations between these states, these broad nineteenth-century histories 
nevertheless supplied the economic, diplomatic and legal lenses still used by scholars today.2 For 
                                                 
2 Henry Adams, History of the United States of America During the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison, 2 
vols. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963); A. T. Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812, 2 
vols. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1905); For the continued use of Adams and Mahan, see, Bradford 
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the European perspective, Eli Heckscher’s foundational study of the Continental System helped 
to develop the focus on civilian experience during the war by looking at economic over military 
factors. Heckscher was able to expand on several of the points made by Mahan while also 
reinterpreting them in light of a mass of economic data. Like Mahan, Heckscher saw the British 
Orders in Council and licensing system as an attempt to re-impose mercantilist policies on the 
former American colonies, effectively depriving the United States of its commercial 
independence. However, by repositioning the economic policies as a battle between Britain and 
France, rather than a prologue to war with America, Heckscher opened the door for historians to 
examine the effects of economic war on the economies and daily lives of neutrals and 
belligerents.3  
 Since Heckscher, historians have established the contours of the Continental System and 
its real effect on British and neutral trade. Here, historians have noted that the Continental 
System was more detrimental to British industry than previously imagined, and that its 
inconsistent application on the continent allowed for divergent experiences for those living under 
the self-blockade. Kenneth O’Rourke has used trade data to show that among the three powers, 
Britain emerged from the war as the economic ‘victor’ while the United States suffered the most 
from the repeated trade embargoes and blockades.4 Increasingly, historians have moved beyond 
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3 Eli F. Heckscher, The Continental System (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922); For a recent statement on the impact 
of Heckscher, see the introduction by Aaslestad, Katherine B. Aaslestad, “Introduction,” in Revisiting Napoleon’s 
Continental System, ed. Johan Joor and Katherine B. Aaslestad (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
4 O’Rourke, “The Worldwide Economic Impact of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815”; 
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the ‘blockade’ and its principal actors, to focus on a ‘system’ with many moving parts. Under the 
Napoleonic System, the experiences of the Baltic States show the uneven application of 
Napoleon’s universal economy. Neutrality could be immensely profitable for cities like 
Hamburg, but direct subjugation had the potential to ruin an economy with drastic price 
increases, the loss of territory and a crippled merchant marine.5 
The devastating impact of the war on local economies was a significant factor in shaping 
the general outlook of trade for many merchants. However, it is important not to ignore the role 
of governments in determining merchant success as well as the scope of international trade in 
wartime. Silvia Marzagalli has recently pushed for a view of international commerce that focuses 
on the mutual interests of state policy and merchant activity. According to Marzagalli, American 
commerce should be understood by studying it in conjunction with the activities of the American 
consular service. Merchants depended on consuls, who were often state agents as well as local 
traders, to provide important commercial information, but consuls were also merchants’ 
advocates with a foreign state looking to seize their goods and condemn their ships. In such a 
climate, merchants depended heavily on local consuls for protection and guidance in order to 
carry on their trades.   
At the same time, in emphasizing the importance of government intervention, scholars 
have also argued for a global perspective on trade. This is a perspective which emphasizes the 
often overlooked connections between ports in different countries regardless of the evidence 
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coming out of national trade statistics. While making new connections, such a view does not 
wholly preclude the role of the government as a commercial actor. These historians though have 
minimized the importance of commercial regulations in favor of the fluidity and unpredictability 
of global trade.6 Much of the focus on commerce in this period has centered around the 
constraints on neutral trade, but as Katherine Aaslestad argues, the Continental System and the 
Orders in Council helped to create a ‘shadow economy’ for smugglers to funnel British goods 
into the continent under the nose of Napoleon’s customs agents.7  
 In order to integrate individual merchant experience into the broader histories of the 
Continental System and trade during the Napoleonic Wars, it is necessary to turn to how 
historical actors conceived of their dual identity as both merchants and subjects of the state. A 
broad range of recent studies has examined the relationship between trade and identity in this 
period. These scholars have shown how the study of nationality can help to explain the makeup 
and direction of international commerce. Reinvigorating older traditions which focused on 
national pride to explain state policy, Mlada Bukovansky and Paul Gilje have each looked at the 
ideology used by the American state in the lead up to the War of 1812. Bukovansky argues that 
American foreign policy can only be understood by viewing neutrality as integral to American 
identity. More recently, Gilje has shown how the early American political system was based 
around ideals found in the popular slogan ‘free trade and sailors’ rights’. As Federalist and 
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Republican politicians debated free trade and America’s economic enemies, the government was 
able to mobilize the populace’s support for war against Britain with this rhetoric.8  
As trade continued to develop over the course of the war, the identity of merchants 
became more pliable. Traditionally, the national character of the owner of a ship was a key factor 
in determining the results of an admiralty court decision. Margrit Schulte Beerbühl has re-
examined the British licensing program to show the malleability of an owner’s identity in 
determining legitimate neutral commerce. Even when the United States and Great Britain were at 
war in 1812, the licensing system allowed for American neutrals to trade with the continent 
under the British stamp of approval.9 Taking note of the layers of criteria used to define a neutral 
in the admiralty courts, scholars have further emphasized the importance of identifying property 
and ships taking part in neutral voyages. The definition of contraband was hotly contested in the 
eighteenth century, as it varied by country and treaty.10 Though historians of international law 
have frequently emphasized the legacy of precedents and traditions behind admiralty court 
decisions, recent studies of neutral trade have highlighted the complicated factors that 
determined neutral identity. This has led Eric Schnakenbourg to question whether a neutral 
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voyage was defined in court by an adherence to the rules or merely by an absence of any 
culpable evidence.11  
As Britain and France became embroiled in an economic war, neutral merchants were 
forced to navigate an increasingly hostile ocean. This chapter contributes to recent scholarship on 
economic warfare’s effects on conceptions of nationality and allegiance by examining the 
experiences of neutral ships tried by the British Admiralty Courts. As the records of these courts 
during the Napoleonic Wars reveal, the national character of any given vessel was not fixed but 
amorphous; a ship’s identity changed depending on space and time. The multiple identities a ship 
possessed, from its origin to its destination, overlapped and complicated commerce to such a 
degree that courts were forced to rely on hearsay and conjecture in order to decipher the true 
identity of commercial transactions during wartime.  
 
 
The Admiralty Court System under Scott 
 
The British admiralty courts played a decisive role in shaping neutral commerce during the 
Napoleonic Wars. This section uses the first decade of Sir William Scott’s tenure on the High 
Court of Admiralty (1798-1808) as a chronological framework for conceptualizing the evolution 
of admiralty law and the politicization of the courts during the Napoleonic Wars. The 
transformation of the courts under Scott provides the necessary context for understanding how 
neutral identity was constantly renegotiated during the war. While the British courts endeavored 
to put forward a claim of tradition and precedent in their rulings, a study of admiralty court 
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decisions and merchant experience before the courts reveals the malleability of national character 
during the war. In its rulings, the court tacitly acknowledged that outside forces constantly 
reshaped the identity of a commercial voyage. The decisions discussed below further illustrate 
how the court struggled to make sense of an increasingly complex commercial world where 
transactions were not limited to individuals of the same nation. As this section and the evidence 
examined later in the chapter reveals, the courts attempted to handle the complexities of trade by 
forcing merchant identity into set categories. In doing so, the court revealed the ability of 
merchants (and the state) to reform identity to fit the momentary needs of the market. In short, 
admiralty court records show that commercial identity during the Napoleonic Wars was 
constantly in flux as it was broken, lost, converted and concealed.  
As Scott’s modern biographer, Henry Bourguignon, has shown, the High Court of 
Admiralty was repeatedly forced to deal with the ‘chameleon-like’ merchant practices common 
in eighteenth-century commerce. Merchants often resided in foreign countries and took part in 
international joint-ventures. Nationality in the West India trade was particularly hard to pin down 
because, in the words of Scott’s predecessor, Sir James Marriott, the islands were “full of 
renegadoes of all nations.”12 Especially during war, contact between foreign islands was constant 
and attempts to prevent correspondence and trade often stumbled in the face of real war-time 
demand. Governors might expel foreigners from the island, and blockades could cut off an 
individual port from the rest of the West Indies, but these measures simply obscured trade rather 
than preventing it. With neutral commerce, sweeping proclamations from colonial governors 
merely made the discovery of bona fide neutrals and belligerents all the more difficult. The 
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courts were far more effective when they recognized these complications as an opportunity for 
judges to condemn a voyage on multiple levels: the nationality of the owner, the origin of the 
property, the intention of the captain, or even the origin of the ship.  
When Scott first took over for Sir James Marriott in 1798, the High Court of Admiralty 
was overwhelmed by the volume of cases on its docket. The number of untried cases was partly 
the fault of the unregulated and poorly organized system of vice-admiralty courts. These courts 
were often conducted by unqualified men who depended on prizes for their income, and as a 
result, colluded with privateers in the capture and condemnation of neutral vessels. The strain of 
the workload on the aged Marriott resulted in numerous delays for merchants waiting for their 
cases to be tried. The experience of William Constable, who waited every day for six months for 
his case to be heard, is just one example of the hundreds of cases that came before the High 
Court of Admiralty.13 The numerous delays proved expensive for neutrals, as valuable cargoes 
could be tied up in court for years on appeal. Recognizing the plight of American merchants, the 
American Minister to London, Rufus King, complained loudly to Foreign Secretary Lord 
Grenville in 1798 of these delays, observing that the ‘infirmities’ of Judge Marriott had virtually 
“incapacitate[d] him” and forced others to suffer under his “caprice, inferiority and incapacity.”14  
It is unsurprising that American diplomats celebrated Scott’s appointment, as they 
believed he would bring precision and objectivity to a flawed court. American diplomats had 
already cultivated a close relationship with Scott during the negotiations over the Jay Treaty in 
1795, in which Scott provided a guide to admiralty law for the American ministers. Following 
his meetings with John Jay, Scott often engaged in informal discussions with American 
                                                 
13 See Chapter 3.  
14 Rufus King to Lord Grenville, 6 Sept. 1798, and Rufus King to Timothy Pickering, 16 Oct. 1798, in King, “The 
Life and Correspondence of Rufus King,” 1895, 409–15, 448–51. 
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diplomats concerning his views on the law and even sharing his ideas for the reform of the 
current system of vice-admiralty courts. Scott proved to be an invaluable resource for Americans 
looking to instruct their countrymen in the British view of legitimate commerce. In order to 
provide ready information on admiralty court precedents, Rufus King arranged for the 
republication of Scott’s decisions in America, found in Robinson’s Reports of cases argued and 
determined in the High Court of Admiralty.15 Before the publication of Robinson’s Reports, the 
established views of the court could only be found in the occasional printed pamphlet and 
newspaper article. Inaccurate reports hindered the appeals process and made it more difficult for 
merchants to learn the official position of the court.  
 Increasingly, Scott’s main responsibility was the maintenance of the British Empire. In 
this regard, he acted as an important reformer of the entire admiralty court system in 1801. The 
vice-admiralty courts were widely viewed as corrupt, especially by neutral traders and foreign 
diplomats: some were established illegally on conquered French islands, and in general the 
courts refused to follow the latest instructions sent by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty 
and the Board of Trade.16 Under the advice of Scott, Parliament vastly reduced the number of 
admiralty courts from nine to two in 1801. The government’s view of the earlier courts was best 
expressed by William Scott in 1807 in reply to the petition for a new court at St. Lucia. Scott 
argued that the reforms put in place were meant to remedy the ‘mal-administration’ of the vice-
admiralty courts which had resulted in a series of abuses including: “the disposition shown by 
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those courts to condemn without sufficient caution, all prizes brought before them for the 
purpose of drawing as much business as possible to the respective courts, and thereby increasing 
the fees on which the emoluments of the officers entirely depended.”17 The new system would 
instead focus on installing only qualified judges whose salaries would make them independent of 
the prize system. This was part of a wider program of tightening control over Britain’s imperial 
possessions in the nineteenth century, which also included closer monitoring of the discretionary 
power of governors to open their ports. New courts could only be formed through a petition to 
the Board of Trade, and while their number gradually increased again over the course of the war, 
the stricter requirements on the new courts firmly established the government’s authority over 
admiralty law.  
 Accompanying the reform of the vice-admiralty courts were Scott’s groundbreaking 
decisions on neutral commerce and the legal definition of blockades. Both of these issues 
reshaped transatlantic trade by creating a rigid system of rules for neutrals and belligerents to 
follow. Within the first two years of Scott’s appointment to the High Court of Admiralty, he had 
placed Great Britain in a position to dictate international law, setting a foundation for 
interpretations of the law which would last into the twentieth century. In addition, Scott’s rulings 
offered the British government an avenue for narrowing the parameters of acceptable commerce 
by reinterpreting the meaning of his decisions in later years. 
In the case of The Betsey (1798), Scott condemned the paper blockade established in the 
West Indies to stop neutral commerce with the French islands. Paper blockades allowed the navy 
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to exert its authority over all enemy territory without actually dedicating the manpower 
necessary to enforce its claims. In The Betsey, Scott established three criteria required for a 
breach of blockade: the existence of an actual blockade, knowledge of the blockade, and a 
violation of the blockade by the captured ship. By forcing the Admiralty to maintain a blockade, 
rather than merely proclaiming a paper blockade and depending on privateers to loosely maintain 
a force, Scott undercut a key measure of the war. As the previous chapter discussed, paper 
blockades were incredibly controversial for merchants as they were generic in their enforcement 
and a violation of traditional maritime practices of ‘touching’ ports in search of a profitable 
market.18 Scott’s limitations on the implementation of blockades extended to the war on the 
continent as well as the West Indies. In 1798, Scott challenged the Admiralty’s claim of a 
blockade of Havre by pointing to the occasional relaxation of the blockade as proof of its 
illegitimacy. Scott restored several captured ships, stating that the court found that “If the ships 
stationed on the spot to keep up the blockade will not use their force for that purpose, it is 
impossible for a court of justice to say there was a blockade actually existing at that time, as to 
bind this vessel.”19 While the rules may have cut in favor of the neutrals, they also encouraged 
more rigorously maintained blockades of belligerent ports. All of this made smuggling more 
                                                 
18 The Betsey (1798) in Christopher Robinson, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the High Court of 
Admiralty, 1798-[1808], vol. 1 (London: A. Strahan, 1806), 92–101; By 1802 Scott’s guidelines for blockades had 
been reprinted in Browne’s guide to admiralty law, Arthur Browne, A Compendious View of the Civil Law, and of 
the Law of the Admiralty, Being the Substance of a Course of Lectures Read in the University of Dublin (London: 
Printed for J. Butterworth, 1802), 316–17. 
19 Scott in the same ruling condemned the cargo, arguing that the owners of the cargo only had knowledge of a 
‘rigorous’ blockade and therefore they had no knowledge of the relaxation which their captain discovered at Havre. 
Since their intention was to ship despite the blockade, regardless of the actual circumstances, the cargo was 
condemned, see, The Juffrow Maria Schroeder (1798) in Robinson, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the 
High Court of Admiralty, 1798-[1808], 1802, 3:147–61; The Havre blockade also illustrates the power of the British 
ministry to interfere in the admiralty court’s decisions, see, Rufus King to James Madison, 31 Oct. 1801, Rufus 
King, “The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King,” vol. 4 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1897), 6–7.  
 
159 
difficult by delimiting neutral defenses before the court to three possible criteria: insufficient 
force at the port, ignorance of the blockade, and accidental violation of the blockade.  
 The most pressing issue faced by the court at the turn of the century was the question of 
the ‘continuous voyage’ of neutral vessels between enemy colonies and the mother country; a 
trade that allowed France and Spain to subsist and maintain their empire despite Britain’s naval 
superiority. This trade was technically in violation of Britain’s Rule of 1756, which claimed that 
a trade illegal in peacetime could not become legal during a war. However, the Rule of 1756 had 
not been enforced with any kind of consistency since the Seven Years’ War.20 After 
independence, American merchants enjoyed access to European colonies, especially in times of 
crisis. With the start of the war in 1793 this trade had rapidly expanded, despite momentary 
blockades and occasional state decrees protecting colonial monopolies. In the Immanuel (1799) 
Scott revived the Rule of 1756 with the doctrine of the continuous voyage, arguing that neutrals 
were barred from carrying on a trade between two enemy ports. If a neutral stopped briefly along 
the way, as in the case of the Immanuel, to retrieve or dispose of cargo, this action did not 
sufficiently ‘break’ the voyage, however circuitous. While the Immanuel supplied future courts 
with evidence to condemn most neutral shipping, Scott a year later offered neutrals a pathway to 
protecting their trade. The Polly (1800) reiterated the Rule of 1756 and the doctrine of the 
continuous voyage but it also reminded the captors that neutrals could import the produce of an 
                                                 
20 There’s some disagreement about the actual origins of the Rule, with Chalres Elliott emphasizing 1793 while 
R.G. Marsden believed the Rule dated back to seventeenth-century Venice, see, Charles B Elliott, “The Doctrine of 
Continuous Voyages,” American Journal of International Law 1, no. 1 (1907): 61–104; R. G Marsden, “Early Prize 
Jurisdiction and Prize Law in England,” The English Historical Review 25, no. 98 (1910): 244. Perhaps to add to the 
legitimacy of the renewed Rule of 1756, Lord Liverpool (formerly Hawkesbury) the President of the Board of Trade 
republished his important 1758 work against neutral ships carrying enemy cargo, Charles Jenkinson 1st Earl of 
Liverpool, A Discourse on the Conduct of the Government of Great-Britain: In Respect to Neutral Nations, during 
the Present War. (London: Printed for T. Cadell, Jun. and W. Davies, 1801).  
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enemy colony for their own use. Scott acknowledged that this importation, if ‘bonâ fide’, may be 
re-exported to Europe, declaring somewhat vaguely:  
“It is not my business to say what is universally the test of a bonâ fide 
importation: It is argued, that it would not be sufficient, that the duties should be 
paid, and that the cargo should be landed. If these criteria are not to be resorted to, 
I should be at a loss to know what should be the test; and I am strongly disposed 
to hold, that it would be sufficient, that the goods should be landed and the duties 
paid.”21 
 
With the Polly, Scott established that import duties were the only available test of a sincere 
importation into a neutral country. The payment of duties showed the clear intent of the neutral 
carrier to ship goods for home consumption, but Scott also acknowledged that there would be 
few checks on what happened to the cargo after it was imported. Scott, then, provided 
justifications for captors and captives to defend their actions in court, and the effect of these 
rulings can be perceived in the language used to discuss maritime trade after the Polly.  
The impact of the Polly on neutral commerce was immediate. Rufus King, armed with 
judgment in the case of the Polly, wrote to Lord Hawkesbury in March 1801 complaining of the 
condemnation of an American vessel in the Bahamas. In March, King requested that the British 
government issue strict orders to the vice-admiralty courts in order to protect the neutral trade 
between America and the Spanish colonies. A month later, Hawkesbury had forwarded to Rufus 
King a copy of a letter from the British government informing the Lords of the Admiralty of the 
recent ruling at the port of Nassau. The letter stated the Advocate-General’s opinion that the 
condemnation was “erroneous and founded in a misapprehension or misapplication of the 
Principles laid down in the decision of the High Court of Admiralty referred to, without 
                                                 
21 The Immanuel (1799), see, Christopher Robinson, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the High Court of 
Admiralty, 1798-[1808], vol. 2 (London: A. Strahan, 1806), 186–206; The Polly (1800), see, Robinson, 2:361–72; 
For more on the importance of these two rulings, see, Bradford Perkins, “Sir William Scott and the Essex,” The 
William and Mary Quarterly 13, no. 2 (April 1956): 169–83. 
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attending to the limitations therein contained.”22 The instructions sent to the Lords of the 
Admiralty may have affirmed neutral rights in the broken voyage but it also revealed the 
government’s uneasiness about this trade. In the letter, the Advocate-General acknowledged the 
difficulty in determining what amounted to a direct trade, reiterating Scott, he repeated that the 
only test available to the court was the payment of duties.23  
After the Polly, the value of American re-exports to the continent increased from $40 
million in 1800 to $60 million by 1805. The value of this trade directly related to the increased 
tonnage of the U.S. merchant marine, which had tripled by 1807. Minor port towns in America 
experienced a great boom during the height of the re-export trade, as population and wealth 
soared for merchants throughout the United States. In the years after the Polly, American 
newspapers were filled with advertisements for West Indian sugar. In New York, the firm of 
Edward Goold & Son notified potential customers of large importations of sugar on seven 
different occasions between 1800 and 1801. This trade extended to the British islands as well, 
where Americans reshipped British colonial produce to the continent, often underselling their 
British competitors. In April 1801 alone, the New York Custom-House recorded twenty-seven 
different shipments from Bermuda.24  
Colonial produce entering New York primarily came from Havana, St. Croix and the 
French islands. The sugar was then re-shipped to the continent, often to another neutral port such 
as Hamburg. In many cases, the British continued to serve as middlemen for American traders, 
                                                 
22 Rufus King to Lord Hawkesbury, 13 March 1801 and Lord Hawkesbury to Rufus King, 11 April 1801, King, 
“The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King,” 1897, 403–5, 427–29. 
23 King, 427–29. 
24 Mercantile Advertiser, 15 Aug. 1800; Commercial Advertiser, 2 Sept. 1800; Daily Advertiser, 27 Nov. 1800; 
New-York Price-Current, 13 Dec. 1800, 28 Feb. 1801, 25 April 1801; New-York Daily Gazette, 7 Jan. 1801. The 
Bermuda shipments consisted of colonial produce, reshipped from other British colonies, conquered French islands 
and neutral ports, see, List of all ships and vessels that have entered inwards at the naval office in the port of 
Bermuda from the first day of July 1807 to the thirtieth day of September, CO 37/62, f.115-17. 
 
162 
as British merchants offered to warehouse goods for re-export to Northern Europe. From 
Liverpool in 1804, speculators wrote to their American contacts with advice for providing the 
best products for the continent, suggesting that prices would continue to rise due to the war and 
the French abandonment of Saint-Domingue. One merchant eagerly noted that a ‘violent storm,’ 
which was rumored to have devastated the West Indies, would provide “another motive…for 
increasing prices.”25  
In 1803, the Blockade of the Elbe eliminated virtually all European shipping, leaving it to 
the Americans to supply the continent with sugar and coffee. The blockade increased the value 
and the risk of the Baltic trade, and officially cut Britain off from that part of Europe. American 
dominance in the Baltic is reflected in a letter from the American consul at Hamburg, Joseph 
Pitcairn, to Nicholas Low in 1804. Pitcairn advised Low of the great demand for colonial 
produce and American goods; he promised that higher prices would continue to ‘rule’ in the 
spring so long as the war continued.26 Though blockades are typically studied as economic 
weapons, British and European merchants continued to see the battle between Britain and France 
as an opportunity to leverage their contacts with North America into new markets during the war.  
 
                                                 
25 Liverpool Price Current, 26 June 1803, Box 30, Nicholas Low Papers; John Thomas to Nicholas Low, 14 Feb. 
1804, Box 31; Van Staphorst & Co. to Nicholas Low, 8 Nov. 1804, Box 31, Nicholas Low Papers, LC.  
26 Joseph Pitcairn to Nicholas Low, 21 Jan. 1804, Box 31, Nicholas Low Papers, LC. 
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2. Price list from the Liverpool firms of Tait & Co. for 12 August 1801 (left) and John Thomas Esquire (right) for 31 
January 1804. 
American domination of the carrying trade during the Napoleonic Wars resulted in a 
conceptual shift for the classification of commodities and their origin. Price lists sent to 
American merchants from their British contacts specifically detailed the rates for shipping 
foreign colonial produce through Britain. Traditionally, these price lists ignored colonial 
produce, as it was restricted to native ships, or at the very least these circulars provided some 
kind of distinction between goods coming from the West Indies and American domestic exports. 
By 1804, the American trade in West Indian products was so extensive that circulars sent to 
American houses no longer distinguished in any significant fashion between North American and 
Caribbean products. For all intents and purposes, coffee and sugar had been Americanized. Most 
price lists by the Napoleonic Wars provided a simple accounting of the rates for imports and 
exports for the stated port. Even merchants located in the port of Liverpool, a major hub for the 
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British West Indian trade, adapted their circulars to match current market trends. The examples 
provided above from the Liverpool firms of Tait & Co. (1801) and John Thomas Esquire (1804) 
illustrate this conceptual shift as merchants re-categorized ‘West Indian’ produce into ‘American 
exports’. This tacit acknowledgment of American dominance of the West Indian trade is striking 
given the heated rhetoric from the 1780s and 1790s in defense of the Navigation Acts. 
Overcoming this rhetoric, the price lists showed that some British merchants were willing to 
adapt to new market realities.27 
While technically allowing room for the expansion of neutral commerce, the post-Polly 
period still saw numerous captures of American vessels accused of having conducted a 
continuous voyage, carried contraband or violated a blockade.28 The New York Daily Advertiser 
warned its readers in December 1800 that, despite the lack of coverage, American ships were 
continually brought into the Jamaica Vice-Admiralty Court for condemnation, “without the least 
cause whatever.”29 By 1804, the number of ships stopped and searched greatly increased, 
resulting in delays which could prove costly for the ship held captive. The American merchant 
Dudley Porter complained of his ship being held for two months at Dominica until it was finally 
given permission to leave. The two-month delay ruined the cargo which had been eaten up by 
worms.30 This dependence on overseas trade may have helped to fund the development of the 
early republic in the United States, but it also made the threat of foreign sanctions and domestic 
                                                 
27 Tait & Co Price Current, Lee-Cabot Papers, MHS; John Thomas to Nicholas Low, 31 Jan. 1804, Box 31, 
Nicholas Low, LC. This change in how commodities were categorized took place gradually over the course of the 
French Wars with neutral and free ports more willing to provide simplified lists over British and French price lists 
which took into account those countries’ colonial monopolies, for an example of the latter, see, Price Current at 
Liverpool, 17 Sept. 1792, reel 1, T141, NARA. 
28 In the first four years of the war, Britain had captured 528 American ships, see, Adams, “American Neutrality and 
Prosperity, 1793-1808: A Reconsideration,” 732. 
29 Daily Advertiser, 22 Dec. 1800.  
30 James Madison to Dudley Porter Jr. & Co, 9 July 1804, Founders Online, NARA.  
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embargoes even more dire. Porter’s experience also made clear that American dependence on the 
definition of a neutral voyage in a single admiralty court decision did not necessarily give 
neutrals immunity from harassment while at sea.31 
The renewal of the war in 1803 brought with it a coordinated assault on neutral shipping 
from the British ministry and admiralty courts, prompted by the concerns of the West Indian and 
shipping interests. The West Indian merchants and the shipping industry were responding to 
what François Crouzet has termed a “crisis for the imperial economy”; namely, the domination 
of transatlantic shipping by the American merchant marine and the relegation of Britain, despite 
its naval superiority, to a manufacturing depot.32 In 1804, the Board of Trade began a study of 
the annual exports of coffee and sugar from the British West Indies to the United States as well 
as the current capability of British North America to supply the West Indian colonies with 
provisions. The conclusion of that study, combined with a proposition from the West Indian 
merchants, resulted in new instructions sent to colonial governors stating that the ports of the 
West Indies should remain shut to the Americans, except in cases of “real and very great 
necessity.”33 Governors were barred from opening the ports to foreign ships in general and 
especially any ships carrying lumber and salted provisions, the products of British North 
America and Ireland. While the ports were still opened during the war, the justification for 
                                                 
31 Perkins, Prologue to War, 79; Silvia Marzagalli, “The Continental System: A View from the Sea,” in Revisiting 
Napoleon’s Continental System, ed. Katherine B. Aaslestad and Johan Joor (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 
89; Clifford L. Egan, Neither Peace Nor War: Franco-American Relations, 1803-1812 (Baton Rouge, LA: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1983), 68; O’Rourke, “The Worldwide Economic Impact of the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815,” 127. 
32 François Crouzet, Britain Ascendant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 332. At the end of the 
previous war, the West India Committee had already begun investigating, “this traffic with the most alarm,” as the 
Committee discovered that British sugar was transported to Europe through American ports, see, Minutes of the 
West India Committee, 24 Sept. 1799, reel 2, SHL.   
33 Board of Trade Minutes, 14 July 1804, BT 5/14, f.180-182, TNA. Simeon Perkins in Liverpool, Nova Scotia 
complained that the Americans had dominated the carrying trade to such an extent that it was impossible to sell 
anything to the West Indies, see Simeon Perkins’s diary entry for 25 June 1804, Simeon Perkins, The Diary of 
Simeon Perkins, 1804-1812, ed. Charles Bruce Fergusson, vol. v (Toronto: Champlain Society, 2013), 42. 
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opening the ports required a more thorough explanation of the state of the island after a disaster. 
The records of the Board of Trade after 1804 are filled with accounts of the condition of each 
island and petitions from concerned colonists claiming to be in danger of famine. While similar 
to the conduct of the Board in the 1780s, the response rate and rationalization of the system 
tightened imperial controls on the ports in the West Indies.34  
Unable to fully stop foreign trade with the colonies, the breakdown of the colonial 
monopoly nevertheless alarmed the British government. In response to the decline of British 
shipping during the war, Lord Sheffield embarked on another campaign to protect the Navigation 
Acts from American interlopers. In June 1804, Sheffield presented a petition of the ship-owners 
of the port of London to the House of Lords, complaining of the temporary suspension of the 
navigation laws during the war.35 Sheffield’s argument was furthered by his publication of 
another immense work on trade, Strictures on the Necessity of Inviolably Maintaining the 
Navigation and Colonial System of Great Britain (1804). Sheffield’s Strictures set out to chart 
the steady decline of domestic shipping in favor of foreign tonnage, and how this decline 
affected the very safety of Great Britain. Repeating previous arguments made twenty years 
earlier about the constant need for seamen and the danger to the entire economy if the Navigation 
Acts were continually violated, the work even alleged that criticism of the navigation laws of 
Britain was goaded on by France. By connecting critics to the enemy, Sheffield aimed to silence 
                                                 
34 The Minutes for the Board on 1 October 1805 show a compilation of the Board’s responses to requests for 
opening the ports over the initial year of the new instructions. Responses affirmed the good conduct of governors 
upholding the rules or providing reasonable evidence of real danger, while also condemning governors who violated 
their instructions, for an example of the latter, see the Board’s reply to President Campbell of Tobago’s actions in 
opening the ports to American soap and candles, Board of Trade Minutes, 1 Oct. 1805, BT 5/15, f.147-155, TNA. 
The stricter rules also fell hard on colonists already affected by the war, see the Petition to Governor Nugent of 
Jamaica, 18 Dec. 1804, CO 137/114, TNA. 
35 Bury and Norwich Post, 6 June 1804; the Board of Trade was similarly swamped with petitions from concerned 
ship-owners, see, Minutes of the Board of Trade, 22 June 1804, BT 5/14, f.153-155, TNA. 
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any dissent before the debate even began.36 Taken on its own, Sheffield’s Strictures appear as an 
anachronism by an author who failed to recognize the economic realities of foreign trade in 
1804. Yet in looking forward, it is clear that Sheffield predicted the coming change in British 
policy with the expansion of the economic war against France and neutral powers in the 
following years.  
The reforms of the admiralty courts and the governance of the West Indies laid the 
groundwork for the Essex decision in the summer of 1805. Expanding on Scott’s earlier 
Immanuel decision, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, led by Sir William Grant, used 
the Essex to effectively end the loophole created by Scott in 1800. The Essex was an American 
vessel travelling between Spain and the West Indies, by way of Salem, when it was captured by a 
British ship and brought into Nassau, Bahamas. In a short decision amounting to a single 
sentence, the Lords of Appeal pronounced that the duties paid on the importation and exportation 
of the cargo provided ‘insufficient proof’ that the goods were meant for domestic consumption, 
and the vessel was condemned as a lawful prize. Just as Scott had done five years earlier, the 
Lords set an entirely new precedent with one innocuous case that called into question the entire 
basis of neutral shipping.37 This decision was soon followed up by others which reaffirmed the 
Lords’ new view of the continuous voyage. In the William (1806), Sir William Grant stated the 
view of the Court that “nobody has ever supposed that a mere deviation from the straightest and 
shortest course, in which the voyage could be performed, would change its denomination, and 
                                                 
36 Sheffield’s original pamphlet was fairly short, only about sixty pages, but like his Observations, subsequent 
editions were rapidly expanded, John Holroyd Lord Sheffield, Strictures on the Necessity of Inviolably Maintaining 
the Navigation and Colonial System of Great Britain (London: J. Debrett, 1804), 27. 
37 The Essex (1805) in HCA 45/48, f.242-249, TNA. A copy of the Essex decision can also be found in the 
diplomatic dispatches of James Monroe, see, James Monroe to James Madison, #35, 18 Oct. 1805, reel 9, M30, RG 
59, NARA. 
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make it cease to be a direct one…”38 Specifically citing the Essex decision, Grant claimed that 
the British courts had never held that the payment of duties was a universal test of a ‘bonâ fide 
importation’ of goods into neutral territory. Grant, in turn, disclaimed the tactics used by neutrals 
‘touching’ at a port for the mere purpose of ‘colouring’ their voyage. In ignoring years of 
precedent, the Lords of Appeal used the William and the Essex to rewrite history to meet the 
government’s new policies in the war.  
 In light of the Essex, Scott had to resituate his future decisions to meet the ruling of the 
higher court. At first, Scott attempted to reconcile the Essex and the Polly. Scott clarified his 
earlier decisions by reiterating that the act of mere ‘touching’ at a port did not constitute an 
importation, but he nevertheless restored a ship under his earlier guidelines because it had 
attempted to break up its voyage. After the William, Scott was forced to fall in line and support 
the government’s new position, despite finding little legal basis for the Lords’ view of the 
continuous voyage.39 Scott eventually came to terms with the Essex, at least officially, after 
reading a manuscript of James Stephen’s War in Disguise; or, The Frauds of the Neutral Flags 
(1805), which viciously attacked ‘pseudo-neutrals’ for protecting French trade from the might of 
the Royal Navy. War in Disguise, which went into three printings within six months, was widely 
seen as an official statement by the British government. This was an understandable view given 
that Stephen had close connections to Scott, and the Attorney-General, Spencer Perceval. 
Scholars have also connected Prime Minister William Pitt to the suggestion that Stephen publish 
the pamphlet anonymously in order to avoid any accusations that it was official government 
                                                 
38 The William (1806) in Christopher Robinson, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the High Court of 
Admiralty, 1798-[1808], vol. 5 (London: A. Strahan, 1806), 385–406. 
39 Bourguignon, Sir William Scott, Lord Stowell: Judge of the High Court of Admiralty, 1798-1828, 238. 
 
169 
policy.40 For Scott, War in Disguise seems to have convinced him that patriotism and the war 
demanded that Britain target neutrals in order to hurt the enemy. 
The Essex did more than nullify the importance of duties in neutralizing a voyage, it also 
shifted the burden of proof from the captors to the neutral carrier. Now, neutral ships were faced 
with the almost impossible task of proving their neutrality before a tribunal in order to avoid 
condemnation.41 In order to decide whether a neutral vessel was worthy of condemnation, the 
courts focused on the ‘intention’ of the trader, a vague standard that relied on all of the actions of 
the vessel after it had left port. The vagaries of ‘intention’ exposed neutral commerce, without 
the protection offered by the Polly, to rampant condemnation, based on a variety of factors 
including the origin of the ship, its destination, and the testimony of the crew. Intention could, of 
course, change en route so the original intent was not a sufficient safeguard to prevent the seizure 
of a neutral cargo.42 
The Essex decision was accompanied just a few months later by Britain’s victory at the 
Battle of Trafalgar, solidifying Britain’s dominance of the seas. The following two years 
witnessed Napoleon’s Berlin and Milan Decrees that established a self-blockade of Europe and 
barred the importation of British goods into the continent. Any neutral ship that came into 
contact with a British vessel was considered ‘denationalized’ under the Milan decree, essentially 
                                                 
40 James Stephen, War in Disguise, or, The Frauds of the Neutral Flags (New York: re-printed by George Forman 
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criminalizing neutral commerce with the British.43 Britain responded with the Orders in Council 
of November 1807, which proclaimed a blockade of all French ports and the ports of Napoleon’s 
allies. Neutrals were forced to stop in Britain on their way to the continent and purchase a license 
or face condemnation. The Orders essentially redirected all commerce to the continent through 
Great Britain, forcing neutrals to participate in Britain’s war effort and allowing the British 
economy to openly profit from neutral trade. To the United States, these Orders appeared to be a 
reestablishment of the Navigation Acts, relegating the United States back to colonial status.44 
While the Orders were officially defended as purely retaliatory measures against Napoleon’s 
decrees, many openly questioned whether America was their true target. The London Morning 
Chronicle complained that the ministry concealed its true intentions of injuring America behind 
a ‘mass of words’ that would only lead to contradictory interpretations in the admiralty courts.45 
The Morning Chronicle’s observation seemed to come to the forefront when Scott himself was 
obligated to justify the conduct of the new Orders in the case of the Fox (1811). With the Fox, 
Scott reiterated his view that the Orders appeared to violate international law but he argued that 
the British nation was coerced into the extreme measure of targeting neutral commerce because 
of the ‘gross outrages’ perpetuated by France.46 
In America, the Essex decision and the Orders in Council were greeted with alarm. 
Memorials were submitted to the U.S. Senate by the merchants of over half a dozen ports 
including Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, all complaining of these new restrictions on 
trade. The merchants of New York went so far as to challenge a system of regulation that relied 
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on condemning certain types of trade based on the intention of the merchant. The New York 
merchants argued that their business was based on circumstances, and it was impossible to 
predict intention. The merchants further claimed that it was against the principles of ‘reason, 
equity and law’ to condemn a business already suffering under so much risk because of the 
motives of the merchant. Opposing the Rule of 1756 and the unjust seizures of their ships, the 
merchants concluded by calling for “no innovations on the law of nations.”47 
The American government responded to the decrees of the belligerents with an embargo 
in 1807, cutting Europe off from the valuable neutral trade that had sustained belligerents and 
neutrals during the war. The effects of the embargo on either belligerent power was minimal 
compared to the ramifications in America. Some were infuriated by President Jefferson’s refusal 
to go to war in response to the continued issue of impressment and the Orders in Council. Others 
explicitly violated the embargo by dispatching their vessels before customs officials could 
officially close the port, and by maintaining a steady traffic across the Canadian border. 
Violations of the embargo due to the incompetence and corruption of customs officials 
undermined the reputation of the American government at the same time that European powers 
seemed to be strengthening controls over their own economies. While Britain’s West Indian 
colonies subsisted on provisions coming from Canada, the U.S. government and economy 
suffered from drastic price fluctuations, a monumental fall in customs revenue and an 
increasingly divided United States.48 
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Admiralty Court Evidence and the Reshaping of Neutral Identity 
 
In December 1805, the American ship Baltic was captured and carried into Bermuda by a British 
naval vessel. The ship’s supercargo, a naturalized Frenchman, claimed the vessel was en route to 
Philadelphia from the Isle of Bourbon when it was seized. The supercargo defended the vessel 
and cargo as the property of Richard Gernon of Philadelphia, an American citizen. After the 
vessel was summarily condemned before the Vice-Admiralty Court of Bermuda, Gernon had his 
British contact, William Vaughan, file an appeal in London where the case was again condemned 
by the court in June 1809. The Lords of Appeal ruled in favor of the capture and were aided by 
the precedent established by the Essex four years earlier. The captors provided three reasons for 
the condemnation of the vessel: the property was the enemy’s; the real destination was Bordeaux 
rather than Philadelphia; and the outward cargo was in ‘concealed’ contraband.  
On the face of it, the story of the Baltic was a fairly straightforward one of neutrals 
trafficking in enemy goods during the Napoleonic Wars: capture meant condemnation in a 
hostile court. Yet the case of the Baltic tells us much about the nature of transatlantic commerce 
and merchant identity in this period. First, despite a lengthy war depicted by many in apocalyptic 
terms, this one case involved a British merchant, representing an American, who had hired a 
French supercargo to trade with an enemy colony. The overlapping nationalities of the several 
persons involved in the Baltic’s voyage testifies to the complexity of international commerce at a 
time of stringent commercial regulation. Courts were aware of multinational deals involving 
fellow countrymen, enemies and neutrals, but such deals only made classifying a cargo with a 
certain nationality even more difficult. Secondly, the Baltic is important because of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
argues that the embargo cost about 5 percent of America’s GNP, Douglas A. Irwin, “The Welfare Cost of Autarky: 
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arguments made by the captors in condemning the voyage. These arguments encompassed the 
three main types of evidence impacting a voyage’s identity: the national character of the crew 
and owner, the origin and destination of the vessel, and the origin of the cargo onboard. While 
the totality of the evidence against the Baltic may have made for an easy condemnation, it also 
revealed the many factors involved in negotiating an identity on the high seas. In interpreting this 
evidence, the court made nationality even more amorphous by relying on motivation or 
‘intention’ to act as their guide; interpreting evidence and condemning vessels based on where it 
could potentially lead a voyage rather than any tangible proof.49  
Given the increasingly restrictive policies of the British government with regard to 
neutral trade, the conduct of the admiralty courts may appear less important in retrospect. 
However, the contents of these decisions, and the weight of the evidence, offers insight into how 
the admiralty court understood identity and legitimate commerce in this period. A closer analysis 
of the different types of evidence that determined an admiralty court decision bears further 
examination. The cases studied below reveal the degree of nuance and complexity in admiralty 
court rulings. Looking more closely at admiralty court decisions also helps to explain the role 
that ‘intention’ played in those rulings. These cases show that the admiralty courts constantly 
adapted their understanding of the law to meet the commercial demands of Great Britain. The 
language used in the vice-admiralty courts also reflects the ability of the superior courts to force 
local institutions to uphold the latest precedents. It also shows how those superior court decisions 
could be repackaged by vice-admiralty courts to meet local demands and uphold condemnations. 
Finally, this section highlights the myriad of sources that affected the national character of a 
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transatlantic voyage by studying the importance placed on a vessel’s origin and destination, the 
identity of the crew, cargo and owner.  
Before delving deeper into the evidence brought before the court, it is first necessary to 
establish what types of evidence the court relied on in making its rulings. The examination of 
witnesses was a standard part of any admiralty court case; sailors, captains, supercargoes and any 
passengers on board the ship were all questioned by the court. While varying slightly from case 
to case, witnesses were each given thirty-two questions encompassing the vessel’s ownership, 
previous voyages, the national origin of the captain, the owner and the cargo, the destination of 
the ship, and any information on the passengers and papers on board. Their responses were then 
compared to the ship’s papers, which included: bills of lading, affidavits of the owners, customs 
house clearances and any additional evidence submitted to the court. This systematic approach 
ostensibly uncovered secret information about the voyage that the captain may have hidden from 
the captors – a pursuit that became even more important once the court began to rely on intention 
to interpret the evidence. While fairly uniform in their approach, these examinations could 
produce startling discoveries in court, such as when a cook and mariner broke with the rest of 
their crew to announce that the American ship, The Britannia, had been previously captured by a 
British privateer in the West Indies, directly contradicting the testimony of their captain in open 
court.50 In order to protect the legitimacy of a neutral voyage, the testimony of the crew had to 
remain consistent, or the entire endeavor would fall apart.  
 The identity of the crew, vessel and owner was often the focus of debates over the proper 
classification of neutrals in the admiralty courts. As shown in Chapter 3, the crews of merchant 
vessels were much more diverse than strictly allowed under the law, especially in wartime. 
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Occasionally, a too diverse crew could arouse the interest of the admiralty courts, provoking 
greater scrutiny of the ship’s papers as in the case of the Thomas. The Thomas reportedly 
possessed a multinational crew of all countries ‘except French’, which seems to have contributed 
to the court’s suspicions of the ship in general. Nathan Perl-Rosenthal has further noted earlier 
cases in 1746 and 1756 where the courts allowed privateers to seize ships based on the crew 
complement, but such occurrences were rare.51 Rather, the nationality of the crew infrequently 
determined the outcome of a prize case. In general, outside of the watchful gaze of the press 
gang, the identity of the crew of a ship, including its master, was largely determined by the 
national character of the ship and its owner. This approach to national belonging stood in stark 
contrast to the intense debates surrounding the impressment of foreign seamen on American 
ships. By situating nationality around the employer, the admiralty prize courts allowed for a 
much more malleable conception of identity for sailors, while also relegating the role of sailors 
in prize cases to the periphery in favor of the ship’s owner.52 In fact, the testimony of sailors 
tended to only carry much weight in court when it contradicted that of the captain or the papers 
found on board the ship as in the case of The Britannia.53 The admiralty court’s reliance on 
merchant nationality, over the identity of the crew, further reflected an attempt to simplify and 
organize a complicated and confusing system of international trade and finance; a trade which 
overrode national borders and connected disparate individuals from throughout Europe and 
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America. To determine the identity of a merchant, admiralty courts used residency as an 
adaptable means of handling merchant migrations while also enforcing British policies on neutral 
commerce. 
Determining a ship’s national identity based on the residence of its owner appears as a 
relatively simple endeavor. The testimony in court focused on the birth, current residence, and 
marital status of the owner. Merchants could further submit affidavits and corroborating 
documents in support of a claim on national identity. Yet matters became infinitely more 
complicated when dealing with transatlantic partnerships and voyages conducted in wartime. In a 
series of cases, Sir William Scott attempted to create a coherent doctrine of merchant identity 
based around intention and residence. Scott argued that birth only determined national character 
so long as the merchant continued to reside within his country of origin. If a neutral merchant, 
for example, relocated to a belligerent country, his trade was liable to condemnation as he had 
effectively transformed himself into an enemy subject. As in his other cases, Scott placed a 
heavy emphasis on intention, arguing that a merchant must show signs of intending to relocate 
from a belligerent country in order to maintain a neutral identity.54 Government officials were 
not immune to this doctrine either. In the 1790s, Fulwar Skipwith, while serving as U.S. consul 
at Martinique, saw his property captured and condemned because Skipwith, it was argued, had 
become a French merchant through his trade in the French West Indies. Skipwith spent a decade 
attempting to prove that he was an American citizen, but he was unable to offset the nearly 
universal opinion that his trade had transformed his identity. As King’s Advocate in 1795, Scott 
dealt personally with Skipwith’s case, where he opposed the appeal, stating “I cannot 
recommend an appeal for I am of opinion that on any just & admitted principle of the law of 
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nations, the property of Mr. Skipwith is liable to be considered and treated as the property of a 
French merchant.”55 As judge of the High Court of Admiralty, Scott extended this view to 
include British officials trading in foreign countries, arguing in 1802 that the British consul at 
Embden should be considered German for the purposes of his trade on the continent.56 
If state officials were not protected from these identity politics, private merchants were 
even more exposed. The experience of George William Murray in two cases before the High 
Court of Admiralty and the Lords of Appeal show the complex thinking of the courts in regard to 
national origin. Murray was a naturalized American citizen, who, born in England, had relocated 
to New York in 1784. Murray admitted in his court testimony that he had lived in Holland, 
France, England and the United States in his commercial pursuits; though he had relocated his 
wife and family to New York and expressed to the court a deep-seated desire to live in America 
since childhood. Murray’s first case, the Harmony (1800), gave Scott an opportunity to discuss 
his views on residence at length. In the Harmony, Murray was represented as a partner of an 
American firm, residing in France. While the captors believed Murray’s birth in England was the 
simplest route to condemnation, as they depicted him as a British merchant trading with the 
enemy, Scott disagreed. He instead concluded that time was ‘the grand ingredient’ for 
determining residence and merchant identity. After a thorough examination of the ship’s papers 
and Murray’s letters to his brother and business partner, Scott believed that Murray showed no 
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intention of leaving France and the cargo was condemned. While Scott attempted to use the 
length of residence as the guiding doctrine in this case, the text of the judgment of the Harmony 
reveals the court’s discomfort with the question of residence in international trading partnerships:  
“The active spirit of commerce now abroad in the world, still farther increases this 
difficulty [of determining residence] by increasing the variety of local situations, 
in which the same individual is to be found at no great distance of time, and by 
that sort of extended circulation, if I may so call it, by which the same transaction 
communicates with different countries; as in the present cases in which the same 
trading adventures have their origin (perhaps) in America, travel to France, from 
France to England, from England back to America again, without enabling us to 
assign accurately the exact legal effect of the local character of every particular 
portion of this divided transaction.”57 
 
Scott relied on time and intention for his ruling, deciding that Murray had ‘superadded’ a French 
character onto his American identity and English birth. Once added, it appears that Murray’s 
French character was very difficult to dispose of. Five years later, in the case of the Active (1805) 
before the Lords of Appeal, Murray attempted to defend a shipment made from Bordeaux to 
New Orleans in 1804. Having learned from his earlier experience in court, Murray claimed that 
he had returned to America in 1800 after the failure of his previous house of trade. Murray had 
only travelled to France in 1803 in order to complete some outstanding business, part of which 
required the shipment of the cargo on the Active. Murray concluded his long accounting of his 
life to the court with the statement that it was never his ‘intention’ to remain in France, actively 
adapting the language of his earlier condemnation into his defense. Yet Murray’s captors and the 
vice-admiralty courts had also learned from earlier precedents, and it was argued that the 
Harmony had already established Murray’s residence in France “as to make his property liable to 
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confiscation.”58 Despite having left France, traveled through Europe, returned to America and 
ended his previous partnership, Murray was still French in the eyes of the court.59 Murray’s case 
underscored the problems faced by the admiralty courts in determining identity, as well as the 
growing limitations of the state to regulate global commerce through the narrow category of 
national origin.  
 If the movements of merchants proved hard to classify, then deciphering a ship’s origin 
and destination was often even more convoluted. Decisions based on destination stressed the 
ability of identity to evolve in the middle of a voyage. In the post-Essex period, destination 
became even more important as each belligerent attempted to blockade the sea and the land, and 
the doctrine of the continuous voyage seemingly reigned supreme. Both the blockade and the 
continuous voyage put a neutral’s motives at the center of the court. Relying on this ambiguous 
form of evidence, admiralty court decisions attempted to systematize the use of intention by 
focusing on the direction, destination and value of the voyage. In doing so, the court attempted to 
make up for its uncertainty when dealing with ‘intention’ with strong language that claimed to 
uncover the ‘real’, ‘ostensible’ and ‘bonâ fide’ meaning of the voyage.  
 As Scott had established in 1798, the violation of a blockade required proof of intention, 
but this was particularly hard to prove when neutrals argued that a blockade did not even exist. 
When the Admiralty proclaimed a blockade of the coasts of Martinique and Guadeloupe at the 
start of the war in 1803, neutrals used Scott’s arguments to have the blockade countermanded. 
James Madison, in a letter to Edward Thornton, the British Minister to the United States, argued 
that the Martinique blockade lacked ‘sufficient force’ to cover the collective four hundred miles 
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of coastline needed to legally blockade the two islands. In response, the British ministry 
officially limited the scope of the blockade to the seizure of contraband and the blockade of 
specific ports, but local vice-admiralty courts and privateers often ignored these orders in their 
pursuit of neutral vessels.60  
 British privateers brought a series of neutral vessels in for adjudication for violating the 
‘blockade’ of Martinique and Guadeloupe. Under interrogation, captains claimed to have heard 
news that the blockade was raised, despite the claims of the privateers. Samuel Evans, captain of 
the Samuel, reported that his ship had ‘found a good market’ at St. Pierre, Martinique, 
successfully passing through the blockade without any interference from British vessels. Other 
neutral ships captured by privateers echoed Evans’s testimony, reporting that their vessels had 
easily accessed the port of St. Pierre; other neutral vessels were witnessed in the port; there was 
no sign of any armed vessels in the area; and finally that their home government had not received 
any notification of the blockade before they embarked on their voyages.61 In making these 
arguments, American captains showed a sophisticated understanding of current admiralty court 
precedents, repeating Scott’s doctrines back to the court when under interrogation. Despite these 
claims, the papers of the Lords of Appeal show that several ships were condemned for violating 
the blockade, and dozens of others were undoubtedly captured but never received a hearing.62 
The treatment of these cases by the Lords of Appeal varied drastically. Samuel Evans’s ship, 
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which entered Martinique on June 30, 1804, was restored on appeal, but the Robert which 
arrived on May 21, 1804, was condemned, “because the blockade of Martinique was violated.”63 
In all of these cases, the destination was not in dispute, but the meaning of the destination proved 
to be a debatable point. 
The court cases rested on the question of knowledge of the blockade and whether the 
blockade was legally enforceable. In each case, the master and the crew consistently reported 
their ignorance of the blockade. One crew member even helpfully suggested to the court that 
perhaps his ship was actually seized because of the French property on board, rather than due to 
a blockade violation.64 The captors in response, relied on the testimony of the local British 
commander, Samuel Hood, whose orders filled the accompanying appendices to the blockade 
cases. Yet Hood’s orders were broad and increasingly lacked definitive end dates and locations, 
opening the cases up for interpretation.65 After the Essex, the courts tended to side with the local 
commander on the question of whether a blockade was in force, but the debate in the vice-
admiralty courts is nevertheless significant because it points to the ability of captured neutrals to 
negotiate their cases through the language of the court. The testimony of the crew also calls 
attention to the relative effectiveness of the Royal Navy, which could not enforce its claim to be 
everywhere at once, often leaving ‘blockaded’ ports unguarded in pursuit of other goals.  
The conduct of a vessel after it left port could also potentially transform its identity, 
calling into question its intended destination. In 1806, the Osiris was captured on a voyage from 
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New York to St. Thomas by the HMS Ethalion and carried into Antigua. The master of the 
Osiris, John Morris, in his examination, stated confidently that St. Thomas was the destination of 
his ship. Morris was able to name the merchants he expected to meet on the island, and claimed 
to have known them for several years. Morris further claimed that he never deviated from his 
course, “when the weather would permit,” and denied any allegation that he had ‘sailed wide’. 
The testimony of the crew corroborated Morris’s claim that their destination was the Danish 
West Indies and the ship had not altered its course to an enemy port. In response, the crew of the 
Ethalion, in an affidavit, argued that the Osiris had deviated from its logical course. The captors 
based their claim on their ‘judgments as seamen’ which they believed persuasively showed that 
the path taken by the Osiris was ‘intricate and dangerous’ if the true destination was the Danish 
West Indies.66 
 
3. Map for the voyage of the Osiris (1806), provided by the crew of HMS Ethalion 
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In defense of their claim, the captors compiled a map (see above) which outlined the two most 
logical courses for the captured ship (no. 1 & 2) as well as the actual voyage of the Osiris (no. 3) 
and the site of its eventual capture near the enemy island of St. Martin’s (no. 4). The captors 
further argued that their ship was operating at the time under French colors, which they believed 
encouraged the captain of the Osiris to “bring to sooner than he otherwise would.”67 The captors 
concluded that it was the vessel’s ‘intention’ to enter St. Martin’s, and therefore condemnation 
was warranted on the grounds that the vessel was carrying contraband (naval stores) and sailing 
“under a false destination, to an enemy’s port.”68 Vice-Admiralty Court Judge Edward Byam 
heard the case in August 1806, and accepting the map and the testimony of the Ethalion, Byam 
declared the ship and cargo to belong to the enemy.69 Perhaps persuaded by the lack of any 
documentary evidence to the contrary, the Lords of Appeal heard the case, nearly three years 
later, and overturned the original verdict. The case of the Osiris showed how courts and captors 
exploited the direction of a vessel to prove the true intention of a merchant voyage. Direction 
could be ascertained from sailor’s experience and it did not necessarily depend on any 
corroborating evidence. The captors’ preconceptions of Morris’s intentions, combined with their 
knowledge of admiralty court precedents and the local waters, helped them to formulate a 
persuasive case for the local court despite lacking any real evidence to prove their claims.  
 Finally, contraband had the potential to reshape a merchant voyage in the eyes of the 
court. The definition of contraband in the eighteenth century was largely unsettled as neutrals 
argued that contraband only covered war materials while belligerents viewed contraband as 
extending to naval stores and even provisions. Neutrals carrying contraband were accused of 
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providing ‘aid and comfort’ to the enemies of Great Britain, by allowing besieged ports to 
continue to thrive despite the efforts of the Royal Navy. While the idea of ‘free ships make free 
goods’ had largely fallen from favor, especially with the collapse of the last League of Armed 
Neutrality in 1801, Americans still maintained their right to carry provisions and enemy colonial 
produce to markets in the West Indies and Europe.70 After the Essex, British courts were liable to 
view any goods coming from belligerent territories as the property of the enemy; there was in 
fact a ‘legal presumption’ of guilt when dealing with questions of contraband.71 
 When J.W. Irwin’s ship, the Mary, was captured and carried into Bermuda in January 
1807, he learned that the basis of his seizure stemmed from the value of his cargo. The captain of 
the privateer explained that Irwin’s cargo would not pay for the expenses of the voyage if he 
intended to trade at Jamaica, concluding that his cargo was instead meant for Saint-Domingue. 
Corroborating this, a mate aboard the Mary confirmed the privateer’s suspicion that the ship was 
really destined for Saint-Domingue. The sailor provided the additional claim that the ship was in 
fact smuggling ammunition to the island. The captors proceeded to tear apart Irwin’s ship in 
search of further proof of Irwin’s true “intention to smuggle the cargo into that island.”72 Irwin 
was shocked by the seizure as his ship was in fact British, carrying on a trade between America 
and the West Indies. Believing in the safety of his identity, Irwin wrote to his business contact 
William Wallace (nephew of Nicholas Low and partner in the New York firm, Low & Wallace) 
predicting that the ship would not be condemned on “the ridiculous information of this 
scoundrel,” but he worried that the number of men on board and the arms on the ship would 
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influence the court’s decision.73 Tentatively confident in the recovery of his ship, Irwin worried 
that the delay of a trial would ruin his cargo. When the vessel was eventually condemned in 
April, Irwin reported that the condemnation was based on two factors: the account of two mates 
(one examined drunk) who based their testimony on rumors from the other members of the crew, 
and a cargo that was inadmissible in Jamaica. In defense of his cargo, Irwin pointed to the 
proclamation of Eyre Coote, Governor of Jamaica, on November 27, 1806, which allowed for the 
importation of provisions into the island. Irwin complained that his counsel ignored this 
argument in favor of claiming that the court could not try a smuggler without proof of 
smuggling. In Irwin’s view, the evidence hardly mattered as the judge came to court with his 
verdict already written down. Since Irwin’s barrister failed to take any notes during the trial, 
Irwin was forced to scribble down the sentence for insurance purposes: 
 “…but taking all the circumstances into consideration such as her being a stout 
built vessel, well-armed and strongly manned and every way calculated for the St. 
Domingo trade and having a cargo on board which could not legally be imported 
into Jamaica he should consider her as bound to some part of St. Domingo and as 
such she must be condemned as being engaged in an illegal trade.”74 
 
In the case of the Mary, the Vice-Admiralty Court of Jamaica chose to ignore the proclamation 
of the island’s governor in favor of their own suspicions based on what was discovered aboard 
the ship. The classification of the British ship’s cargo as French property had ramifications 
beyond the courtroom because such a ruling could negatively affect the insurance policy on the 
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voyage. Low & Wallace in New York learned that the North American Insurance Company, who 
underwrote the policy, was prepared to withhold payment unless proof could be provided that the 
cargo could be classified under the terms of the policy: ‘Goods per British Brig Mary’.75 If the 
British Brig Mary was in fact French, the insurer was no longer liable to cover the claim. As the 
case of the Mary shows, even beyond the courthouse, the reclassification of commodities could 
have a real impact on merchant business.   
 When a cargo’s identity was not easily fixed, the court could split the national character 
of a ship into multiple parts, reserving the right to condemn each part on its own merit. This 
approach allowed the court to circumvent instructions sent by the Admiralty or even 
proclamations of the local governor. The courts also maintained that if one part of the cargo was 
enemy property, it could implicate the rest of the voyage in a scheme to fraudulently ship 
belligerent goods under a neutral flag. This approach also helped to distinguish the different 
parties involved in an individual merchant venture, further expanding on the layers of evidence 
available to the court.  
The division of the cargo based on ownership alone could quickly become extremely 
complicated. In October 1805, the Adeline was captured in a voyage from Guadeloupe to New 
York, its cargo on board, primarily sugar, was jointly owned by three New York firms: Nathaniel 
and George Griswold, J. Macardier and Bertrand Dupoy. Further confusing the identity of the 
property involved in this case, Bartlet Sheppard, the captain of the Adeline, worked for a separate 
company, a Connecticut firm which owned the vessel engaged by the charter-party. Because of 
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times could be particularly hard on merchants attempting to insure their property amidst numerous neutral captures, 
in March 1807, Joseph Lewis reported to Low & Wallace that only one in seven insurance offices would cover a 
vessel heading to the Bahamas, see Joseph S. Lewis & Co. to Low & Wallace, 23 March 1807, Box 38. Yet, these 
difficulties did not stop the insurance companies from waiving the ‘illicit trade’ clauses found in their policies, see, 
Joseph S. Lewis & Co. to Low & Wallace, 2 Feb. 1807.  
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his temporary relationship with the merchants chartering the Adeline, Sheppard’s testimony was 
vague and confused, often forgetting the names of individuals involved and even the amount of 
cargo on board. When pressed, Sheppard was forced to refer the court to the ship’s papers on 
numerous occasions.76 To simplify the case, the Vice-Admiralty Court at Nova Scotia split the 
cargo into thirds: condemning Bertrand Dupoy’s share, requesting further proof for J. Macardier 
and restoring the ship and the remaining cargo to the Griswold brothers. The case of the Adeline 
shows the dangers of international commerce within a court system seeking to label individual 
transactions with a particular identity. When captured by the British vessel, Captain Sheppard 
was told that his ship had been stopped “on account of the vessel’s being chartered, and having 
more cargo on board than she carried out.”77 When the case came before the Lords of Appeal, 
the Lords decided in favor of the American merchants but ordered further proof to be made 
within nine months for the property owned by Bertrand Dupoy. Dupoy’s inability to convince 
the courts in Nova Scotia and London of the authenticity of his property seemed to stem from his 
role in the charter party. The Adeline’s captain was able to tell the court more about the Griswold 
brothers, who were connected to the owners of the ship, than he was about Dupoy himself. 
Sheppard’s testimony on Dupoy rested only on his residence in New York as a merchant. Unable 
to give any further information on the nature of Dupoy’s business, Sheppard again simply 
referred to the ship’s papers and professed his ignorance. Other court records reveal that the 
entire shipment was Dupoy’s idea, based around his connections to Deville & Rezeville in 
Guadeloupe. Initially, Dupoy attempted to rectify the court’s doubts by submitting several 
documents testifying to the various stages of the transaction and his own citizenship as an 
                                                 
76 Appendix to Adeline (1807), HCA 45/52, f.146-151. The charter-party which engaged the Adeline was a 
relatively simple affair compared to the case of the Wells (1807), whose cargo was split into six different categories, 
four of which were condemned, see, Wells (1807), HCA 45/52, f.93-108, TNA. 
77 Adeline (1807), HCA 45/52, f.148. 
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American, but it is unclear whether he ever won over the court as there does not seem to be any 
record of further proof being provided.78  
By focusing on the evidence used in admiralty court cases we can trace the effectiveness 
of Sir William Scott’s doctrines and his reforms implemented in the vice-admiralty courts. While 
the vice-admiralty courts continued to chafe against the latest Orders in Council and instructions 
sent by the Admiralty, the records nevertheless reveal that the local courts were in an 
increasingly dependent position. Tighter controls on the court led to judges who more closely 
followed the language and tenor of the superior courts in their rulings. Echoing Scott, these 
courts used ‘intention’ as their guide in scrutinizing evidence and determining the innocence of a 
captured neutral ship. The Essex though showed that the local courts did not answer to Scott, but 
rather to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, whose political agenda manipulated the 
language of Scott’s decisions to safeguard the economic welfare of the British Empire. In doing 
so, the courts continuously adapted their rulings to meet the complex strategies pursued by 
neutrals in safeguarding their trade with the enemy.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the years between the Essex and the Embargo, neutral merchants attempted to work within the 
admiralty court system to defend their rights. Mobilizing the decisions made by Scott in 1798 
and 1800, neutral merchants effectively defended their commerce from external attack. By 
examining the records of the admiralty courts in detail, this chapter shows how captains, vice-
admiralty court judges, and privateers participated in the debate over neutral commerce and the 
development of international law. In 1805, the growth of the British state and the reinvigoration 
                                                 
78 In fact, most of the documents submitted to the court involved Dupoy in some way, Adeline (1807), HCA 45/52, 
f.150. 
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of the continuous voyage allowed for courts to once again redefine and condemn neutral 
commerce based on its destination, ownership and property. By situating the interpretation of 
evidence solely around hidden intentions, all evidence could be second-guessed and construed 
into making neutral voyages appear sinister in the eyes of the court. 
The measures taken by Britain, America and France from 1806-1809 laid the foundation 
for an increasingly restrictive commercial system in the Atlantic World. If the years following 
the Essex saw the gradual deconstruction of neutral identity, then the last six years of the war 
would see a rapid expansion of British commercial identity to include anyone willing to pay for a 
British license. As the next chapter reveals, after 1809 the British government implemented the 
licensing of foreign ships to rapidly expand the umbrella of acceptable commerce to include 
licensed neutrals. This system served to effectively engulf all transatlantic shipping within the 
British commercial empire. The opening up of British merchant identity only came after the 
admiralty courts had established the limits of legitimate commerce, classifying most neutral 
activity as belligerent. The British institutionalization of the licensing system, and the 
encouragement of neutral smuggling to the continent and the West Indies, allowed for a final 
shift in Anglo-American identity. While some Americans were classified by the British state as 
‘pseudo-neutrals’, or belligerents in disguise, the licensing system allowed for other Americans 
to reenter the British Empire for a fee. 
Chapter 5: Licensed American Traders, 1809-1815 
 
By 1807 neutral commerce appeared to be at a standstill. In Europe, France’s Continental 
System tightly controlled all foreign access to France, its territories and that of its allies. 
Meanwhile, the British blockade of the Continent, under the Orders in Council, similarly limited 
trade with Europe, preventing shipments to any port adhering to the Continental System. 
The situation was little better in the West Indies. The Essex decision had ended the ‘broken 
voyage’ and neutrals were now presumed guilty until proven innocent. Both France and Great 
Britain separately targeted neutral shipping with great zeal, seizing any neutral vessel which had 
come into contact the enemy. Believing that neutral trade was a potential a powder keg, Thomas 
Jefferson instituted an embargo to prevent any American vessels from antagonizing the warring 
parties into declaring war. American ships would remain home rather than become embroiled in 
a foreign war.  
Despite the best efforts of the French, British and American governments, commerce 
persisted in the years of the war after 1807. Often, merchants simply subverted their own 
country’s economic restrictions and worked closely with foreign business contacts to facilitate 
the movement of goods. Essentially, this meant that every merchant operating in the Atlantic 
World became a smuggler in order to maintain their business during the years of blockade and 
embargo. States were complicit in this endeavor. The commercial system established in 1807 
was the highest expression of mercantilist doctrine: all unlicensed foreign commerce was 
declared illegitimate. States now claimed sweeping control over their borders and their subjects’ 
contact with foreign entities. These restrictive economic systems were not simply passive walls 
blocking out the outside world. Instead, each state greatly expanded its regulation of commerce 
by establishing licensing systems. Now, any merchant attempting to trade past a blockade was 
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forced to pay a fee and act as an official agent of the state. A license provided protection from 
seizure by privateers and the navy, but this official sanction also transformed a merchant’s 
identity. From the perspective of the licenser, purchasing a license was a public statement of 
allegiance to the new commercial order. For other governments, license holders were simply 
smugglers operating under a veneer of legitimacy. Licensing, in effect, blurred commercial 
identity, making a single merchant at once: a foreign agent, a licensed smuggler, a loyal subject 
and a traitor.  
This chapter will examine the consequences of the licensed system for both international 
commerce and popular conceptions of national identity. To do this, the chapter will focus on the 
British licensing of foreign commerce at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. While France and 
America also licensed certain trades in these years, the British system was by far the largest and 
most sophisticated system in use. The chapter will begin by examining the divisive public debate 
which licensing provoked. Licenses brought to the public mind questions about the nature of 
allegiance, sovereignty, and commercial freedom. Few of these questions were easily answered, 
and this debate set much of the groundwork for dividing the United States on the eve of the War 
of 1812. The chapter will then focus on how licensing actually worked by examining two case 
studies of the licensed trade: the American provisioning of the British army in Spain and 
Portugal and the licensing of neutral commerce in the West Indies. Americans who helped 
provision the British army, especially after 1812, were viewed as traitors by their fellow 
countrymen, but the trade persisted and proved to be one of the most profitable transatlantic 
trades during the war. The trade with Spain and Portugal reveals the commercial and political 
consequences for merchants trading with the enemy under the license system. Finally, the trade 
to neutral islands such as the Swedish island of St. Bartholomew’s represented the limitations 
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and opportunities created by Great Britain’s licensed system for the Greater Caribbean. By 
forcing merchants trading with neutral ports to operate under British licenses, the British 
overrode the commercial sovereignty of other states. All commerce in the West Indies now fell 
under the umbrella of the British empire’s license system. The Royal Navy’s unchallenged 
control of the seas meant that neutral merchants required the tacit approval of the British 
government to trade with the United States, Europe or the West Indies. On the other hand, the 
British reliance on the island revealed the limitations of the new system. Much like St. Eustatius 
during the American Revolution, St. Bartholomew’s served a pivotal role in moving goods and 
information through the British empire. In relation to British licensing, St. Bartholomew’s was 
emblematic of the larger flaws which had developed in the system as a whole. By 1809 the 
empire was over-extended and had become largely unstable. The conquered Caribbean islands 
created a hinterland where migrants, goods and ideas could slip past imperial barriers. During the 
War of 1812, the holes created in Britain’s blockade at St. Bartholomew’s in the West Indies, 
New London and New Haven on the eastern coast of the United States, and Passamaquoddy Bay 
on the Canadian border continued to reveal how individuals contested the borders of Britain’s 
new licensed empire.1 
For almost a decade the licensing system transformed international commerce. Great 
Britain and its dominions acted as the entrepôt for the world. All trade and even correspondence 
required the empire’s approval. The licensing system had the potential to greatly expand the 
British empire. In this sense, licensing was a mercantilist milestone in the final years of the 
                                                 
1 For more on the over-extended nature of the British empire and the opportunities created by the new frontier, see, 
Candlin, The Last Caribbean Frontier, 1795-1815, 166; For the role of small islands in creating a trans-imperial 
network, see, Han Jordaan and Victor Wilson, “The Eighteenth-Century Danish, Dutch, and Swedish Free Ports in 
the Northeastern Caribbean,” in Dutch Atlantic Connections, 1680-1800, ed. Gert Oostindie and J. V. Roitman 
(Boston: Brill, 2014), 276. 
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Navigation Act. More importantly, the system offered an alternative view of mercantilism. 
Rather than a restrictive system catering to the few who monopolized foreign trade, licensing 
liberalized membership in the empire by granting access to any merchant willing to pay a fee.  
The occasional licensing of vessels to trade with the enemy was a generally accepted 
practice in early modern European warfare. For the French Revolutionary Wars, the British 
government initially began licensing vessels for overseas trade in 1797 as a means of facilitating 
their free port traffic with the Spanish West Indies.2 But it was not until 1806 that licensing took 
on a new importance as a response to Napoleon’s Continental System. In the following years, the 
number of licenses issued by the British government increased exponentially as a way around 
Napoleon’s blockade. The government invested heavily in licensing with over 18,000 licenses 
issued to merchants by 1810.3 Licensed trades were further encouraged by insurance companies 
which insisted on licenses for policy-holders to guarantee that insured vessels obtained 
protection from the Royal Navy while at sea. Despite political opponents who claimed foreign 
licensing was an assault on national sovereignty, merchants recognized the appeal of purchasing 
a license and safeguarding their shipments from capture. The cooperation of private 
organizations and individuals with the state effectively placed most of the maritime trade in the 
world under the stewardship of the British government and the Board of Trade.4 
Historian’s treatment of the licensing system has been rather uniform over the last 
seventy years. There are few book-length treatments of licensing. Instead, licensing is generally 
                                                 
2 Armytage, The Free Port System in the British West Indies: A Study in Commercial Policy, 1766-1822, 101. By 
1808 this early system was discovered to be rife with corruption with British licenses used to protect clandestine 
trades with the French islands, see, ibid, 106. 
3 Heckscher, The Continental System, 205. 
4 Aaslestad, “Introduction,” 6. Initially, the license system was tightly controlled and licensed ships were forced to 
travel in convoy for their own protection (and policing), see, James M. Witt, “Smuggling and Blockade-Running 
during the Anglo-Dutch War from 1807 to 1814,” in Revisiting Napoleon’s Continental System, ed. Katherine B. 
Aaslestad and Johan Joor (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 158.  
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featured as a minor episode in the greater story of economic warfare between Britain and France, 
or licensing is depicted as just another example of the internal division of the United States 
during the War of 1812. While neither approach is inaccurate, both are limited in scope. The 
majority of scholars have simply acknowledged what amounts to a startling fact about the British 
empire under the licensed trade: commercial membership in the empire potentially included 
everyone (outside of France) in the Atlantic World.   
Scholarship on the impact of the licensed trade revolves around two main themes:  how 
licensing reshaped everyday commerce and how licensing served as a weapon of economic 
warfare. These two interwoven ideas were first brought forward by Eli Heckscher in his 
groundbreaking study of the Continental System. In Heckscher’s view, the licensing system was 
the ultimate expression of mercantilism as it placed all foreign trade in the hands of the British 
government. Licensing furthered the state’s mercantilist goals by placing a major emphasis on 
exports. Further, license holders trading with Great Britain were required to export a sum of 
equal value in order to guarantee a favorable balance of trade for the mother country.5 While the 
French licensing system was an essential part of the ‘new order of things’, Heckscher believed 
that British licensing was always strictly meant to be a response to the Continental System. In 
making this distinction between British and French commercial philosophies, Heckscher seems 
to have underestimated the extent to which licensing upended all trade during the war.  
The claim that the licensing system was simply Britain’s most effective economic 
weapon in the last years of the war has continued to preoccupy scholars. Yet, as a weapon, it 
                                                 
5 Heckscher, The Continental System, 205–6, 209. Before Heckscher, Alfred Mahan was the first to argue that 
Britain’s commercial policies were an attempt to impose ‘colonial dependence’ onto the United States. Mahan’s 
argument belongs to the ‘revenge theory’ of U.S.-British history which argues that the first decades after 
independence were defined by the British government’s desire to avenge their losses from the war, see, Mahan, Sea 
Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812, 103; Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution: British Policy toward the 
United States, 1783-1795, ix–x. 
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remains unclear who the license system was actually meant to be directed against. Many have 
argued that neutrals, rather than France, were the true target. Henry Bourguignon’s study of the 
career of Sir William Scott concluded that the ministry quickly moved beyond France to create a 
‘discriminatory’ system intended to enrich British businesses at the expense of neutral trade. In 
contrast, others have argued that the license system was meant to absorb neutral trade rather than 
destroy it. According to Stephen Neff, the license system was used to conscript neutrals into 
working for the British government as “instruments of Britain’s economic warfare program.”6 
Brian Arthur has recently combined these two earlier views in his study of Britain’s system of 
economic warfare against the United States in the War of 1812. Arthur views licensing in tandem 
with the system of blockades as an effective tool in restricting trade and making the American 
economy heavily dependent on British licenses.7  
Others have moved away from economic warfare to consider how licensing restructured 
everyday trade for merchants operating in the Atlantic World. Placing the impressment 
controversy on its head, Michael J. Crawford has emphasized how merchants and military 
officers blurred the lines between English and American identity, turning travel on the high seas 
into a ‘tragic comedy’ of mistaken identity.8 Faye Kert’s study of privateering during the War of 
1812 illustrates the appeal of licensing for merchants. Kert argues that licenses were imminently 
profitable for merchants because few vessels carrying licenses were ever captured and three-
                                                 
6 Stephen C. Neff, “Britain and the Neutrals in the French Revolutionary Wars: The Debate Over Reprisals and 
Third Parties,” COLLeGIUM: Studies Across Disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences 10 (2011): 235–36, 
242. 
7 Bourguignon, Sir William Scott, Lord Stowell: Judge of the High Court of Admiralty, 1798-1828, 216; Brian 
Arthur, How Britain Won the War of 1812: The Royal Navy’s Blockades of the United States, 1812-1815 (Rochester, 
NY: Boydell & Brewer, 2011), 171. 
8 Michael J. Crawford, “The Navy’s Campaign against the Licensed Trade in the War of 1812,” The American 
Neptune 46, no. 3 (1986): 167–68; More recently, Crawford’s argument has been expanded on by Joshua Smith who 
describes the identity games required by the license trade as a “ticklish business”, see, Joshua M. Smith, Borderland 
Smuggling: Patriots, Loyalists, and Illicit Trade in the Northeast, 1783-1820 (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 2006), 89–90. 
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quarters of those seized were eventually released.9 Given that transatlantic merchants lacked few 
alternatives by 1812, the temptation to license vessels under the British government was a 
powerful one. 
While most studies have acknowledged the similarities between the licensing policies of 
Great Britain during the Napoleonic Wars and the old colonial system of pre-Revolutionary 
America, none have really considered this idea in-depth. Nor has the scholarship on the licensing 
system considered the full implications of licensing’s effect on identity and belonging in the Age 
of Revolution. If admission to the empire required nothing more than the payment of a licensing 
fee, then anyone trading in the Atlantic World could potentially claim the protections of a British 
subject. This was recognized by many engaged in the licensed debate at the time. In an editorial 
featured in the Massachusetts Republican Spy, the danger licensing posed to national allegiance 
was spelled out to the reader: “In getting and submitting to this license, we surrender our 
independence to king George, &c renounce the name and title of freemen.”10 The mundane 
purchase of a shipping license was in fact a transformative moment for the vessel and its owner.  
Licensing not only transformed individual merchants, it also reshaped all foreign 
commerce by drastically altering the flow of traffic and manipulating the importance of markets. 
Licensing forcefully opened up the closed Continental System to trade with the outside world. 
As Silvia Marzagalli has recently explained, the Continental System only occasionally brought 
maritime trade to a standstill, instead, it “diverted maritime trade routes more than it stopped 
trade entirely.”11 The ports of Hamburg, Malta, Heligoland, Gothenburg and Gibraltar gained 
unparalleled importance as the British exploited these ports as holes in Napoleon’s system. To 
                                                 
9 Faye M. Kert, Privateering: Patriots and Profits in the War of 1812 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2015), 63. 
10 Republican Spy, 21 Sept. 1808. 
11 Marzagalli, “The Continental System: A View from the Sea,” 86. 
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trade with Europe, a merchant was forced to either smuggle goods past French customs officers 
or take the more dangerous route of circumventing the Royal Navy’s blockade. At Heligoland, 
the most important port in Northern Europe during the Continental System, merchants brought 
goods to the small island for re-export to the Continent. Over 200 British merchants relocated to 
the island, establishing 140 warehouses to support their booming trade.12 An Order in Council of 
May 30, 1809, confined the Heligoland trade to British ships and British license-holders. By 
limiting this smuggling trade to those who purchased a license, the ministry ensured the 
popularity of their new licensing scheme. Demand for licenses was so great that the government 
invested the British governor of Heligoland with the power to issue licenses - a power strictly 
confined to the crown as it authorized trade with the enemy.13  
For the British empire, the license system largely replaced the occasional proclamations 
issued by colonial governors to allow foreigners past Britain’s Navigation Act. During the War 
of 1812 the Board of Trade opened Bermuda to a licensed trade with the United States in neutral 
vessels. Bermuda would act as an entrepôt to the rest of the British West Indies, funneling 
American flour to where it was most needed, often directly supplying the Royal Navy which was 
currently fighting American privateers in the Caribbean. Further licenses were granted to protect 
vessels conveying American flour from Bermuda to Barbados, and for shipping coffee and sugar 
from Bermuda to the United States.14 By designating one port of entry and controlling the trade 
                                                 
12 Margrit Schulte Beerbühl, “Trading Networks across the Blockades: Nathan Mayer Rothschild and His 
Commodity Trade during the Early Years of the Blockades (1803-1808),” in Revisiting Napoleon’s Continental 
System, ed. Katherine B. Aaslestad and Johan Joor (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 145. 
13 For Sir William Scott’s elaboration on this principle, see The Hope and Others, in Edward Stanley Roscoe, ed., 
Reports of Prize Cases Determined in the High Court of Admiralty: Before the Lords Commissioners of Appeals in 
Prize Causes, and Before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, from 1745-1859, vol. 2 (London: Stevens and 
Sons, 1905), 153. Board of Trade, 26 Dec. 1809, BT 5/19, TNA; London Gazette, 30 May 1809. 
14 Technically, the Board merely confirmed a practice already instituted by Vice-Admiral Sawyer and others who 
began issuing licenses at the start of the war, see Minutes of the Board of Trade, 21 Aug. 1812, BT 5/21. For the 
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with licenses, the British could closely monitor access to their colonial possessions and avoid the 
mercantilist headaches associated with previous American trades. The actions of the Board of 
Trade were the culmination of the stricter regulations issued to colonial authorities over the 
previous decade.15 Rather than sporadic exceptions to the rule, which might weaken the 
effectiveness of Britain’s mercantile policies, licensing allowed for a more coherent approach to 
commercial regulation.16 All foreign vessels were now suspect, and only license holders were 
allowed to navigate the seas ‘freely’.  
In 1809, the admiralty court case of the Goede Hoop provided the government an 
opportunity to explain the license system to the rest of the commercial world. In his ruling for the 
case, Sir William Scott explained that licenses were traditionally given only as special exceptions 
to the general prohibition against trading with the enemy. However, Napoleon’s Continental 
System had changed the general practice of war. Napoleon was accused of targeting commerce 
in general and removing the neutral ports that Great Britain relied on in wartime.17 Rather than 
documents of ‘special and rare indulgence’, licenses would now be granted “with great liberality 
to all merchants of good character,” in order to support Britain’s overseas commerce. As there 
were few neutrals left in Europe, Scott understood that the license trade required that British 
merchants partner with the enemy. Scott further claimed that such transactions required absolute 
secrecy in order to sidestep Napoleonic customs officials. Finally, Scott used the Goede Hoop to 
                                                                                                                                                             
later licenses see, Board of Trade, 29 Sept. 1812 and 6 Oct. 1812, BT 5/21; For the expansion of these policies, see, 
Board of Trade, 6 Oct. 1812, BT 5/21. 
15 As previous chapters have shown, this was a major goal of the British since American Independence. For more on 
the regulations issued to the colonies, see Chapter 4. 
16 When petitioners from other colonies attempted to move beyond Bermuda in their trade with the United States, 
they were rebuffed by the Board, see, Memorial of Andrew Wright, in Margaret Ells, ed., A Calendar of Official 
Correspondence and Legislative Papers, Nova Scotia, 1802-15 (Halifax, N.S: Board of Trustees of the Public 
Archives of Nova Scotia, 1936), 319. 
17 Scott’s ruling was effectively the same logic he had used to confirm the Essex decision, see, Perkins, “Sir William 
Scott and the Essex,” 181. Neff notes that there never was any resolution in court to the questions licensing 
provoked, see, Neff, “Britain and the Neutrals in the French Revolutionary Wars,” 247. 
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bolster the power of the British ministry; he argued that the crown had sole authority in issuing 
licenses, and that the court did not have the power to reinterpret licenses beyond the text of the 
document.18 With this case, Scott established that Britain’s overseas trade for the length of the 
war would entail a full-scale smuggling operation, conducted under a veil of secrecy, and 
legitimized by the government through the issuing of licenses to enemy ships.  
Some historians have noted that the willingness of the government to adapt to changing 
situations, and continue to reform the inner-workings of the empire, is evidence of the strength of 
mercantilism at this late date.19 Yet the demands of the licensing system forced the British 
government to legalize illegal trades which violated traditional commercial principles. When the 
British Consul at Boston, Andrew Allen, illegally issued his own licenses to American merchants 
in 1812, Sir William Scott admitted that Allen’s actions violated the “friendly and peaceable 
nature of an ambassador,” by encouraging Americans to trade with the British in a time of war. 
However, the Orders in Council of October 13 and 26, 1812, retroactively legalized Allen’s 
actions and secured a valuable trade for the British armies battling Napoleon in Spain.20 Laws 
were rewritten to support the new system and justified as a necessary war measure. The 
adaptability of the commercial system actually weakened the laws which undergirded the 
Navigation Act.  
                                                 
18 Roscoe, Reports of Prize Cases Determined in the High Court of Admiralty, 2:73; J. R. Hill, The Prizes of War: 
The Naval Prize System in the Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815 (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Royal Naval Museum 
Publications, 1998), 50. By placing sole authority to control the license system in the hands of the government, Scott 
had authorized a new source of revenue outside the control of Parliament. Many in Parliament opposed the licensing 
system because of the unregulated power it gave to the government, see, Heckscher, The Continental System, 207. 
19 W. R. Copp, “Nova Scotian Trade During the War of 1812,” Canadian Historical Review 18 (1937): 153; Craton, 
“The Role of the Caribbean Vice Admiralty Courts in British Imperialism,” 16; Heckscher, The Continental System, 
207. 
20 See the Case of the Hope & Others, 19 February 1813, in Roscoe, Reports of Prize Cases Determined in the High 
Court of Admiralty, 2:153; W. F. Galpin, “The American Grain Trade to the Spanish Peninsula, 1810-1814,” The 
American Historical Review 28, no. 1 (October 1922): 31. 
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Licensing also had unforeseen consequences by establishing a market for British identity. 
Licenses, both counterfeit and legitimate, were sold throughout Europe, Britain and America. 
The purchaser of a British license was allowed to enter the British empire and trade with Great 
Britain and even the enemy. While the system aimed to control the totality of international 
shipping, it was never fully consistent. There were several types of licenses offered to 
enterprising merchants. Licenses issued by the Board of Trade were known as ‘Sidmouth’s’ and 
‘Prince Regents’. These licenses, technically, were the only documents that could legally permit 
a British subject or ally to trade with Britain’s enemies. However, the Board of Trade failed to 
anticipate the demand for licenses and numerous other governmental authorities began issuing 
new licenses to any merchant looking to temporarily work for the British government. As noted 
above, the British governor at Heligoland issued his own licenses, but these were at least 
authorized by the Board of Trade. When the War of 1812 began there was a flood of new 
licenses issued by admirals, ambassadors and consuls looking to secure supplies from America 
despite the war. The first among these was the British Minister to America, Augustus Foster, 
who began issuing licenses in early 1812. Foster was soon followed by Vice-Admiral Sawyer, 
commander-in-chief of the North American Station, who issued his own licenses when war 
broke out with the United States in 1812. Sawyer was concerned about maintaining the flow of 
grain to Britain’s military forces on the Spanish Peninsula so he took it upon himself to issue 
licenses. In doing so, Sawyer drafted British Consul Andrew Allen to help distribute licenses. 
Allen himself began issuing his own licenses by reinterpreting a letter of instruction sent to him 
by Sawyer.21 
                                                 
21 Galpin, “The American Grain Trade to the Spanish Peninsula, 1810-1814,” 29–31. 
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To further complicate the world of licensed trade, the French government began 
providing their own licenses to compete with the profits brought in by the British. Napoleon’s 
licensing system was never as effective as its British counterpart, suffering from bureaucratic 
inconsistencies and extreme micromanagement. The French government even attempted to 
control commerce by designating ‘good cities’ in America (New York, Boston, Baltimore and 
Charleston) that the French would trade with and even ‘good cargoes’ by banning all West 
Indian produce.22 Added to this, French licenses were used as a means of extortion for captured 
American vessels held in French ports. Rather than dealing with complicated questions of 
blockade and neutral rights, the French government now seized cargoes based on a much simpler 
premise: whether the ship possessed a French or British license. For the French, a system of strict 
licensing provided a means of capturing unauthorized vessels without further justification. Yet 
this was also the system’s greatest weakness. In America, French licenses hurt the standing of 
the French government by providing further ammunition for British diplomats. The British used 
French licenses to justify their own licensing system as well as proof that Napoleon had failed in 
his promise to repeal the Berlin and Milan decrees. 
By 1814 the British licensed trade with the enemy had ended. As Napoleon lost control 
over the annexed territories after the disastrous 1812 campaign, the Continental System 
collapsed and licensing went with it. Meanwhile, the whole of the American coast was under a 
strict blockade by the Royal Navy, which resulted in an end to new licenses issued to American 
merchants. A variety of factors contributed to the end of the license system. Peace in Europe 
limited the demand for American foodstuffs. Also, the opening of the Baltic provided an 
                                                 
22 It was assumed that all West Indian commerce was British in origin given that Great Britain had assumed control 
over all French colonial possessions. Alexandria Gazette, 27 July 1811. For the British view on French licensing, 
see, London Courier, 10 Sept. 1810. The British mobilized a fleet of vessels sailing under ‘false French licenses’ to 
move into the Baltic and undermine Napoleon’s entire continental system, see, Suffolk Gazette, 27 Oct. 1810. 
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alternative source of lumber and provisions for British forces. Finally, the British government 
decided that it was no longer politically profitable to encourage divisions in America by 
licensing merchants to trade with their nation’s enemy. Though the height of the licensing 
system only lasted seven years, in that time the British arguably managed to do more to 
undermine their navigation system than all of the unregulated American commerce since the end 
of the War of Independence.  
 
Debating the License System  
 
From the start licensing during the Napoleonic Wars was controversial. Opposition to licensing 
brought together disparate groups in both the United States and Great Britain who feared the 
potential consequences of merchants purchasing a new identity. American opponents of the 
licensing system viewed it as a threat to national sovereignty. They openly questioned the loyalty 
of anyone who would betray their country for profit. Ship-owners throughout Britain worried 
over the potential economic losses for their industry if the government protected foreign shipping 
from seizure. Essentially, the British ship-owners believed that the empire had overreached and 
that the Navigation Act would suffer for it.  
In Britain, opposition to the licensing system came swift and early. Lord Sheffield’s 
vigorous defense of the Navigation Act in 1804 proved to be an early warning against the future 
license trade. Sheffield warned that for the mere price of £10 foreign entrepreneurs could bring 
about a ‘suspension’ of the Navigation Laws. Speaking of licenses and governor’s proclamations 
in the same instance, Sheffield claimed that loosening the effectiveness of the Navigation Act 
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would ultimately open the door to smugglers and the enemy.23 For many, Sheffield’s warnings 
were prophetic. Joseph Phillimore argued in an 1811 pamphlet that Britain was now completely 
dependent on foreign ships for its trade with Europe. Phillimore took the unique approach of 
defending at the same time the rights of neutrals and the importance of maintaining the 
Navigation Act. Phillimore abhorred the immorality of investing in a trade based entirely on 
deception.24 In two separate pamphlets, Joseph Marryat similarly warned that licensing was too 
unregulated. Licenses effectively broke down the legal distinction between British and foreign 
ship-owners and created too many exceptions to Britain’s vital Navigation Act.25 In sum, all of 
these pamphleteers believed that the British government was guilty of violating its own 
commercial laws. Further, they accepted the notion that Britain’s prosperity was inextricably tied 
to its adherence to the Navigation Act. Finally, they believed that tradition – rather than 
innovation – would save Britain from Napoleon. 
The pamphleteers were joined by members of the British shipping interest who 
reasonably saw foreign license holders as a threat to their industry. In 1810 the Merchants and 
Ship-Owners of Hull sent a petition to the Board of Trade requesting the immediate end to 
licensing. When the Board failed to act, the Hull Merchants continued to meet and discuss the 
dangers that licensing posed. In 1812 the Hull Merchants convened a meeting at the local 
guildhall to consider further opposition to the license system. At that meeting, the ship-owners 
                                                 
23 Sheffield, Strictures on the Necessity of Inviolably Maintaining the Navigation and Colonial System of Great 
Britain, 56–58. 
24 Joseph Phillimore, Reflections on the Nature and Extent of the License Trade (E. Budd, 1812); Heckscher, The 
Continental System, 206. 
25 Joseph Marryat, Hints to Both Parties, or, Observations on the Proceedings in Parliament upon the Petitions 
against the Orders in Council: And on the Conduct of His Majesty’s Ministers in Granting Licenses to Import the 
Staple Commodities of the Enemy. (London: Printed for J.M. Richardson, 1808), 24–25; Joseph Marryat, 
Concessions to America the Bane of Britain: Or, The Cause of the Present Distressed Situation of the British 
Colonial and Shipping Interests Explained, and the Proper Remedy Suggested (London: W. J. & J. Richardson, 
1807), 45–51. 
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complained that licensed ships were draining bullion from the country. Worse still, these ships 
were carrying saltpeter straight to the guns of the enemy. The assembly voted to submit a new 
petition, this time to Parliament, seeking redress.26  
In Parliament, MP Brougham agreed with the ship-owners’ sentiments. Brougham noted 
the numerous bankruptcies that had occurred since the Orders in Council, he then argued that the 
license trade had greatly diminished British tonnage while at the same time offering employment 
for enemy sailors. Brougham also revealed that the system was managed so poorly that a clerical 
error had resulted in increasing the worth of a license to £15,000.27 Brougham’s points were 
keenly felt by many in government, but nevertheless licensing continued unabated until 1814. As 
Sir William Scott had explained in the Goede Hoop, licensing was an exceptional response to the 
economic situation brought on by Napoleon’s commercial system. As a weapon of economic 
warfare, licensing could not be simply abandoned until the war was won.  
If the British government was unwilling to stop the license trade, some in America 
believed that they could convince potential customers to boycott licenses. Given the United 
States’ tumultuous relationship with Great Britain by 1809, it is unsurprising that opposition on 
the other side of the Atlantic was much more virulent. In America, the debate over the licensing 
system centered around questions of national sovereignty and personal loyalty. The tone for this 
debate was set by President James Madison in March 1809. Just a few days into his first term, 
                                                 
26 For the initial petition see, Minutes of the Board of Trade, 17 April 1810, BT 5/20 and 25 Feb. 1812, BT 5/21; 
Hull Advertiser and Exchange Gazette, 15 Feb. 1812. The petitioners at Hull were joined by other petitioners from 
Sunderland, South Shields, Scarborough, and Aberdeen. All argued that the license system undermined the main 
principles of the British commercial system Heckscher, The Continental System, 209. 
27 Perthshire Courier, 12 March 1812. Since the licensing system began, there were many in Parliament who were 
opposed to it. Lord Auckland argued that licensing was unlawful and even Castlereagh admitted that the system 
could only be justified as a war measure, see, Neff, “Britain and the Neutrals in the French Revolutionary Wars,” 
243. 
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Madison described licensing as a ‘tribute’ to a system of ‘usurpation and monopoly’.28 If 
licensing was a weapon, Madison believed that it was pointed directly at America rather than 
France. As such, the harsh language employed by Madison and his political allies only became 
more severe when America went to war with Great Britain in 1812.  
The general theme of the opposition in America was that licensing was a re-imposition of 
the old colonial system. Newspaper editorials called Britain the ‘tyrant of the ocean’, and 
accused its officials of running a ‘piratical government’.29 There was a general fear that British 
influence was infecting American political culture. Since the start of the French Revolution, 
national politics had adopted an internationalized discourse, wherein political opponents were 
decried as secretly ‘French’ or ‘British’. The license system heightened the rhetoric as some 
Americans were now actively working for the interests of the British government.30 The sale of 
licenses provided fodder for conspiracy theories which claimed that America was suffering from 
a subversive British influence. Responding to the Orders in Council, the Washington National 
Intelligencer in 1808 complained that the British had overtaken American culture: “Everything 
now-a-days is to be British. Our coats are to be British. Our laws are British. Our busiest 
politicians are British. The law of nations is to be British. The very beverage which an American 
sips at his morning’s repast or evenings’ recreation, is also to be British.”31 Now, the paper 
warned, the British were threatening the freedom of the seas by requiring licenses for all 
shipments to the empire. Once war broke out between the two nations the British influence over 
                                                 
28 James Madison to William Pinkney, 8 March 1808, Founders Online, NARA. In February 1813, Madison 
expanded on this, describing the British system in a message to Congress as “resting upon a mass of forgery and 
perjury,” 24 Feb. 1813, Annals of the Congress of the United States: Twelfth Congress - Second Session (Gales and 
Seaton, 1853), 105. 
29 City Gazette, 16 April 1808; The Monitor, 24 December 1808; Mount Hope Eagle, 10 Oct. 1807. 
30 Bradburn, The Citizenship Revolution: Politics and the Creation of the American Union, 1774-1804, 118–20. 
31 National Intelligencer, 12 September 1808 
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American daily life only became more sinister. The news that American merchants were 
smuggling provisions to the British army in Canada and that licensed American traders were 
shipping goods to British forces in the West Indies and Europe, led one newspaper to proclaim: 
“down down with the tories the Anglo-American tories!”32 
As in Britain, there were also several petitions sent to the U.S. government in opposition 
to British licensing. The ‘Citizens of the first Congressional District of the State of Pennsylvania’ 
submitted an address to Madison in 1810 supporting armed resistance and swearing, “That the 
commerce of the United States ever has and ever shall under Providence be conducted without a 
British License and without the protection of the British Navy.”33 Similar sentiments were 
repeated by the citizens of Richmond, Watertown, and even at a meeting of Massachusetts 
Republicans.34 The general consensus was that a British license was a ‘tribute’ to a foreign 
nation at a time when neutral rights were ‘trampled upon’. Petitioners called on Congress to act 
by prohibiting the license trade, and punishing license-holders. Some even concluded that the 
only solution to the license problem was an embargo or war.  
From the very beginning, Republicans in Congress were deeply opposed to the license 
trade. Republicans believed that licensing would solidify the Orders in Council and allow Great 
Britain to claim sole dominion over transatlantic commerce. In March 1809, Congress 
considered the extreme measure of stripping American license-holders of their citizenship. 
However, Congress’s willingness to act did not necessarily guarantee results. Many in Congress 
were concerned about whether they possessed the legal authority to disenfranchise citizens but 
they nevertheless saw the debate as a form of protest against foreign encroachment. By pushing 
                                                 
32 Columbian, 16 April 1814.  
33 Address of the Citizens of Pennsylvania to James Madison, 17 Feb. 1810, Founders Online, NARA. 
34 Inhabitants of Richmond, Manchester and Vicinity to James Madison, 30 May 1812; Republican Watchtower, 28 
Feb. 1809; City Gazette, 10 Nov. 1808. 
 
207 
for a disenfranchisement bill, Congress was also offering a tacit acknowledgment of Napoleon’s 
claim in the Berlin and Milan Decrees that inappropriate contact with the British had the 
potential to ‘denationalize’ a vessel.35 The bill quickly passed the House of Representatives, but 
it stalled in the Senate and debate over licensing continued. Other punitive bills similarly 
stumbled over the question of whether to oppose all licenses on principle or simply licenses 
forced on American commerce by the British.36 
When the war with Britain began, matters only became worse. There was a steady 
movement for the first year of the war to once again punish any American who obtained a British 
license. License takers were viewed as traitors who had thrown their lot in with the enemy. In the 
lead up to the war, the editor of the American Advocate proclaimed that license holders were 
“Englishmen, and ought to be so treated on every occasion.”37 Prompted by Madison’s charge to 
Congress to stop a “corrupt and perfidious intercourse with the enemy,” legislation was finally 
passed by the Thirteenth Congress to ban the use of enemy licenses in 1812.38 Rather than 
disenfranchisement, Americans found in possession of a license would be found guilty of a 
misdemeanor and forfeit twice the value of the licensed cargo. These measures were only 
partially effective at stopping the license trade, and Congress was forced to rely on a new 
embargo to stop the tide of British goods flooding into America.39 
                                                 
35 During the debate, some members actually suggested that the bill was superfluous since “no man would be sill 
enough to take a license from the British government,” Annals of the Congress of the United States: Twelfth 
Congress - Second Session, 1555. Also, see, Enquirer, 7 March 1809; New-York Gazette, 7 March 1809 
36 Representative Pickering in Congress suggested in 1813 that a bill to prohibit licenses replace ‘Great Britain’ with 
‘all nations’, see,   
37 American Advocate, 30 Jan. 1810.  
38 James Madison, Annual Message to Congress, 4 Nov. 1812, Founders Online, NARA. 
39 Niles Weekly Register, 3 Oct. 1812; Donald R. Hickey, “American Trade Restrictions during the War of 1812,” 
The Journal of American History 68, no. 3 (1981): 538; Annals of the Congress of the United States: Thirteenth 
Congress - First Session (Gales and Seaton, 1853), 55–56. See Madison’s message to Congress, 9 Dec. 1813, 
Founders Online, NARA. 
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For merchants’ ships at sea, the debate over licensing had an immediate effect. American 
privateers swarmed into the Atlantic searching for prizes during the war. While their principal 
targets were valuable British convoys, the privateers held particular scorn for American license-
holders. Readers of Niles Weekly Register, a Baltimore paper, were able to track the progress of 
these privateers each week as more American vessels were brought in for possession of a British 
license. The publisher, Hezekiah Niles, labeled these vessels ‘semi-American’ and eagerly 
documented each capture for his readers along the following lines: “Ship St. Lawrence, from 
England, with a British license full of most valuable British goods, worth from 3 to 400,000 
dolls. captured by an Eastern privateer and sent into Portsmouth, NH where she was condemned. 
The vessel and property is affected to have been American.”40 From Niles’s perspective, these 
vessels had lost their American identity by adopting a British license. To further prove that 
license-holders were ‘traitors’, Niles recounted how American privateers would pretend to be 
British sea captains in order to lure a captured vessel into revealing its true identity. One captain 
not only showed his license but told the American privateer that he had supplied specific British 
naval ships with provisions, admitting “that he had no doubt if he fell in with an American 
privateer he should be hung.”41 Niles undoubtedly agreed with the ship’s captain, as he made it 
his mission to convince his readers that license holders were traitors who worked for the British 
military against their own country. For proof of their complicity, Niles printed the entire text of a 
license issued to an American merchant:  
“By Herbert Sawyer, esq. Vice-admiral of the Blue, and commander in chief of 
his majesty’s ships and vessels of war employed, in the river St. Lawrence, along 
the coast of Nova-Scotia, in the islands of Anticoste, Madelaine, St. John, and 
cape Breton, and the bay of Fundy, and at and abound the islands of Bermuda or 
                                                 
40 Niles Weekly Register, 6 Nov. 1813. The language Niles employed to describe vessels captured with a license, is a 
clear indication of his views. They were ‘affected to have been American’. 
41 Niles Weekly Register, 1 Aug. 1812 and 29 Jan. 1814; also see Farmers Repository, 31 July 1812.  
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Somers-Islands, &c &c Whereas, Mr. Andrew Allen, his majesty’s consul at 
Boston has recommended to me Mr. Robert Elwell, a merchant of that place AND 
WELL INCLINED TOWARDS THE BRITISH INTEREST, who is desirous of 
sending provisions to Spain and Portugal, for the use of the allied armies in the 
Peninsula; and whereas I think it fit and necessary that encouragement and 
protection should be afforded him in so doing.”42  
 
For Niles, the implication was clear: license-holders worked for the ‘British interest’. He warned 
his readers to be wary as the seacoasts of America were now infested with traitors.  
Licensing split many American merchants from their fellow countrymen. This was 
mainly due to a general underlying uncertainty regarding whether the licensed trade with the 
enemy was genuinely treasonous. Despite the rhetoric of pamphleteers and newspaper editors, 
the American government desperately needed the customs revenue provided from foreign trade. 
Further, Congress failed to act on the licensing trade for the first year of the war – an indication 
that even American officials were uncomfortable condemning all licensed trades outright.43 The 
British picked up on the opportunity offered by this internal division and began favoring the New 
England states during the war in order to encourage further discord. A report provided to 
Secretary of State Earl Bathurst stated confidently that “Great Britain has many friends in the 
United States…Those friends principally inhabit the Northern and Eastern states.”44 This advice 
was clearly taken to heart, as the British held off on blockading New England until the end of 
1814. Up until this time, licenses were still issued to ‘the Eastern states exclusively’ as a measure 
meant to divide the nation commercially as well as militarily.45 
                                                 
42 Niles Weekly Register, 13 March 1813. 
43 Crawford, “The Navy’s Campaign against the Licensed Trade in the War of 1812,” 171. 
44 David Deane Roche to Earl Bathurst, 14 Jan. 1813, CO 42/152, TNA 
45 Niles Weekly Register, 27 Feb. 1813; Arthur, How Britain Won the War of 1812, 162. Madison made note of this 
to Congress, attacking “the general tendency of these demoralizing and disorganizing contrivances,” see, Madison’s 
message to Congress, 24 Feb. 1813, Founders Online, NARA. The British government even ordered Admiral 
Warren to try to seek a separate peace with New England, if possible, Wade Glendon Dudley, “Without Some Risk:  
A Reassessment of the British Blockade of the United States, 1812-1815” (The University of Alabama, 1999), 199. 
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What is most striking about the debate over licensing in the Atlantic World is that 
licensing came at a time of increased suspicion of a state’s own subjects. Since the outbreak of 
the French Revolution, political discourse was largely defined by the detection of foreign 
influence. The Continental System itself was based on the idea that contact with an enemy 
infected a neutral, turning neutral ships into belligerents.46 In the licensing years, these ideas 
continued to spread, despite the increase in the number of foreign traders within the British 
empire. Official reports from British North America indicated that a secret cabal of French spies 
and American ‘emissaries’ were working to stir up rebellion among the Native American tribes. 
And such suspicions also persisted in the West Indies where the Governor of Bermuda 
complained on several occasions to the British ministry that his opposition in the House of 
Assembly was primarily American in principle and education.47 Meanwhile, American 
newspapers continued to lament the failure of the American criminal code to punish ‘traitors and 
spies’ in their midst. 
There were those on both sides of the Atlantic who defended the license system as a 
reasonable solution to wartime circumstances. Officially, the British ministry claimed that the 
license system was not intended to force all neutral traffic through the empire. Instead, Lord 
Castlereagh informed the British Minister to America Augustus Foster that the official position 
of the government was that the license system was meant as a favor to neutral business during 
the blockade of the Continent. Castlereagh even authorized Foster to offer the Americans an end 
to the license system if they agreed to “the principle of rigorous blockade against the French 
                                                 
46 See Chapter 4.  
47 Niles Weekly Register, 15 May 1813; Morning Advertiser, 1 June 1808; John Hodgson to Lord Castlereagh, 9 
Feb. 1809 and 10 Aug. 1809, CO 37/65, TNA.  
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dominions to the exclusion of our own trade equally with that of neutral nations.”48 The 
government may have offered to exchange one weapon for another, but their proposal would 
never have been accepted by the American government. Such an agreement would have ended 
all American trade with the Continent until Napoleon repealed the Berlin and Milan Decrees, 
effectively forcing America to side with Great Britain during the war. 
Even in America, some publicly defended British licenses as a necessary medicine to 
fight off “the invincible Herald of Lucifer (the French emperor)…”49 Further, it was 
acknowledged that licensing had already become a universal practice during the war so 
opposition was pointless. As an American newspaper explained, there was little Americans could 
do about licensing: “the practice prevails in Europe in the most powerful nations. Numerous 
French vessels carry on trade under English licenses, and almost innumerable English vessels 
prosecute a very beneficial commerce with French licenses; and thus submit to circumstances.”50 
When Congress considered further penalties for Americans taking licenses, it was pointed out 
that licensing was simply a product of the war, and that Britain had every right to seize ships 
trading with the enemy. If the whole commercial world accepted licensing, then America only 
hurt itself by refusing to participate.51 
The debate over licensing, then, highlighted both the dangers and opportunities that 
licenses offered. Licenses made trade more versatile and malleable, transforming neutral cargoes 
                                                 
48 Augustus Foster to Lord Castlereagh, 10 April 1812, FO 5/83, TNA. This seems to have been recognized at the 
time, as the Morning Chronicle notes, an American bill to end licensing in 1813 would result in an embargo, see, 
Morning Chronicle, 7 April 1813. 
49 Federal Republican, 3 Oct. 1808 
50 Hill, Napoleon’s Troublesome Americans Franco-American Relations, 1804-1815, 55–57, 87. For the British 
position, see, Augustus Foster to Marquis Wellesley, 17 Jan. 1812, FO 5/84, TNA. Spirit of ‘Seventy-Six, 10 Aug. 
1810; Along with the British and the French, the American government also offered coasting licenses during the 
embargo, see, Rao, National Duties, 144.  
51 Commercial Advertiser, 13 Nov. 1812. 
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into protected British property on the high seas. After commercial restrictions in Europe all but 
ended the profitability of transatlantic commerce, licenses offered a means of survival for 
American merchants during the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809 and the war. As the British 
government had sole control over the trade, there were more opportunities for American business 
under the licensing system. Through licensing, Americans traded with Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick, the British West Indian islands, Spain and Portugal, and the markets of Europe 
through the ports of Malta and Heligoland. Yet all of this trade provoked troubling questions 
about whether an American merchant could remain American while in possession of a British 
license. Many in the press denied this dual identity, but the trade nevertheless flourished as no 
one seemed at all certain what it actually meant to be a licensed American trader. 
 
 
Wartime Commerce and Licensed American Traitors  
 
In order to better understand the role of licensing in transforming transatlantic commerce, this 
section looks at the licensed trade of Thomas Handasyd Perkins to Spain and Portugal during the 
Peninsular War and the War of 1812. Finally, the section then turns to the experience of 
American and neutral merchants who invested in licensed shipping to the neutral island of St. 
Bartholomew’s. Perkins and his fellow merchants were forced to navigate the complicated and 
controversial licensing system that had turned the commercial world on its head. For years, 
neutral merchants exploited loopholes and inconsistencies in the law in order to carry on their 
trade with the British empire. Licensing changed everything by strictly defining all legal 
commerce rather than merely focusing on what constituted an illegal trade. Now that all 
unlicensed trades were illegal, merchants were forced to purchase licenses in order to protect 
their businesses. The licensing system offered merchants like Perkins the chance to earn a 
fortune in a closed economic system, but its complete dependence on the goodwill of the British 
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government was a severe burden for ships trading with the enemy. When new blockades were 
announced or licensed markets were glutted with provisions, commerce was at a standstill. 
Licensing may have opened up the empire to foreign trade, but it also forcefully eliminated the 
freedom of the seas.  
The firm of J & T.H. Perkins was well-placed to take advantage of the licensed trade. 
Thomas Handasyd Perkins, who was a member of Boston’s elite merchant class, founded the 
firm in 1792 with his brother to take advantage of the Haitian Revolution and to pursue a 
profitable trade with China. Along with establishing businesses in new markets, the firm 
maintained important contacts in Asia, the West Indies, and Latin America throughout the 
Napoleonic Wars.52 The firm’s diverse business interests may have contributed to its survival 
during the embargo and the war, but access to so many markets required the firm to base much 
of its business around smuggling past foreign and U.S. customs officials. Perkins’s commercial 
correspondence is full of references to ‘Spanyardize’ American ships, English manufactures 
transformed into French products, and a heavy trade in false origination papers, passports, and 
flags. Given the firm’s history and business practices, the adoption of British licenses was a 
natural evolutionary step in the pursuit of new markets for Perkins’s goods.53 
Since 1809 Spain and Portugal were the most important consumers of American grain 
exports. The Iberian Peninsula was always an important trading partner for American grain (with 
125,000 barrels shipped in 1805) but Britain’s invasion of the Peninsula in 1808 and the 
                                                 
52 Holloran, Peter C., “Perkins, Thomas Handasyd,” American National Biography Online, February 2000, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/anb/9780198606697.article.1001302. 
53 For just a sampling of the firm’s business, see, J. & T.H. Perkins to W.F. Magee, 28 Jan. 1805; J. & T.H. Perkins 
to James Gorham, 11 Oct. and 22 Nov. 1804; J. & T.H. Perkins to Samuel Williams, 17 Feb. 1805 and 18 March 
1805, reel 6, Thomas Handasyd Perkins Papers, MHS. The firm also participated in outright smuggling, instructing 
ship’s captains to ‘drift’ into colonial ports closed to foreign traffic or to feign distress in order to gain access to 
closed markets, see, J. & T.H. Perkins to Capt. William Ingersoll, 20 July 1804; J. & T.H. Perkins to Capt. Harvey, 
22 Nov. 1804, ibid. 
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devastating war that followed created heightened demand for provisions to feed the army as well 
as the local populace.54 After an initial decline during Jefferson’s embargo, American shipments 
strongly recovered by 1809. By 1811 over 2,000 American ships carried 835,000 barrels of grain 
into Iberian ports. A number which just increased the following year to 938,000 barrels. Despite 
the British occupation, Spain and Portugal were viewed by the American government as neutrals 
rather than British allies. Making Spain and Portugal neutral allowed American merchants to 
continue selling to the Peninsula during the Non-Intercourse Act and even during the War of 
1812. Iberian neutrality, however, was complicated by the fact that the entire American grain 
trade was licensed by the British government and directed towards supporting the British army 
fighting Napoleon.55  
For American merchants, the day to day provisioning of Spain and Portugal was in many 
ways very similar to previous disasters Americans had profited from. Merchants received news 
from European contacts about the state of the market, often searching their letters for keywords 
such as ‘scarcity’ or ‘famine’ and ‘high prices’ to determine the profitability of the trade. As 
T.H. Perkins proudly stated to Richard S. Hackley in Cadiz, “From the scarcity of flour in the 
Mediterranean and the state of the crops in Spain & Portugal, we feel persuaded a saving price 
will be found for our shipments.”56 Commercial news was structured to provide such valuable 
information to merchants. When the New York Evening Post reported on the latest military 
events in Spain the paper analyzed the activity of the army and the actions of the government, 
                                                 
54 After the Order in Council of 31 July 1812, all U.S. shipping required a license in order to avoid capture, see, 
London Gazette, 4 Aug. 1812. Though the success of the British army largely depended on American grain, 
Wellington was not happy with this dependent relationship once Great Britain and America went to war, see, G. E. 
Watson, “The United States and the Peninsular War, 1808-1812,” The Historical Journal 19, no. 4 (December 
1976): 869–71.  
55 Pitkin, Timothy, A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States of America (New Haven: Durrie & Peck, 
1835), 119–20. 
56 James & T.H. Perkins to Richard S. Hackley, 13 April 1811, reel 12, Thomas Handasyd Perkins Papers, MHS. 
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then an economic conclusion was provided for the reader: “Rice is in brisk demand, as it is 
generally understood that Spain will be in great want of provisions, and a considerable advance 
has taken place.”57 The demands from Spanish and Portuguese markets created a convenient hole 
in the Royal Navy’s blockade of the Continent, but enterprising merchants quickly learned that 
official British licenses would be required by all merchants looking to exploit this latest 
opportunity.  
The majority of the trade to the Peninsula went through commissioned merchants 
appointed by the British government to negotiate contracts with flour merchants in America. The 
most prominent of these commissioned merchants was F.T. Sampayo, a Portuguese subject, who 
served as a British agent for supplying the army, and William Wood the former Consul at 
Baltimore. Overwhelmed by the demands from the Peninsula, Sampayo and Wood worked 
closely with American merchants to consign shipments to Spain and Portugal. Sampayo and 
Wood’s business faced a hurdle: to facilitate the traffic in American provisions, licenses were 
necessary, but the only legal authority which could grant new licenses was the Board of Trade. 
When America declared war on Great Britain, it was no longer clear whether new licenses would 
be issued. In order to expedite the shipment of grain, Vice-Admiral Sawyer in August 1812 acted 
on his own authority and granted 180 licenses to any vessel willing to carry provisions. The 
majority of these licenses were sent to Sampayo and Wood for distribution to American 
merchants willing to send supplies to the Peninsula.58  
Since 1811 Perkins had partnered with the Boston-London firm of Higginson & Co. to 
carry on a trade with the Peninsula. Recognizing the value of this business, Perkins even 
                                                 
57 New York Evening Post, 22 Aug. 1808. 
58 Technically this trade was illegal until retroactively authorized by the Board, see, Minutes of the Board of Trade, 
21 Aug. 1812, BT 5/21, TNA. 
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maintained a constant agent at Cadiz to protect his interests and provide him with the latest news 
about the state of the market. Perkins was very aware that his business depended on the active 
military presence of the British army. The army was the determining factor in predicting the 
swings of the market, as Perkins explained in a letter to his agent Richard Hackley in June 1811: 
“Were we confident that GB would still continue her armies in Portugal & her fleet in the ports 
of Cadiz & Lisbon; we should not hesitate to make large contracts for flour & wheat deliverable 
in October.”59 A month later, Perkins wrote to Hackley again, this time he observed with 
satisfaction that recent battles between the two clashing armies had devastated the Iberian 
countryside. Perkins believed the labor shortage and crop damage from the war would diminish 
Spain’s agricultural output, creating scarcity and heightening demand. Perkins concluded his 
letter by promising to continue shipping provisions to the Peninsula into the winter.60  
America’s war with Britain in 1812 was accompanied by new commercial concerns. 
Perkins worried that the war with Great Britain might interrupt his steady trade with the 
Peninsula. He firmly believed, though, that the “cruisers of GB would not interrupt supplies 
intended for the suffering inhabitants of Spain & Portugal.”61 Despite his concerns about the 
heightened potential of capture, Perkins continued to invest heavily in the trade to the Peninsula, 
sending 8,000 barrels of flour in September 1812 alone.62 To protect his shipments, Perkins 
needed to acquire new licenses, as any British licenses issued before the start of the war were 
                                                 
59 For a discussion of this partnership, see, T.H. Perkins to Bulkley, Alcock & Oxenford, 13 April 1811; T.H. 
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now invalid.63 After his vessels were captured, the importance of having adequate documentation 
became paramount. But the licensing of ships was never a perfect safeguard against capture and 
condemnation. By the end of 1812 Perkins had received news that several of his vessels were 
captured. Each ship carried a British license at the time of capture, and their stories show the 
dual dangers of licensed shipments during the war. The Ariadne was captured and tried in the 
United States for trading with the enemy. The Miser and the Topaz were captured at Gibraltar for 
failing to immediately produce a license when stopped. These cases all illustrate the inherent 
dangers merchants faced in investing in a trade consumed by mutual suspicion and complicated 
questions about allegiance and legitimate commerce.  
On October 15, 1812, Perkins’s ship the Ariadne, was captured while en route to Cadiz 
by the U.S. Brig Argus commanded by Arthur Sinclair. The Argus approached the Ariadne under 
British colors and convinced the master to reveal his license. Though the ship was captured and 
tried for possessing a British license, this did not stop the prize crew put on board the Ariadne 
from using Perkins’s license on the voyage home in order to escape British cruisers. Henry 
Denison, the leader of the prize crew, informed the Secretary of the Navy that the captured ship 
escaped two British cruisers “by making use of the license and a little finesse.”64 The multiple 
identities exploited in the taking of the Ariadne shows the fluidity and malleability of national 
identity under the licensed trade – even the U.S. Navy became temporarily British to protect their 
prize and crew.  
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At trial, the case of the Ariadne also provides an excellent illustration of the potential 
dangers Americans faced in their own country while attempting to maintain their overseas 
businesses during the war. When the war began, Perkins was concerned about the risks posed by 
British cruisers. Just a few short months later, his ship was now held captive by his own navy. 
Along with Perkins, other elite Boston firms had placed cargoes on board the ship, including: 
Thomas C. Amory and Company, Nathaniel Goddard, Samuel G. Perkins and Company, Samuel 
May, Thomas Parsons and William Parsons. The trial largely focused on the national character of 
the Ariadne and its intended customers. The voyage was justified by the Boston merchants in 
court as a purely neutral transaction, despite the British license. It was pointed out that since very 
few of the ‘enemy’ remained in Cadiz after the recent siege, the ship’s provisions were really 
meant for the distraught populace rather than the British army. In summation, the claimants for 
the Ariadne argued that a shipment of flour to a neutral port was “as innocent as a voyage from 
Baltimore to Boston.”65 For the district court, the arguments pursued by Perkins and the other 
merchants behind the Ariadne were convincing and the ship was restored. The captors, however, 
were not so easily defeated. The case was then appealed to the circuit court, the original ruling 
was overturned and the ship was condemned. In 1817, the case of the Ariadne reached the 
Supreme Court for a final decision. The Supreme Court upheld the circuit court’s decision, 
basing their ruling on the principle that: “A voyage prosecuted in furtherance of the enemy’s 
interests is undoubtedly illegal…”66 Without contrary evidence, the court presumed that any 
vessel in possession of a British license was acting in the interests of the enemy. The court’s 
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ruling also indicates that licenses remained controversial in America long after the end of 
hostilities between Great Britain and America.  
The courts’ assumptions about British licenses and the complicity of American merchants 
did not stop the grain shipments to Peninsula or the general popularity of the licensed trade. In 
fact, after paying bond for the vessel while it was under appeal, the Ariadne left Philadelphia and 
continued on its voyage to Cadiz, finally arriving in February 1813. The conflicting opinions in 
court regarding the fate of the Ariadne represents a larger division in American society about the 
propriety of using British licenses during the war. In 1818, a petition made to Congress 
continued to push for relief from the Supreme Court’s decision on the Ariadne. The petitioners 
argued that Congress at the time of the capture of the vessel had declined to act against the 
license trade, which indicated that the government itself was unsure about the illegality of 
licensed voyages.67 The petitioners could have also pointed to ambiguous statements made by 
American officials regarding the license trade. While voicing opposition to licensing in public, 
several members of Congress allegedly invested in licensed trades according to contemporary 
newspaper reports. Even Thomas Jefferson, who was undoubtedly the most prominent opponent 
of Great Britain in America, believed that the grain trade with Spain and Portugal was important 
to American commerce. Jefferson stated his views on the license trade to Madison in April 1812: 
“For I am favorable to the opinion which has been urged by others, sometimes acted on, and now 
partly so by France and Great Britain, that commerce under certain restrictions and licenses may 
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be indulged between enemies, mutually advantageous to the individuals.”68 War with Britain a 
few months later did not temper Jefferson’s views on licensing. In fact, Jefferson and others 
believed that by supplying the British army in Spain it would encourage the war with Napoleon 
and keep Great Britain distracted. In 1813 Jefferson followed up on his convictions, investing in 
a licensed shipment of 450 barrels of flour to Spain; the shipment was stopped only due to the 
appearance of a British blockade off of the coast of Virginia.69   
While American privateers remained a concern for the length of the war, Perkins also 
suffered at the hands of the Royal Navy. Perkins’s other ships captured that winter, the Miser and 
the Topaz, were taken to the Vice-Admiralty Court at Gibraltar for trial. Both ships had left with 
the Ariadne as part of a major shipment of flour to Lisbon and Cadiz. For the Miser, bad luck 
seemed to have doomed the voyage from ever turning a profit. The captain learned after coming 
into contact with a British cruiser that the ship’s license was destroyed by rats during the Atlantic 
crossing. Lacking any defense in court, Perkins hurriedly forwarded on duplicates of all of the 
ship’s original documents hoping that the Miser would be released before the papers even 
reached Gibraltar. Desperate to control the situation, Perkins wrote in December 1812 to Richard 
Hackley at Cadiz with instructions for every eventuality: 
“If under embarrassment when this gets to hand, send this paper to Gibraltar. If 
condemned in the vice Admiralty forward it to England to S. Williams to be used 
in the appeal. If the ship is cleared it will be well that she has this document on 
her home passage as it will secure her against interruption.”70 
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Some British privateers refused to even honor the licenses, they waited offshore for vessels to 
unload their shipments at Lisbon and capture the American ships returning home with a cargo 
full of gold and silver. Corruption was always a problem in the license trade. An English naval 
officer made a sizable business out of issuing licenses to American merchants and then 
ransoming vessels once they arrived in Lisbon.71  
While the Miser waited on the mail, the Topaz was released on December 10, 1812, after 
a month’s delay while the court awaited instructions from the British government. However, the 
damage the ship experienced while held in port delayed its shipment to Cadiz even further. 
Worse still, while the supercargo awaited the court’s decision in Gibraltar he was forced to watch 
as other American vessels arrived in port. The supercargo witnessed a visible display of the 
importance of arriving first at a market, as ships unloaded their cargoes and guaranteed profits 
for their owners. By December, news had arrived that the markets at Cadiz were overflowing 
with flour with approximately twenty-five American vessels already in port. John Bromfield in 
Cadiz reported home that only an American embargo would save the voyage by artificially 
increasing the price of flour.72 By February 1813 the entire venture seems to have been a wash. 
Perkins openly lamented his financial woes, stating that of the six shipments he had sent to Cadiz 
that year, “not one should have arrived without accident…”73 Added to this, Congress had taken 
up the issue of licenses again and Admiral Warren’s blockade of the southern ports of the United 
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States cut off a major source of American flour. Perkins worried that if the latest rumor of a 
French withdrawal from Spain was true, then the “Spaniards & Portuguese would be left to 
cultivate their fields in quiet…”74 Without the constant burden of two invading armies, the 
Peninsula would no longer need to rely on imports from America.  
Most of Perkins’s troubles in the winter of 1812 may be explained by the conditions 
faced by the British army in Spain. There appears to have been a direct correlation between the 
Duke of Wellington’s progress against the French army and the relative legality of a licensed 
grain shipment from America. Wellington, who always despised relying on American grain to 
feed his army, moved as quickly as possible to avoid any further dependence on a country 
currently at war with Great Britain.75 Unknown to investors on either side of the Atlantic, the 
licensed trade was quickly coming to an end. In fact, many were investing more in the Peninsula. 
Despite the numerous problems he faced in 1812, the following year Perkins promised to 
persevere, pushing for further shipments, and inquiring whether Samuel Williams in London 
could obtain more licenses for the Peninsula.  
Perkins’s profits were always susceptible to a sudden change in the trade winds. By 
funneling American grain into a single market, the British fueled their armies but they also 
ensured an eventual market glut. By the summer of 1813 prices for grain had dropped by two 
dollars a barrel, and the British were already considering alternative sources for grain from 
Egypt, Brazil and the Baltic. As a result, the tonnage of American vessels fell by almost 75 
percent between 1813 and 1814. Profitable grain shipments were further hindered by the Royal 
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Navy’s growing blockade which had divided America into friendly and unfriendly zones. The 
blockade severely disrupted local markets resulting in widespread uncertainty and price hikes. 
For example, Brian Arthur has found that, due to the blockade, a barrel of flour cost six dollars in 
Baltimore and almost twelve dollars in Boston. Similarly, Bostonians paid over double the cost 
of sugar compared to prices in New Orleans. As it became more difficult to move goods through 
America, markets became so isolated that they were entirely disconnected from the rest of the 
country.76  
The proceeds for Perkins’s shipments to Spain and Portugal were remitted to Henry 
Higginson and Samuel Williams of London, further emphasizing the interdependence of Anglo-
American trade. Just as in the previous years, London creditors continued to provide essential 
services for transatlantic commerce. Merchants depended on London bankers for credit and for 
news from Europe, but the license system and the war also made these connections more 
tenuous. Communication between America and Great Britain was closely watched by the U.S. 
government, which feared what Americans might reveal to their British contacts. When New 
York merchant Jonathan Ogden wrote to his partner and brother Robert Ogden in London, he 
informed Robert that any letters sent direct from London “will go to Washington to be there 
opened & it is frequently weeks before they get to my hands.”77 To counteract this, merchants 
developed tactics to circumvent the watchful gaze of authorities. When T.H. Perkins wished to 
contact Samuel Williams in London, he would write to Williams by way of H.T. Sampayo in 
Lisbon (the brother to F.T. Sampayo). Perkins instructed Sampayo to forward on his letters from 
Lisbon to his contacts in London. Perkins assured Williams that Sampayo could be trusted and 
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that Williams should transmit his responses to Lisbon or Cadiz to be then forwarded on to 
Boston.78 Other methods of maintaining communication relied on more local enemy ports such 
as Halifax, where the firm of Forsyth, Black & Co. assisted several American firms by 
forwarding letters to Europe and the West Indies. Canadian businesses acted as a conduit for 
American merchants looking to correspond with contacts in the British empire. Perkins himself 
maintained a constant correspondence with British-held Martinique and Guadeloupe, Plymouth, 
Liverpool and London by way of Halifax.79 Finally, the neutral Swedish island of St. 
Bartholomew’s acted as a further intermediary for Americans looking to ship goods past 
American and British cruisers as well as a neutral way station for secretly directing letters to the 
British empire.  
Purchasing licenses for neutral ports allowed Americans to maintain contact with their 
correspondents in Great Britain during the war. Yet this system of communication had its 
pitfalls. As Perkins experienced in 1812, timing was everything in the provisioning trade. When 
merchants were forced to rely on intermediaries to transmit important commercial information 
their communications were often delayed or even lost. In order to ensure delivery, duplicates of 
letters were sent through multiple channels with the hope that at least one would arrive at its 
intended destination. When Jonathan Ogden wished to communicate with the Liverpool firm of 
Hobsons & Bolton he directed one letter to be sent on a Portuguese vessel and another copy to be 
sent to St. Bartholomew’s. From St. Bartholomew’s, the letter was carried to Bermuda before 
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eventually being delivered to Liverpool.80 However, the process of duplication was always time-
sensitive and could potentially lead to costly errors or omissions further endangering the 
potential profits from these adventures. 
St. Bartholomew’s was not only a hub for correspondence between America and the 
British empire. Similar to the role played by St. Eustatius during the American Revolution, the 
island also acted as an important center for West Indian commerce during the War of 
1812.81 After the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, St. Eustatius was largely deserted by its population 
of cosmopolitan merchants in favor of the Danish island of St. Thomas and the Swedish island of 
St. Bartholomew’s. When it became too dangerous to leave an American port with a British 
license, ships would travel under a Swedish or Danish flag. Once St. Thomas was captured by 
the British in 1807, enterprising merchants were only left with one option. Hundreds of ships 
flocked to St. Bartholomew’s in the following years. Some American merchants even became 
Swedish subjects in order to neutralize their businesses. The trade in Swedish bottoms during the 
war appears very similar to previous neutral trades, with the exception that much of this traffic 
was now licensed by the British government.82 Licensing neutral commerce forced many to 
question the limits of legitimate neutrality.  
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Since Jefferson’s 1807 embargo, American interest in neutral papers had increased as a 
means of circumventing American commercial restrictions rather than offering any kind of 
protection from belligerent vessels. When the British began blockading the American coast in 
1813, merchants once again invested heavily in neutral shipping. Newspapers advertised vessels 
that ‘sails remarkably fast’ or guaranteed vessels ‘built in Sweden’ rather than simply naturalized 
with the appropriate documents. Others sold vessels which seemed capable of adopting whatever 
identity would meet the needs of the buyer, claiming ships “well calculated for the Swedish or 
Spanish trade.”83 For a time, these advertisements offered merchants hope of continuing their 
trade with the British empire, despite the embargo, blockade and legislation banning British 
licenses. 
Initially, the British intended to rely on neutral shipping to Bermuda rather than a neutral 
island to supply the West Indies. With the Order in Council of October 26, 1812, Great Britain 
had transformed Bermuda into the main port for foreign trade with the British West Indies. The 
Order authorized the importation of British sugar and coffee into the island for re-export to the 
United States. The Order further permitted the granting of licenses to any neutral ship to carry 
provisions from the United States to Bermuda. These goods were then redistributed throughout 
the West Indies. Finally, the Order allowed for the entry of American vessels under license into 
Bermuda, provided those ships originated from the ‘ports of the Eastern States exclusively.’84 
Even as an expedient wartime measure, the Order drastically undermined the exclusivity of 
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Britain’s colonial possessions. By opening the West Indies to foreign traffic, the government 
punctured a Bermuda-sized hole into the Navigation Act. Further, in adapting the West Indies to 
the licensed trade, Britain had confessed that the West Indies continued to rely on American 
supplies for their very survival.  
The plan to make Bermuda into the center of the West Indies was challenged from the 
very beginning. British merchants argued that Bermuda was too remote and that it would 
unnecessarily increase the cost of transshipment as well as add to the length of an individual 
voyage. The many inconveniences surrounding the Bermuda trade came to the forefront in 1813 
when hurricanes devastated the British West Indies. Once again, the Board of Trade was forced 
to consider how to reconcile the problem of immediate need with the mercantile philosophy of 
the Navigation Act. Neutral shipping direct to Bermuda was clearly not working, and a new 
strategy was needed in order to feed the colonists and the military forces stationed in the British 
West Indies. The Board’s short-term solution was to return to the spirit of the old system of 
proclamations by giving colonial governors the power to grant licenses.85 Within the space of a 
year, the hole in the Navigation Act had already expanded to undermine the entire commercial 
system.  
Desperate for relief, the government increasingly relied on neutral ports for supplies. St. 
Bartholomew’s transformation into the neutral entry-point into the British empire came about 
haphazardly. As early as November 1812, Admiral Warren was reporting to Whitehall that St. 
Bartholomew’s had already become the main ‘entrepot’ for supplying the West Indies. Warren 
had received applications for licenses to St. Bartholomew’s for American and neutral vessels and 
was unsure of how to proceed. In the application for a license, Consul Andrew Allen stated to 
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Warren that just as St. Eustatius and St. Thomas were used in previous wars as ‘mediums of 
communication’, now St. Bartholomew’s could serve the same purpose for the British. Allen 
noted that while it was illegal for an American ship to directly trade with the enemy by taking a 
British license for a British port, St. Bartholomew’s could serve as a viable alternative. Allen’s 
proposal even spelled out the form of the license for Warren in order to avoid any violation of 
U.S. law.86 Neutral commerce, which had so long worked against the interests of the empire, 
now worked for it. The American Prizes Act of February 1, 1813, modified previous Orders in 
Council to allow belligerents to sell their ships to neutrals. The details of the Act were then 
forwarded on to the Governor of St. Bartholomew’s. This was, in effect, “the tacit approval from 
Whitehall of American trade under the Swedish flag.”87 Recognizing the significance of this new 
policy, colonial governors began explicitly licensing British vessels to stop at St. Bartholomew’s 
before proceeding to a U.S. port.  
The wholesale takeover of the neutral trade was a great victory for the empire, but to the 
military, it was a further sign of weakness. Though Admiral Warren depended on these 
provisions to support his winter base in the West Indies, he nevertheless believed that the license 
system was too unwieldy. In Warren’s view, the blockade of the American coast proved 
ineffective so long as American merchants could pass British forces freely under neutral cover. 
Further, Warren questioned the effectiveness of a blockade while the enemy government 
continued to collect customs revenue.88 
The trade between St. Bartholomew’s and the British West Indies focused on the 
transshipment of goods through the island. As the stated port of destination, St. Bartholomew’s 
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neutralized a voyage and protected the shipper from capture, namely from the American 
privateers swarming into the Caribbean. The journey of the Flora, for example, highlights how 
this new trade played out amid war, blockades and a sea of privateers. In February 1813, the 
Flora, owned by Samuel Blagge of Boston, traveled from St. Bartholomew’s for New York with 
a cargo of sugar, molasses and hides consigned to Blagge’s contact in New York, Robert Dickey. 
Having learned that the customs officer for the port of New York was targeting vessels with 
colonial produce from St. Bartholomew’s, the Flora changed course for Connecticut and the 
ports of New Haven and New London. These two ports had grown over the course of the war to 
become the principal smuggling sites for the Atlantic coast of the United States. After six 
months, their reputation was already so notorious that they were known by U.S. officials as the 
‘St. Bartholomew’s of America’.89 After landing the Flora’s cargo, the goods were shipped 
overland to New York. Arrangements were made for the Flora to pick up a return cargo for St. 
Bartholomew’s by travelling in ballast to New York. The Flora left New York carrying 
important letters from American merchants to their neutral contacts in St. Bartholomew’s. The 
correspondents warned that much of the American coast was now blockaded, but that the ports 
north of New York were safe for neutral shipping. The story of the Flora shows how commercial 
restrictions had the potential to shift international trade to new markets. In Europe, the ports of 
Heligoland and Malta had gained new importance as avenues for subverting the Continental 
System. Similarly, St. Bartholomew’s, New Haven and New London became major hubs for the 
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redistribution of colonial produce and grain. This idea was crystallized by Blagge’s New York 
partner who noted that even though most ports were blockaded by the Royal Navy and the war 
was set to continue, “Our markets for West India produce is again looking up.”90  
Like all neutral trades, the trade with St. Bartholomew’s relied on the active use of 
multiple identities in order to outmaneuver privateers and customs officials. The case of the 
Albion alias Anna Catharina, taken by a British privateer in November 1813, shows how this 
multifaceted trade worked. The ship’s multiple names give an early indication of how 
complicated identity could become in the St. Bartholomew’s trade. The Albion was owned by an 
American, Richard Foster Breed, who ran a merchant firm in Liverpool, England. In order to 
protect itself from capture by American privateers, the Albion traveled with Swedish documents 
and under a Swedish name, Anna Catharina. The ship’s papers reveal that the supercargo, David 
Austin of Boston, was instructed to first stop in St. Bartholomew’s for information on the West 
Indian markets. Though the ship and cargo were claimed as British property, Breed instructed 
Austin to consider trying the markets in the Spanish and French West Indies. Given its multiple 
identities and destinations, the captors believed that there was every reason to suspect that the 
Albion was in fact American property. In the initial years after the Essex decision, the court 
probably would have agreed. However, the captors were unable to convince the Admiralty Court 
of Appeals which refused to condemn the vessel as a lawful prize.91 In the eyes of the court, the 
use of a license, the avoidance of American privateers, the British owner, and the trade with St. 
Bartholomew’s trumped the possibility of American collusion. 
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Many vessels leaving America for St. Bartholomew’s never actually made it to the 
Caribbean, instead these vessels leveraged their Swedish papers to travel to Halifax. In 
December 1812, 20,000 barrels of flour arrived in Halifax from Boston under neutral colors.92 
Isaac Clason reported on the trade in Halifax to James Madison, stating, “The enemy are 
regularly fed by Swedes or by pretended Swedes, with forged papers from Halifax.”93 To avoid 
suspicious authorities, merchants were forced to become increasingly creative in their schemes to 
ship goods under neutral colors to the British empire. Neutral vessels landed their cargoes in 
Nova Scotia at night or even met with the blockading squadron off the coast of the United States. 
In one case, a ship under Swedish colors was stopped by a suspicious customs officer and 
searched thoroughly for any incriminating documents. The ship was officially destined for the 
neutral port of Fayal, but the customs officer discovered a British license hidden in a jug which 
indicated that the ship was really heading to Halifax.94  
Since the embargo of 1807, the local economies in British North America had greatly 
benefited from the disappearance of American shipping. Goods smuggled from America were 
transshipped by vessels from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia to the West Indies. During the 
embargo of 1807, these ports handled more shipping than the entire U.S. merchant fleet.95 British 
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North America’s new commercial role only became more important during the war. While many 
merchants engaged in outright smuggling along the border of British North America, the 
transshipment of U.S. goods was a far more important trade for both sides. By October 13, 1812, 
an Order in Council opened the ports of Halifax, St. John and St. Andrew’s to a licensed trade 
with the United States. Since U.S. ships could not legally depart for an enemy port, merchants 
arranged for the capture of their own vessels in order to fool authorities in the U.S. that the 
shipments were not intended for the enemy.96  
A neutral ship could only provide so much protection from American privateers or the 
Royal Navy. Several contemporary newspapers followed the capture of vessels accused of 
violating their neutrality. In January 1814, Niles Weekly Register reported on the capture of the 
Swedish schooner Neutrality from St. Bartholomew’s. Despite its neutral flag and neutral origin, 
the Neutrality was captured by an American privateer “on suspicion of coming from Halifax.”97 
While there were many reports that British traders were covering their trades with neutral papers, 
particular scorn was reserved for those former American vessels that were now under Swedish 
colors and British licenses. American vessels would leave the United States and clear customs 
for St. Bartholomew’s but these vessels rarely unloaded any cargo on the island. According to 
Nathaniel Strong, the American agent in St. Bartholomew’s, “not more than half of the vessels 
and sail from the United States…ever were in the island, they proceed direct to the islands of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Traffic: The Commerce of the Champlain-Richelieu Corridor During the War of 1812,” Vermont History 44, no. 2 
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97 Niles Weekly Register, 29 Jan. 1814. In March 1814 Niles reported on the capture of another Swedish ship 
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enemy and return from them under forged clearances.”98 Like the American trade to St. Eustatius 
in the 1780s, St. Bartholomew’s was merely a way station into the British empire.  
Along with destination, there was also a question of the actual identity of the owners of 
the vessels engaged in this trade. Privateers, the U.S. Navy, American spies in the British West 
Indies, and even the British Admiralty Courts all admitted that neutral ships were often secretly 
owned by British or American merchants.99 American privateers enjoyed great success bringing 
in vessels carrying Swedish papers and British licenses. In March 1814, the Niles Weekly 
Register claimed that American privateers had captured nearly forty vessels worth an estimated 
two million dollars in the space of a month. Many of these prizes were neutrals traveling 
between neutral ports and listed in the Register as ‘supposed British’ or ‘called a Spaniard, but 
with a British license’.100 The following months carried more lists of captured neutral ships. 
These captures were justified as it was generally believed that there was a direct link between 
neutral license holders and the continued strength of the British military. When a British Vice-
Admiralty Court zealously condemned several vessels sailing under the Swedish flag, the Niles 
Weekly Register applauded the enemy court’s move against perceived traitors.  
British privateers were also deeply uncomfortable with the new status-quo. As shown 
above, privateers continued to use post-Essex justifications for bringing in ships: enemy crews, 
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suspicious documents and problematic destinations. While their methods had not changed, the 
higher court’s treatment of the St. Bartholomew’s trade seemed to completely disregard enemy 
ownership of neutral vessels. When a British privateer brought the Robert of St. Bartholomew’s 
into Antigua, he declared that the ship had sailed from a blockaded port and there were further 
reasons “to infer that the property belonged to the enemy.”101 The Robert sailed from St. 
Bartholomew’s in 1813 with colonial produce, landed goods at New Haven, and departed for 
Barbados with a cargo of flour. The Robert intended to trade with both sides of a war, profiting 
at each end of the voyage. In earlier years, this was grounds for condemnation. Further, the 
owners of the Robert, Elbers and Krafft of St. Bartholomew’s, had several other vessels captured 
by British privateers – a fact that was generally interpreted as evidence of guilt. However, on 
each occasion, Elbers and Krafft prevailed in the Admiralty Court of Appeals.102 In effect, the St. 
Bartholomew’s trade with the British West Indies was more vital than any potential revenue 
from prizes taken by British privateers. 
In 1813, Perkins’s firm struggled to make the transition to the neutral trade in Swedish 
bottoms after the devastating losses which had occurred the previous year in Spain. Perkins 
wrote dejectedly to an associate in Martinique that ‘business was dull’ and with the blockade of 
all of the ports south of New York, supplies could only come in neutral bottoms.103 Perkins’s 
poor experience with the license system helps to explain why he testified at the trial of Andrew 
Allen to verify Allen’s signature on the British licenses granted to several Boston merchants.104 
It would take until December 1814 before Perkins felt confident enough to recommend his 
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contacts ship any more goods for America. On December 31, 1814, Perkins could no longer 
resist engaging in the neutral trade. He wrote to a contact in St. Bartholomew’s that the 
uncertainty of the war had depressed the market, but the latest news hinted that the war would 
continue for a number of years, if true, “the price of sugar & coffee must be very high & will 
probably induce us to take the hazards of shipments to y[ou]r place in which case we shall have 
the pleasure to address you.”105 Five days later, Perkins sent a similar letter to another resident of 
St. Bartholomew’s soliciting a potential business opportunity. Perkins informed his contacts on 
the neutral Swedish island that they should respond to his letters via Forsyth, Black & Co. of 
Halifax or Samuel Williams in London. Like his business in Spain, Perkins’s latest scheme was 
ill-timed as the war had already ended before his letters even arrived at their intended 
destination. Nevertheless, the letters themselves are important. Even when business dried up and 
the Royal Navy’s blockade covered the entire American coast, Perkins still actively maintained 
his contacts in the empire. In writing these letters Perkins continued a tradition of American 
merchants since independence of relying on British contacts to relay information, protect his 
interests, conceal his business and advocate for him with the authorities. The information, 
however discouraging, that Perkins collected from his British contacts was the most important 
commodity in his possession.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The license trade was the culmination of decades of reforms of the navigation system of the 
British empire. By 1807, with nearly complete control over the seas, the British claimed sole 
authority to regulate international trade in the Atlantic. In this sense, licensing fulfilled the 
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ambitions of the Navigation Acts by banning all foreign traffic not permitted by the British 
government. Licensing decisively tipped the balance of trade in Britain’s favor. As the sole 
purveyor of colonial goods, Britain had become the world’s marketplace. The power of this 
monopoly to reshape the market is clear. As the license trade reveals, foreign consumers and 
merchants actively broke their own society's laws to gain access to products only the empire 
sold. Despite popular misgivings, many were more than happy to form a partnership with the 
‘tyrant of the ocean’. 
While licensing was a testament to the adaptability of mercantilist policy to meet a crisis, 
the system also greatly weakened the effectiveness of the Navigation Act. Even though only 
licensed British traders were able to move freely through the Atlantic, it was now incredibly easy 
to become a British trader. The text of the license stipulated that everyone ‘not French’ could 
obtain a license. After paying a fee, these licensed traders carried British products to foreign 
countries or, worse still, they returned home with a cargo of specie drained straight from British 
coffers. The government attempted to rectify the deficiencies in licensing by constantly adjusting 
the system and ending licensed trades as soon as a market was sustainable. But the damage was 
already done.106 For the short term, the empire depended heavily on foreign shipping to move 
goods and information until the war ended. Looking forward into the nineteenth century, it is 
clear that licensing greatly contributed to the downward spiral of Britain’s closed navigation 
system. 
Licensing also further complicated British identity. The empire had struggled with 
distinguishing British subjects from Americans since the end of the American Revolution. By the 
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1805 Essex decision, the British finally had a response to Americanness: Americans were 
enemies, little better than the French in the eyes of the courts. Within three years, many 
Americans were suddenly transformed into licensed British traders working to actively support 
the empire’s war effort. Even with the outbreak of war in the summer of 1812, there seemed to 
be a strong belief within the British government that the commercial interest in America was 
aligned with Britain. It was believed that this interest would never support the war and by 
purchasing a license, these merchants had already taken a side. Instead of supporting the war, 
through various channels, American merchants actively supported their nation’s enemy by 
sending supplies to Canada, the West Indies and Europe. The War of 1812 may have helped 
many in America distance themselves from their legacy as a colony of the British empire, but the 
war also emphasized the continued interdependence of American and British trade.   
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Conclusion  
 
This dissertation has focused on continuity in the Age of Revolution. After spilling a lot 
of blood and gold to win independence, American merchants smuggled, falsified, and negotiated 
their way back into the British Empire. Despite the supposed rupture caused by their colonial 
revolution against the mother country, American merchants saw no contradiction in their newly 
won identity and their place within the empire. Likewise, a period that began with the British 
government viewing disloyal members of the empire as ‘bayonet subjects’ ended with licensed 
American traders, whose loyalty to the crown began and ended with the wartime commercial 
privileges the license purchased. In the end, belonging within the British Empire could not be 
broken down into simple binaries of loyal subject and foreigner. One could in fact appear 
disloyal or even independent and still belong. The innumerable configurations of foreigners who 
participated in the empire challenges the traditional trajectory of modern citizenship outlined by 
most historians.  
Continuity is also evident in the two Anglo-American wars which bookend this study. 
During the revolution, American merchants joined British, French, and Spanish merchants as 
Dutch burghers on the neutral island of St. Eustatius. Similarly, British and American merchants 
relocated to the Swedish island of St. Bartholomew’s, and after paying a naturalization fee, the 
merchants turned the island into a conduit for trade traveling between the West Indies and the 
United States during the embargo and War of 1812. For both St. Eustatius and St. 
Bartholomew’s, peace brought economic disaster as merchants relocated to more traditional 
ports. Those who remained attempted to take advantage of the opening of South American 
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markets and portrayed the island as a free port for supplying privateers, but St. Bartholomew’s 
had little to offer in peacetime amidst an expanding sea of free ports.1 
At the end of both wars, the association between the two countries remained so entangled 
that no one was quite sure if America retained access to the West Indies, despite the confident 
pronouncements of popular pamphleteers to the ‘Alien States of America’.2 At the end of the 
War of 1812, Petty Vaughan, a merchant in London, informed his brother William in Maine: “I 
cannot yet learn whether the late treaty admits American vessels to the WI, let me know if you 
can.”3 Even when Petty learned that all shipments to the British West Indies were once again 
confined to British ships, this did not necessarily clear up the confusion. Americans simply 
purchased shares in British vessels and indirect shipments of American supplies continued to 
flow into the empire via Bermuda.4  
In the state’s own pursuit of continuity, the period from 1783 to 1815 was also defined by 
experimentation in the empire. Forced to confront former British subjects, who no longer owed 
allegiance to the crown, the British government proved equally adaptable. The Board of Trade 
pressured governors to avoid opening the ports to American merchants at all costs, making every 
breach of the Navigation Act an uncomfortable balance between famine and loyalty. Privateers 
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deconstructed Americanness on the high seas by using suspicious conduct to unmask secret 
identities. The direction of a ship at sea became a marker of identity, as the crew of the Osiris 
discovered when their ship was seized based on the route they had chosen and the allegedly 
superior maritime judgment of the British privateer. Meanwhile, the British admiralty courts 
determined nationality by relying on temporary residence and intention rather than merely birth. 
In fact, admiralty court cases revealed a much more nuanced understanding of international 
commerce than is traditionally assumed. The courts were forced to negotiate through 
complicated international partnerships with often overlapping identities and businesses 
seemingly at once working for and against the British war effort.5 Even with the arrival of peace 
with the Treaty of Ghent, national identity remained malleable for both the state and individuals 
willing to cross borders.  
Though scholars have identified the latter-half of the eighteenth-century as a particularly 
extreme tropical storm cycle, those living in the Greater Caribbean in the nineteenth century 
experienced drastic temperature fluctuations, earthquakes, and hurricanes all of which created 
new opportunities for disaster relief. The 1831 hurricane which struck the British West Indies 
threatened St. Vincent and Barbados with starvation. However, while the destruction remained a 
constant facet of Caribbean life, the official response had changed. The massive windfalls 
experienced by American merchants in the 1780s were largely diminished by increased 
government aid and the liberalization of foreign trade with European colonies. The continued 
danger of slave revolt or colonial revolution added greater urgency for governments to provide 
support for endangered colonies in order to guarantee their loyalty and stave off rebellion.6 
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The conclusion of the war destabilized the Caribbean, leading American and British ship-
owners to compete in a trade war for the right to provision the British colonies and access 
Spanish American markets. The independence movements in Latin America served as a capstone 
to a nearly fifty-year effort on the part of the British to openly trade with the Spanish Empire. 
Britain’s free ports in the Caribbean, which encouraged smuggling efforts into rival imperial 
systems, now faced unwanted competition by enterprising American merchants once the war had 
ended.7 Tensions between the two countries remained so high that when James Buckley of New 
York wrote to his British contacts in March 1815 with news of peace, he warned that peace 
might be short lived: “The success that the Americans have most with at sea seems to have 
inspired them with the idea that the day is not far distant when they shall be able to humble the 
pride of the British navy.”8 While competition was primarily about access to restricted markets, 
the ultimate goal was never the absolute collapse of all commercial barriers, but the pursuit of 
exclusive privileges.  
The march toward free trade in the nineteenth century was not smooth or even universally 
supported by the mercantile community. Rather, merchants continued to take advantage of the 
licit and illicit opportunities created by the state’s regulation of the economy. Scholars used to 
assume that British faith in mercantilism had waned by 1783, but increasingly peace in 1815 is 
seen as the marker for a change in economic philosophy.9 However, the years after the war saw a 
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doubling down on traditional commercial policies within the empire. Facing the reinvigoration of 
the Corn Laws and the Navigation Act, the United States invested in its own mercantilist 
policies.10 Much like the empire’s support of neutral traffic under the licensing system, the 
British only willingly supported free trade once Great Britain dominated international commerce. 
Support for liberal economic policies occurred in fits and starts. The Corn Laws were 
continuously modified between 1828 and repeal in 1846 while the Navigation Acts remained 
casually enforced until 1849. The repeal of both of these regulations, essential cornerstones of 
early modern political economy, carried more political than economic weight by mid-century.11 
If mercantilist policies were a ‘jumble of devices’ designed to meet particular interests, the 
transition to free trade did not occur as a wholesale adoption of a new philosophy. Rather, free 
trade, like mercantilism, came out of composite interests pushing against the privileges of the 
competition.12  
Adopting free trade not only entailed a change in British commercial policy, but also a 
complete redefinition of British identity. During the eighteenth century, the British based 
conceptions of loyalty and belonging around the Navigation Act. These beliefs were made even 
more evident in the years after American independence. In the words of Lord Sheffield, the 
Navigation Act was “the guardian of the prosperity of Britain,” by guaranteeing protection for 
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Britain’s shipping and a nursery of seamen for the empire.13 The Navigation Act was also the 
moral compass of the empire as it distinguished Britons from the avaricious character of other 
commercial peoples. Gradually, free trade supplanted adherence to the Navigation Act as the 
standard for Britishness in the nineteenth century. For Victorians, free trade was the marker 
which distinguished the British from Continental protectionism.14 Finally, just as protectionist 
policies benefitted from the growth of the state in the eighteenth-century, the philosophical turn 
towards free trade encouraged this trend. With free trade came the establishment of national 
customs enforcement agencies and further constraints on the easy movement of men and material 
across borders and nationalities. 
For Americans, the process of ‘unbecoming British’, to use a phrase coined by Kariann 
Yokota, was long drawn out.15 As this study has shown, it would be inaccurate to chart a linear 
trajectory for the development of American cultural identity. After playing with the ambiguities 
of political independence in their commercial pursuits for almost a decade, Americans used their 
nationality as a neutral shield during the Napoleonic Wars. However, if American nationality 
discourse increasingly became associated with republicanism, free trade, and sailor’s rights at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, it nevertheless failed to check the overwhelming popularity 
of the licensing system (with all of its British associations) among the commercial classes in the 
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United States.16 Instead, the check on American commercial entanglement with Great Britain 
came as a result of market forces after the war. The repeated depredations on American 
commerce, despite licensing, thoroughly disenchanted many transatlantic merchants. Merchants 
like T.H. Perkins and Nicholas Low increasingly turned toward manufacturing, finance, and land 
speculation as the provisioning trade dried up. This is reflected in the personal correspondence of 
Perkins who complained at the end of 1815: “The harvest of American Commerce has been 
reaped, and a scanty crop will be gathered in future.”17 The decline of early modern merchant 
practices did not end the close commercial relationship between the two countries. Just as in the 
first decade after independence, Americans in the nineteenth century continued to consume vast 
quantities of British manufactures. Yet by this late period American consumers expected goods 
to reflect their own cultural tastes rather than to serve as an emulation of British elites.18  
Scholars contend that the Atlantic World effectively ended by the middle of the 
nineteenth century. After all, the Atlantic World was a distinctively early modern moment, a 
period of transition and experimentation. In the Caribbean and South America, the ten years after 
the Napoleonic Wars continued to perpetuate the main characteristics of that world. The 
destruction of the Spanish Empire renewed transimperial cooperation as new frontiers were 
formed and individuals freely crossed imperial borders.19 The revolt of the Latin American 
colonies against Spanish imperial control also provided a commercial opportunity and crisis as 
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52; D’Maris Coffman and Adrian Leonard, “The Atlantic World: Definition, Theory, and Boundaries,” in The 
Atlantic World, ed. William O’Reilly, D’Maris Coffman, and Adrian Leonard (London: Routledge, 2015). 
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armed bands of men joined multinational ships and waged war on the high seas. In 1818 the 
Boston Daily Advertiser carried a vivid description of one pirate crew: “The crew of the pirate 
appeared to consist almost entirely of Irishmen, Englishmen, and Americans; and all those who 
came on board of us (the boarding officer in particular) seemed to be most determined 
robbers.”20 While many at the time, and since, saw such crews as a throwback to an earlier age of 
piracy, it seems more accurate to view these multinational crews through the lens of continuity. 
Even after the 1815, mariners on the periphery could still contest the growing rationalization of 
citizenship and national identity under the law by taking advantage of the opportunities and 
confusion brought on by war.21  
The period from 1783 to 1815 was a moment of enormous commercial opportunity. The 
instability of the British Empire brought on by American independence, environmental disaster, 
and transatlantic revolution allowed foreign merchants to push against the periphery and access 
technically forbidden markets. For American merchants operating outside of empire, the 
persistence of transatlantic networks of information, from official and commercial sources, 
offered a steady supply of news and rumor for navigating around the latest mercantile 
restrictions, or tactics for self-fashioning voyages to fool customs authorities. The loopholes 
created by the empire’s inconsistent governance allowed merchants to exploit the system’s 
weaknesses in order to turn a profit.  
The experience of the merchants outlined in this study challenges the traditional 
narratives of this period as one of revolutionary rupture and the birth of modern concepts of 
                                                 
20 Boston Daily Advertiser, 8 Sept. 1818. 
21 For more on the legal definition of citizenship for sailors, see, Raffety, The Republic Afloat: Law, Honor, and 
Citizenship in Maritime America; For the British case, one can discern the definition of mariner identity through the 
exemptions granted to Parliament, see, Brunsman, The Evil Necessity: British Naval Impressment in the Eighteenth-
Century Atlantic World; For a standard view of nineteenth-century piracy, see, Peter Earle, The Pirate Wars (New 
York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2013), chap. 11. 
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citizenship and loyalty to the state. Those engaged in overseas trade resisted nationalizing 
movements by undermining imperial borders and upending the relationship between center and 
periphery. While cosmopolitan practices pushed against nationalization, merchants were not 
merely passive witnesses to the era, rather they seized advantage of the opportunities created by 
revolution and war. For merchants, the Age of Revolution was the last early modern moment. 
The Age of Revolution, however, was also an age of experimentation for the empire. While 
initially this experimentation was meant to maintain the continuity of the First British Empire, 
something new was created in its stead. Early modern traditions of ineffectual regulations and 
malleable national identity soon gave way to the modern forces of nationalism and civic 
responsibility to the state. In this new modern world, it was less possible and far less profitable to 
purchase Dutch citizenship, a Swedish bottom, or a British license. 
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